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Abstract 
The lived experience of depression is taken as a starting point for this research 
which aims to document and explore the variety of experiences of depression among 
a diverse sample of participants who have been diagnosed with and/or self-report as 
having had an experience or experiences of depression, either currently or in the 
past. Using Q-methodology and drawing on social constructionism and existential-
phenomenology (particularly the work of Kenneth Gergen, Rom Harré and Martin 
Heidegger), I ask the questions ‘How do participants experience (clinical and non-
clinical/self-identified) depression? How do participants’ experiences resemble or 
differ from established psychiatric and clinical psychology accounts of depression 
and how might the findings be relevant to existential counselling psychology 
practice? There were two phases to this empirical study. Firstly, a preliminary focus 
group study was conducted using a ‘clinical’ and a ‘non-clinical’ group and thematic 
analysis was used to analyse the data which provided information and materials for 
the development of the concourse of statements used in the main sorting task. 
Secondly, the main Q-methodological study required 46 participants to sort (online) a 
series of 58 experiential statements along a continuum ‘most like me when I’m 
depressed’ to ‘least like me when I’m depressed.’ Nine of these statements were 
based upon the current DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for major depression. Principal 
component’s factor analysis produced eight interpretable factors which represent 
eight different (but shared) experiences of depression as follows; 1) ‘Clinical’/suicidal 
depression, 2) The ‘blues’/overcoming loss and bereavement, 3) Anxious/’anti-
clinical’ depression, 4) Emotionally devoid/isolated depression, 5) Sadness and 
loss/surviving depression, 6) Alienated/helpless depression, 7) The ‘blues’/surviving 
through self-reliance, 8) Loss of meaning/depression as part of the cycle of life. 
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These different experiences are explicated in detail and in relation to the placement 
of the DSM diagnostic statements. Only one of the factors showed a strong similarity 
to the DSM criteria while all the other factors revealed experiences that may not be 
captured by those measures. The results are considered in relation to social 
constructionist critiques and existential-phenomenological philosophy. Finally, the 
relevance of the findings for existential-phenomenological counselling psychology 
practice is discussed. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The notion of ‘depression’ as an enduring sad, low, melancholic mood is one that 
has meaning not just at a personal level for those who have experienced it, including 
the families, friends and loved ones of those who are affected, but also in broader 
cultural terms - from its representation in art, music and literature through to the 
ways that science, especially via the knowledges and practices of medicine and 
psychiatry, has sought to map the truth of, and above all to document and treat the 
pathology of, this particular lived experience. This complex and multi-layered order 
through which depression has meaning for both clients and for professionals and 
practitioners has, for some time, been dominated by medical and psychiatric 
accounts, including those found within ‘Abnormal’ and Clinic psychology, which 
occupy a privileged place among the various representations with respect to their 
claims to truth. Here I advocate a different, alternative view and in this thesis I set out 
to take the lived experience of depression (or put another way, its phenomenology) 
as the starting point in the research and seek to explore a social constructionist and 
existential interpretation that is grounded in participants’ own accounts of what their 
depression is like. By exploring such a constructionist and existential-
phenomenological understanding of depression I seek to offer some kind of 
constructive critique of accounts which, for me, take an overly narrow perspective in 
trying to understand the lived experience of depression. Moreover, I also seek to 
explore the experience of depression in a way that fits well with and informs a 
phenomenological approach to counselling psychology practice and to enable me to 
add my voice to those calling for the humanist/phenomenological value base that, for 
 
12 
 
many of us, defines counselling psychology as a distinctive practice/profession, to be 
upheld, promoted and defended within and without psychology. 
Thus, the overall aim of this thesis is to, despite the seeming familiarity of the 
term, map some of the complexity and the rich variety of ways in which persons can 
experience that which we name depression, and to contribute to the development of 
an existential understanding of those experiences in a way that is not limited by or, 
indeed, overly dismissive of, clinical psychology and medical accounts - for example 
those found within the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-
5). 
At this point I wish to say something about the way I intend to tackle this 
project and write this thesis. It is important to me that this thesis not only presents 
meaningful and useful empirical research but that it is presented in a way that is fully 
personal and reflexive. Following this, it is also important to me that this thesis takes 
a critical and questioning stance, not only towards the theory and practice of 
psychology and counselling psychology but also towards its own theoretical and 
methodological frameworks. Critical reflection has been central to my work as an 
academic over many years and my more recent work as a psychology practitioner. In 
particular, I see critical reflection as a deeply personal practice, it is something that 
arises very naturally for me and is a way of working that fits well with my personal 
ethics, my politics and my values, which I aim to explicitly include in my writing. 
1.2 The background to the project 
The research undertaken here came about as a development of my long-standing 
interest in the medicalisation and pathologisation1 of human conduct and of what 
                                                          
1 Meaning to regard or characterise persons, experiences and behaviours as medically or 
psychologically abnormal. 
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might be termed problems in living. This concern has a special resonance with 
current debates and controversies concerning the identity and philosophical basis for 
counselling psychology as a profession (see Woolfe, 2016). In particular, it connects 
with the current desire/concern that Counselling Psychology should or could become 
integrated or subsumed with Clinical Psychology (with its continued reliance upon 
mainstream psychological science and medical models of psychopathology) or a 
generic Applied Psychology (Anonymous, 2009; Gidding, 2009; Turpin, 2009).  I 
have previously researched and written about discourse and power relations in 
psychotherapeutic practice, radio counselling and the overhearing audience, how the 
later ‘ethical’ work of Michel Foucault might contribute to an understanding of power 
relations in counselling theory and practice and the strengths and pitfalls of using 
psychoanalysis in counselling practice with sexual minority clients. All of these 
projects have involved a questioning and critiquing of what might be termed 
‘dominant discourses’ and the relations of power, subordination and oppression that 
we so often take for granted and therefore fail to recognise. This current project 
enables me to further develop my interests in existential-phenomenological 
methodology and counselling psychology practice along with my earlier, long-
standing interests in social constructionism, Q methodology and the potentially 
oppressive aspects of psychological discourse and practice (Hodges, 1998; 2002; 
2007, 2011). 
This project employs a broadly social constructionist theoretical and 
conceptual framework, in particular drawing on the work of Kenneth Gergen, Rom 
Harré and the post-structuralist work of Michel Foucault while adopting an 
existential-phenomenological approach to method and methodology, in particular 
drawing on the work of Martin Heidegger. It is important to note that while social 
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constructionism forms the overall conceptual backdrop to the thesis, the key aim is to 
explore the lived experience of depression through an existential-phenomenological 
lens. Also, bringing these two frameworks together necessitates an 
acknowledgement of the tensions, critiques and disagreements both within and 
between their respective theories and practices, which I discuss in Chapters 2 and 7. 
The seeds of this current project were sown several years ago while I was an 
undergraduate student at the University of Reading during the late 1980s. My deep 
commitment to the utility and value of psychological theory and practice transformed 
during that period into a radical questioning of the discipline. Although I was initially 
enthralled by psychology and in particular by the idea of studying human beings, 
their thoughts, their feelings, their behaviour, I rapidly began to question much of 
what I was being taught. In particular, I felt uncomfortable with the kinds of 
reductionism and (over) generalisation that was presented as part of mainstream 
experimental psychology. I am very thankful that by my second year I discovered -
through the great knowledge and inspirational teaching of one of my tutors, the late 
Rex Stainton-Rogers - an intellectual space and most importantly a whole new 
vocabulary for articulating my concerns and my doubts, especially with regard to 
what I felt to be the oppressive, or at lease potentially oppressive, aspects of 
mainstream psychological research and practice.  
One key element of my personal growth at that time was my introduction to 
the social constructionist movement within psychology and what we now call Critical 
Psychology (see Fox, Prilleltensky and Austin, 2009). Rex Stainton Rogers, through 
his incisive, thoughtful and often very amusing lectures and seminars on a range of 
alternative perspectives (Critical Psychology did not exist as a sub-discipline then), 
showed me a new vocabulary which enabled me to gradually find my voice in 
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opposition to much of what I saw as problematic in psychological theory and practice 
at that time. In particular, although I had begun my degree with the keen intent to 
take up clinical psychology, by the end of my second year I had entirely changed my 
thinking. I began to see clinical psychology, especially as it was then, as a dividing, 
pathologising, and sometimes dehumanising practice. These days I do not feel quite 
as strongly as I once did, however I do feel that many of the concerns I had nearly 
30 years ago are, regrettably, still valid today, although sometimes to a lesser 
degree.  
Critical Psychology has gainfully occupied me from the time I began to 
develop my academic career in 1989 and ever since. This has not been an easy 
career path to follow not least because, although somewhat reduced now, there has 
been and there still remains hostility within the discipline towards the kinds of 
critiques and alternatives presented by Critical Psychologists. Despite this however, 
the sub discipline has been something that has enabled me to work as an academic 
in a way that has been personally more meaningful and authentic.  
While social constructionism provided me with a key way in which to 
contextualise and meaningfully critique what I saw as problematic within the 
discipline, at the same time I was introduced, through Rex, to Q methodology as an 
alternative and potentially radical psychological method. I used Q methodology for 
my final year project looking at accounts and understandings of depression. That 
project was more an ‘attitudes’ and opinions piece rather than looking at the lived 
experience of depression itself - as I aim to do here. Looking back, my 
undergraduate project was, of course, tied up with my personal struggles, especially 
my struggle in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s regarding my sexual identity as a gay 
man and the profound sadness that I often felt throughout that period. I have a 
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strong memory of that time that has stayed with me. I am sitting in my room (in a Hall 
of Residence in Reading), alone and in the dark, feeling a deep and stultifying 
sadness and wondering how on earth I can carry on knowing that as a gay man my 
life is bound to be sad and miserable, perhaps even intolerable. That memory has 
stayed with me not only because those feelings were part of an often difficult and 
painful process of gradually coming to accept and then to value and appreciate 
myself, but also because, in my work both as an academic and a practitioner, I 
continue to hear similar stories from students and clients which reflect the enduring 
difficulties that sexual minority women and men face in coming out to themselves 
and others, even today.  At the same time, 27 years on, I am grateful to have 
matured and developed, (mostly) made peace with that period and become much 
more comfortable in my own skin. Moreover, I have at the same time developed a 
deeper and more fully embodied understanding of my own sad moods and the ways 
these are part of who and what I am. 
Aside from the formal aims of the thesis which I present shortly, my personal 
interest is to play a part in questioning and critiquing the pathologisation of 
depression and the over reliance on bio-medical accounts in Clinical and other areas 
of psychology, for example Abnormal Psychology. These issues link not only with 
debates concerning the philosophy and identity of the profession of Counselling 
Psychology but also with my own personal identity as a counselling psychologist. 
Thus, I see this thesis as an important means through which I can explore and 
further develop my own counselling practice, my sense of how I work with clients and 
what existential-phenomenological counselling psychology practice means to me. In 
the next part of this chapter I present a brief summary introduction of what is meant 
by the term depression, from a medical/clinical and then an existential perspective, 
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and go on to outline the aims and objectives of the research. I present the particular 
existential-phenomenological approach utilised in this thesis later on when I discuss 
methodology in Chapter 4. 
1.3 What is depression? 
The term ‘depression’ holds currency both as a psychiatric diagnosis or syndrome 
and also as a lay or ‘everyday’ expression. Feeling depressed is not only a common 
experience for many persons but also a phenomenon which is deeply embedded in 
Western cultures through art, literature, music, the media, popular and professional 
science and a wide range of other images and representations. The lay term 
depression is usually taken to mean a very sad mood, a state of mind determined by 
the negative prevailing emotions which commonly include sadness and melancholia, 
fear, anxiety, guilt, and often hopelessness and loneliness. More formal 
scientific/psychiatric definitions in the psychological literature refer to depression as 
an ‘affect disorder’ which when mild and relatively short lived is quite normal and 
fairly commonplace. However, where the depression is intense and longer term the 
sufferer may be diagnosed with ‘clinical’ depression which is viewed as a form of 
pathology or disease. In this sense depression, both ‘normal’ and pathological, ‘non-
clinical’ and ‘clinical’, are seen as different manifestations of the same syndrome. 
Diagnostically, depression is separated into several forms with two major 
categories - unipolar and bipolar - and with a variety of subtypes for each category. 
According to the latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013: 160), the criteria for diagnosing a major 
depressive episode are that ‘five (or more) of the following nine symptoms have 
been present during the same two-week period and represent a change from 
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previous functioning’ and where ‘at least one of the symptoms is either (1) depressed 
mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure’. These nine criteria come under the label of 
‘criterion A’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013:160-161), I have exactly 
reproduced the criteria as follows: 
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either 
subjective report (e.g. feel sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by 
others (e.g. appears tearful). (Note: in children and adolescents, can be 
irritable mood) 
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most 
of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or 
observation) 
3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g. a change of 
more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in 
appetite nearly every day 
4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by 
others, not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed 
down). 
6. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day. 
7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may 
be delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about 
being sick). 
8. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every 
day (either by subjective account or as observed by others). 
9. Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal 
ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for 
committing suicide. 
In addition to the criteria above which form the first of three diagnostic categories, 
the patient must also fulfil the following two criteria: 
B. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other areas of functioning. 
C.  The episode is not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance 
or to another medical condition 
In contrast to the previous manual (DSMIV-TR), this more recent and updated 
version (DSM-5) now includes several new depressive disorders, for example 
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‘disruptive mood dysregulation disorder’ (for children up to 18) and ‘premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder’. The disorder of ‘dysthymia’ found in DSMIV-TR has been 
replaced with ‘persistent depressive disorder’ which also includes the previous 
‘chronic major depressive disorder’. Several new specifiers have been added in 
DSM-5 including ‘anxious distress’ and ‘with mixed features’ which specify the role of 
anxiety and bipolar symptoms in major depression respectively (APA, 2013). One 
crucial stated element of the scientific basis for these disorders are the biological and 
neurological correlates relating to the medical phenomenology, however these 
correlates do not amount to a causal link which would enable prediction, as stated in 
the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013:160-161): 
Although an extensive literature exists describing neuroanatomical, 
neuroendocrinological, and neurophysiological correlates of major 
depressive disorder, no laboratory test has yielded results of sufficient 
sensitivity and specificity to be used as a diagnostic tool for this disorder.  
These diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder give a sense of the 
ways in which the means of identification (and the subsequent treatment) of 
depression are presented and codified. Here there is a very strong emphasis on 
nosology, that is on the detailed classification of the different types and forms of the 
disease. There has been much critical reflection on the DSM itself, including the 
changes and additions to the new edition with respect to depressive disorders (see 
for example, Pickersgill, 2014; Bandini, 2015; Horwitz, 2015), and while much can 
and has been said about the limits of the medical model in general as a means 
through which to understand problems in living, my focus in this thesis is specifically 
upon the medicalisation and pathologisation of sadness and unhappiness, and the 
extent to which we should embrace or resist this in counselling psychology.  
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An alternative, existential perspective would suggest that we are thrown 
(Heidegger, 1962) into a world of social, cultural, moral and political representations 
and understandings (carried through language and discourse) which has already 
been constructed. Thus, a significant element of our ‘reality’ is defined for us in the 
form of the language(s) we learn and all that comes with them, for example 
concepts, categories, morals, cultural ideals and so on. In this way, much of the 
sense we make of the world - and the way we experience it - is both enabled and 
constrained by language and linguistic structures. Given this, it is important to note 
the role of the language deployed in the list cited above where the feelings and 
behaviours described are constructed as symptoms of an underlying condition or 
disease – and given various specific names, for example Major Depressive Disorder, 
Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder, Persistent Depressive Disorder and 
Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder - all of which revolve around the central image of a 
depressed mood. Dorothy Rowe has argued that in Indo-European languages the 
basic sentence structure requires a subject and predicate, so that when we observe 
certain activities and give them a name, for example calling the above listed actions 
and experiences ‘depression’ and then place the word within a sentence, we begin to 
see it as something tangible and material. Rowe (1988:19) provides a useful 
example of this process of reification using the common cold: 
We see a friend coughing, sneezing and blowing his nose. We observe 
all these activities, lump them together and give them a name, ‘a cold’. 
Then we put ‘a cold’ in a sentence and immediately start to treat it as a 
real thing. ‘I see you have a cold’ we say. ‘Don’t give your cold to me’ as 
if we can hand round a cold in the same way we hand round a plate of 
cakes. 
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In the same way, the term or category of ‘depression’, may to some extent 
reify2 a complex and fluid individual experience, especially when that experience is 
understood in terms of a comprehensive nosology. While the categorisation which 
results from such nosological practice may, in a positive way, help us to make sense 
of this experience, to make something strange and possibly alien seem more 
familiar, the received and available medical and clinical constructions may also 
misrepresent or even distort our lived experience. Here I argue that these kinds of 
medicalised/nosological representations have a strong tendency to objectify both the 
person/client with depression and their lived experience. Moreover, when Clinical 
and other psychologists diagnose their patients as having depression, it is assumed 
that the diagnosis more or less accurately identifies the patient’s experience - but 
even where the patient agrees or is questioned in detail about their depression, how 
can we know that the patient’s and the psychologist’s understanding of the condition 
are congruent? In that vein, Horwitz and Wakefield (2007) argue that the DSM 
diagnostic criteria for depression have led to more and more false positive 
diagnoses: 
[I]n the change of context from the clinic to the community, the false 
positives problem latent in the DSM criteria emerged with a vengeance; 
in fact the new epidemiological instruments equally identified both 
pathological depression and widespread intense normal sadness… and 
thus they grossly overestimated the number of depressive disorders in 
the untreated population. (p. 124) 
In contrast to the medical (clinical), nosological approach described above, 
the phenomenological method employed in this thesis enables a primary focus on 
participants’ lived experience - which includes the bracketing off (I return to this 
                                                          
2 Meaning to understand or represent something non-concrete or conceptual as a real and concrete 
thing. Here this refers to reducing or labelling the complexity and fluidity of moment to moment lived 
experience in a way that distorts or negates it. 
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concept in Chapter 4) of theories and models such as those described in DSM-5. 
Thus, a central theme in this thesis is that of placing participants’ own experiences, 
their own voices, at the heart of the research. This central role of participants’ lived 
experience I argue, goes some way towards making up for what can be described as 
a loss of the experiencing, embodied, choosing agent in social constructionism and 
post-structuralism (I discuss this in the following chapter and I later argue for the 
utility of existential-phenomenology in this regard). Furthermore, for me, 
phenomenology offers a means of focusing on the lived, experienced world without 
recourse to the psychologisation and individualisation which often accompanies 
psychiatric and clinical/abnormal psychological accounts.  
1.4 Research aims and objectives 
In this research I aim to uncover the complexity and variety of participants’ 
experiences through the use of a Q-methodological approach in which the 
participants’ voices can be clearly and fully heard. My key objective is to document 
and explore the variety of experiences of depression among participants who have 
been diagnosed and/or self-report as having had an experience or experiences of 
depression, either currently or in the past. Thus, my definition of the term depression 
here relies upon participants’ self-identification and self-definition in addition to self-
reported diagnoses and therefore includes what has been termed ‘clinical’ and ‘non- 
clinical’ depression in order not to limit the phenomena which might be identified 
under this term or category. I aim to explore the experience of depression in a way 
that better preserves the phenomenon, especially the complex and varied ways in 
which depression can be experienced. Thus, I operate here with a very general and 
open understanding of depression - as opposed to a narrower clinical one - in order 
to uncover the variety of experiences that may be related by this term and to get 
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closer to the ‘thing itself’. In this way I aim to, in some way, challenge the 
pathologisation of depression and to usefully map the variety of experiences that 
may be subsumed under this term or category.  
In addition, I wish to explore what emerges when we analyse personal 
experiences of depression through social constructionist and existential-
phenomenological lenses and how this may inform existential-phenomenological 
counselling psychology practice. Using Q-methodology as a phenomenological tool, I 
ask the questions ‘How do participants experience (clinical and non-clinical/self-
identified) depression? How do participants’ experiences resemble or differ from 
established psychiatric and clinical psychology accounts of depression and how 
might the findings be relevant to existential counselling psychology practice? Thus, 
the findings will be analysed in relation to existential-phenomenological theory and 
therapeutic practice, and especially through some of the ideas of Martin Heidegger.  
There is one final reflection I wish to give in this chapter. While I am arguing 
that some representations or versions of depression, especially the medical and 
‘clinical’ accounts, in some sense objectify3 and reify the lived experience, it could 
also be argued that this research risks doing the very thing that I’m critiquing; reifying 
and potentially objectifying the lived experience depicted in the study. My feeling with 
regard to this issue is that as soon as there is reflection on immediate, pre-reflective 
experience it becomes another type of lived experience; for example, a reflective, 
thoughtful type of accounting and sense-making. Indeed, for me, it is almost 
impossible to capture pre-reflective experience given that as soon as we share or 
communicate that experience, including reflecting on and communicating it to 
                                                          
3 Meaning to treat a person as if they were an object, or put another way, to fail to recognise and to 
treat a person as a complex, feeling, experiencing human being. 
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ourselves, we - intentionally and/or unintentionally - bring in forms of interpretation 
and sense-making which inevitably display and mirror social and cultural as well as 
individual and personal structures and processes. The boundary between the 
description of immediate experience and interpretation/sense-making is an extremely 
narrow one which is very difficult to realistically identify. It may be that pre-reflective 
experience is itself always already permeated and suffused with discourses, images 
and representations which we have already internalised and inhabited. With regard 
to this thesis I argue that reification and objectification can, to some extent, be 
avoided by grounding the project in the lived experience of participants, by placing 
lived experience at the heart of the work; something Q-methodology is ideally suited 
for. Furthermore, reification does not inevitably result in pathologisation, rather there 
are other process which play a role, for example the complex relations of discourse, 
practice, power and authority. These and other issues are discussed in later 
chapters. 
1.5 Summary of chapters 
Following this introduction, in Chapter 2 I present the conceptual framework of the 
thesis through a personal exploration and discussion of the social constructionist 
movement in psychology, including post-structuralist and other critiques along with 
the role that phenomenology could play in potentially enhancing these frameworks. 
In Chapter 3 I review and discuss selected relevant research literature with a focus 
on historical, autobiographical and clinical/abnormal psychological accounts of 
depression. Chapter 4 is split into two parts, firstly I present an account of the 
phenomenological methodology used in this thesis, briefly describing the overall 
phenomenological movement and then focusing on the work of Martin Heidegger. 
Secondly, I describe the methods used in the thesis. I then present the results of the 
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preliminary focus group study in Chapter 5 and the results of the main Q-
methodological study in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7 I discuss the overall findings 
and their relevance for existential-phenomenological counselling psychology 
practice. 
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Chapter 2 The conceptual framework of the thesis: Social 
constructionism 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the social constructionist conceptual framework as it forms 
the backdrop to this research project. I outline some of the key ideas and debates to 
be found within social constructionism and go on to discuss some key critiques of the 
movement, especially those made in relation to its major focus on the role of 
language in the social construction of reality. I then describe how post-structuralist 
ideas, especially the work of Michel Foucault, can address some of the shortfalls 
identified concerning the constructionist perspective and finally I present an 
argument for phenomenology as one key means to enhance social constructionist 
thinking, especially with regard to phenomenology’s focus on the embodied and 
relational aspects of lived experience. Given the reflexive nature of this thesis I have 
structured this chapter in a way that directly reflects my own personal journey 
through these ways of thinking about and critiquing psychology. I begin with the early 
development of social constructionism within psychology during the 1970’s and 
1980’s, then move on to more recent debates and contributions to the field including 
work on the social construction of emotion and mood.  
I was introduced to social constructionism several years ago while I was an 
undergraduate psychology student (in the late 1980’s) and I went on to develop my 
own connection to those ideas, in particular through the work of Michel Foucault, 
while I was a postgraduate working on my Doctoral thesis (Hodges, 1998). My shift 
towards the writings of Foucault came about largely as a result of the inspiration of 
Nikolas Rose, my supervisor. For me now, social constructionism still offers a 
theoretically sophisticated critique of, and at the same time alternative conceptual 
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and methodological approach to, psychological theorising and practice. I still believe 
that the challenges and critiques found within social constructionism enable us to 
rethink and reconstruct mainstream psychological theory and practice in a way that 
places clients’ own experience at the heart of psychological practice. For me, these 
ideas, in providing a more culturally sensitive and contextualised, and above all a 
less objectifying understanding of emotions including depression, are especially 
useful for the development of effective counselling psychology practices. 
2.2 Social constructionism and its relevance for Psychology 
Social constructionism is a term that encompasses several different perspectives, 
different ways of thinking about human beings and the ways they interact, and 
especially different critiques of scientific and positivist approaches in the social and 
human sciences. I suggest that there are at least four key areas of critique to be 
found within constructionist ideas. Firstly, the social constructionist approach, in line 
with other (broadly) post-modernist critiques, dismantles modernist ideas of truth and 
in particular the notion that there is a real, true, discernible world ‘out there’ which we 
can access directly through the senses (the fundamental pretext of empiricism) and 
which pre-exists our interpretation and our sense making. This problematisation of 
truth and fact offers a means of questioning and sometimes resisting the kinds of 
methodology that psychology has borrowed from the natural sciences. Furthermore, 
it enables us to deconstruct notions of objectivity while at the same time bringing to 
the fore the social, historical, economic, political, moral and cultural structures and 
processes that in complex ways entail the conditions of possibility for that which we 
take to be true and real – such that truth becomes an effect of those processes. This, 
roughly speaking, moves us away from the realism of much of mainstream 
psychology, including some of the more scientific elements of counselling 
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psychology, towards the relativism of post-modern thought. In this way, a realist 
(and, for some naïve) notion of truth is avoided in favour of the notion of multiple 
truths and thus the focus shifts away from finding the truth towards the analysis and 
scrutiny of different and/or competing claims to the truth, including individual, 
subjective truth. Through this way of understanding ourselves and the world we 
inhabit, truth is considered as itself a representation. Furthermore, in this account the 
very notion of truth, and I will return to this issue later in this section, is bound up in 
complex ways with the processes and effects of power and regulation (see 
especially Foucault and Faubion, 2002). It should also be added here that Martin 
Heidegger (2002) proposes a very different way of understand truth which he refers 
to as ‘aletheia’, as a presence of Being that equates to some kind of original 
understanding and which itself precedes our representations and accounts, I discuss 
this in more detail in Chapter 4, part 1. 
Secondly, social constructionism offers a profound challenge to the 
dominance of a representational theory of language within mainstream psychology. 
For social constructionists, language is not only representational, that is providing 
labels with which to index and describe what we take to be a pre-existing reality 
(which often corresponds to our own experience of using words), it is also 
constructive and performative. In other words, language does not only enable us to 
represent ourselves, others and the world around us, it also plays a key part in 
constructing that world, in making certain kinds of representations and interpretations 
possible (through constructing what we take to be real and true) while at the same 
time limiting the ways in which we can make sense of ourselves, others and the 
world around us.   Moreover, for Austin (1975), the originator of Speech Act Theory, 
language also performs certain kinds of actions, for example promising, inviting, 
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greeting, complaining, requesting, ordering and so on. Adopting this more complex 
theory of language not only points to the limits of mainstream psychology in this 
regard, but also suggests an approach to psychology (and counselling psychology) 
that is much more qualitative; focused upon language use, accounts, interpretations 
and what has been termed the ‘action orientation’ of language, in place of the usual 
focus on cognition (see, for example Edwards, 1996; Te Molder and Potter, 2005). 
Thirdly, social constructionism challenges what some see as the individualism 
of psychology, the ways in which a particularly Western notion of a unique, fully 
contained and bounded individual has operated at the heart of the discipline and as 
its main object/target. One challenge to individualism from social constructionism is 
the problematisation of the ways in which psychology has tended to locate problems, 
issues, difficulties and especially thought and lived experience, entirely within 
persons and, for some commentators (see especially Sampson, 1989; 2008), in so 
doing, has played a key role in pathologising those individuals who are perceived in 
some sense to be outside of that which is constructed as normal. Put another way, 
the individualism of mainstream psychology plays a role in fixing problems and 
issues firmly within certain individuals and groups, but where those problems and 
issues may in fact have their origin in the relational world and/or in society and 
culture itself. This is something I return to later in this chapter. 
Finally, social constructionism offers a challenge to the essentialism of 
mainstream psychology. Much of mainstream psychology comes from an essentialist 
position - that is where there is some assumed underlying quality that defines 
ontological status - and its explanations are often essentialist in nature, for example 
positing neurological, genetic, hormonal and cognitive structures and processes as 
foundations of behaviour and conduct. Psychology as a discipline in some ways 
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exists in between the social and the natural sciences, however for some, the most 
authoritative aspects of the discipline are those which correspond closely to the 
methods of the natural sciences. Indeed, some commentators of the history of the 
development of quantitative methods in psychology (Rose, 1985; 1999; Danziger, 
2010), have argued that, early on, psychology as a discipline had to borrow from the 
natural sciences in order for its truth claims - both within and without academia - to 
be accepted both as authoritative and as a sound basis for a valid new discipline. 
Most importantly, as I have mentioned, for social constructionists, essentialism has a 
political aspect to it in that such explanations tend to fix characteristics, issues and 
problems within persons while simultaneously eschewing explanations that move 
beyond the individual, for example those focusing on social and economic structures. 
Thus, for many constructionists, essentialism too easily lends itself to oppressive, 
unjust knowledges and practices (for a useful example see Butler, 1988). My own 
academic and personal journey has very much been about challenging inequality 
and oppression and social constructionism has provided me with a powerful and 
useful framework for my continued growth and development as an academic and as 
a counselling psychologist.  
2.3 The development of social constructionism in Psychology 
In this section I further explicate the social constructionist perspective by considering 
its impact in Psychology and its contribution to reshaping some aspects of the 
discipline. Social constructionism has made a very significant contribution to critiques 
of mainstream psychology and played a key role with regard to an earlier phase of 
critiques within psychology during the 1970s and 1980s, providing new, and at that 
time radical, ways to rethink the key aims of the discipline. One important moment 
during this earlier phase occurred with the publication of Kenneth Gergen’s (1973) 
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paper Social Psychology as History. In that paper Gergen argued that rather than 
borrow methodology and methods from the natural sciences, what we do in social 
psychology much more closely resembles a form of historical enquiry.  
In this seminal paper Gergen (1973) offered two main arguments, firstly that 
the subject matter of psychology differs profoundly from that of the natural sciences 
in that psychological knowledge and practice can have profound effects on the very 
subject of inquiry; the ways people think and feel and the ongoing ways they interact 
with and relate to each other. (Gergen, 1973: 310) argues that ‘psychological 
principles… [may] sensitise one to influences acting on him [or her] and draw 
attention to certain aspects of the environment and him [or her]self’ This proved a 
very powerful argument for some in psychology, reminding us that we need to take 
great care in assuming that there are ‘natural’ trans-historical laws of human 
behaviour and experience and that the knowledge we produce as psychologists, in 
complex ways, can become part of the overall stock of human knowledge. In this 
way Gergen (op cit: 310) suggests that ‘…knowledge cannot accumulate in the usual 
scientific sense because such knowledge does not generally transcend its historical 
boundaries.’  
Secondly, Gergen argued that what we observe in psychology, even that 
which appears to be stable and consistent, is always historically contingent. He cites 
many examples where earlier theorising has become outmoded and outdated 
because of changes over time. In Gergen’s words (op cit: 316-317): 
We are essentially engaged in a systematic account of contemporary 
affairs. We utilise scientific methodology, but the results are not scientific 
principles in the traditional sense. In the future, historians may look back 
to such accounts to achieve a better understanding of life in the present 
era. However, the psychologists of the future are likely to find little value 
in contemporary knowledge. 
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Gergen further argued that (1970’s) psychology had very few tools available 
to enable a proper understanding of the interrelation of experiences and events over 
longer periods of time. For him our object of study as psychologists is history in that 
those objects and subjects that we study are in constant flux, constantly shifting and 
changing, in part in response to psychological knowledge and practice. Given these 
two key problems with mainstream psychology, particularly as it was during the 
1970s, Gergen concluded that ‘…[T]he continued attempt to build general laws of 
social behaviour seems misdirected, and the associated belief that knowledge of 
social interaction can be accumulated in a manner similar to the natural sciences 
appears unjustified.’ (op cit: 316).  
Gergen further develops these ideas in his widely cited 1985 paper The Social 
Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology. It is this paper that first drew me 
into social constructionism and then towards critical psychology while I was an 
undergraduate. I was a fierce and passionate recruit. By the time this (1985) paper 
was published both Gergen and the discipline itself had changed in response to the 
different critiques which were growing in popularity at that time. In this sense, it is 
interesting to see the ways in which Gergen’s ideas have changed in this paper 
twelve years after his critique based on the notion of psychology as history. At this 
point Gergen summarised the social constructionist endeavour as follows: 
Social constructionist enquiry is principally concerned with explicating 
the processes by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise 
account for the world (including themselves) in which they live. It 
attempts to articulate common forms of understanding as they now exist, 
as they have existed in prior historical periods, and as they might exist 
should creative attention be so directed. (Gergen, 1985: 266). 
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In this paper, Gergen offered a means to develop an alternative metatheory 
that enables psychology to move beyond the limits of empiricism and rationalism, 
where the social epistemology of psychology’s object(s) of study comes to the fore. 
The notion that language is a carrier of truth is profoundly questioned here. In this 
new relativist version of psychological endeavour, psychology itself must be 
understood as a social process and the discourses, descriptions, interpretations, 
images and metaphors utilised by both ourselves and the persons/clients we 
study/work with become central to the discipline. For Gergen this meant that our 
discipline in a sense needed to move closer to something in between the disciplines 
of psychology and sociology, however at this time, another related philosophical and 
conceptual framework was beginning to have an impact on both these disciplines; 
post-modernism. 
2.4 Social constructionism and post-modernism  
As post-modernism gradually found its way into psychology from the 1980s onwards, 
Gergen and others (for example Kvale, 1992; Holzman and Morss, 2000) saw the 
important links with social constructionism. In his 2001 paper Psychological Science 
and a Post-Modern Context, Gergen further developed his critique of mainstream 
psychology in line with post-modern critiques outside of the discipline. He notes that 
there are three key areas where post-modernism might help us to revise and 
develop psychology in a more meaningful way that is relevant to our contemporary 
present. Firstly, he suggested post-modernist arguments enable us to question the 
centrality of individual reason in mainstream psychology. Thus, the modernist 
emphasis on individual rationality has, according to post-modernism, in fact 
produced hierarchies of rationality where some individuals and groups are placed 
outside the rational, outside of full reason. Furthermore, rationality itself for Gergen 
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and others is rhetorically constituted. One form of rationality can no longer be seen 
as superior to other forms, rather we need to be much more relativist in this regard. 
Ultimately for Gergen (2001: 807-808) ‘… the exercise of rationality is … an exercise 
in language… Making sense - or being rational - is inherently a form of communal 
participation.’ Therefore, rather than understanding rationality as a product of the 
natural world it must be understood as itself a social and historical construction, or in 
Gergen’s view a form of epistemology. Related to this, Michel Foucault’s earlier 
work, for example in Madness and Civilisation (Foucault, 2006), sought to map the 
historical construction of reason and unreason from the Middle Ages onwards and I 
will return to Foucault’s key contribution to these debates a little later. 
Secondly, Gergen questions the notion of a directly observable world readily 
available to us in a form which is unsullied by social psychological and cultural 
structures and processes. From a Post-modern perspective the world is never simply 
‘out there’ waiting for us to observe and to make sense of it in some kind of direct 
and straightforward way. Rather, what we take to be true and what we take to be real 
are themselves social constructions, fundamentally tied to discursive and linguistic 
practices. Moreover those discursive practices must themselves be understood 
within a wider historical, social and political context. In Gergen’s (2001: 808) words, 
‘… What we take to be “the real”, what we believe to be transparently true about 
human functioning, is a by-product of communal construction’. In this paper Gergen 
is at pains to remind us that this is not an idealist argument, rather post-modernism 
requires us to understand the ways in which our experience and understanding of 
‘truth’ and ‘reality’ are always necessarily bound up with that which we bring to bear 
upon them, how ways of describing what exists must always arise from shared, 
communal understandings and intelligibilities, which are, in turn, bound by their 
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historical, social and cultural context. Here again the work of Michel Foucault is 
relevant and I will return to this a little later in this chapter. 
Thirdly, Gergen reminds us of the centrality of language itself in post-
modernist thought. Here language is not only, or merely, a means to represent the 
world, to label it, but it is also fundamentally implicated in the social construction of 
what we take to be real, what we take to be true. It is to language that we need to 
look if we are to understand the ‘real’, if we are to properly understand the nature of 
science. For Gergen (2001: 809): 
… Language is world constituting; it assists in generating and/or 
sustaining certain forms of cultural practice… Science is not to hold a 
mirror to nature, but to participate actively in interpretive conventions and 
practices of a particular culture.  
Gergen’s version of social constructionism is one that was widely welcomed 
by psychologists who wished to be critical of the mainstream elements of the 
discipline, however Gergen’s emphasis on the negotiated, interactional, communal 
process of social construction (see Gergen, 2009) brought various critiques from 
within and without the developing Critical Psychology community. These critiques 
focused on the need to move beyond the key role of linguistic structures towards 
other kinds of non-linguistic structures and practices including the operation of 
power. Indeed, my own struggle with the shortfalls of social constructionism led me 
towards a deeper engagement with post-structuralist ideas and especially the work 
of Michel Foucault. For myself, while I was greatly attracted to Gergen’s work and 
ideas, not least because he was so active in bringing new ways of thinking and 
understanding into psychology in a way that made sense to many of us who were 
searching for a means to critique and to question the mainstream, I struggled with 
what I saw as too limited an understanding of the broader historical and cultural 
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context of language use. These limitations are especially relevant when trying to 
understand the psychology of emotions and therefore, before I address the limits of 
social constructionism, I wish to outline another important strand in the social 
constructionist movement that has particular salience for the study of depression; 
studies and debates concerning the social construction of emotion and mood. 
2.5 The social construction of emotions 
An influential text appeared in 1986 edited by Rom Harré called The Social 
Construction of Emotions. This text usefully demonstrates the relevance and utility of 
this approach for understanding feelings and mood, including depression. This work 
focused on the ways in which the individual, lived experience of emotions can only 
be fully understood with reference to the social, linguistic and historical context. At 
the start of the book Harré lays out his version of the social constructionist viewpoint 
concerning emotions and some of that account is useful here. Harré reminds us that 
much of psychology up until that time (and I would argue that the discipline, to a 
large extent, continues in this vein) placed a representational theory of language at 
the heart of its endeavours. In relation to the study of emotions he suggests: 
Psychologists have always had to struggle against a persistent illusion 
that in such studies as those of the emotions there is something there, 
the emotion, of which the emotion word is a mere representation. This 
ontological illusion, that there is an abstract and detachable “it” upon 
which research can be directed, probably lies behind the ineffectiveness 
of much emotion research. (Harré, 1986: 4). 
Harré suggests that the ‘it’ that underlies emotions is primarily some form of 
physiological state which forms the ground for what he terms ‘felt perturbation’ (op 
cit: 4) and that psychologists, falling into the trap of the ontological illusion, have 
often made the assumption that the physiological state and the emotion are the 
same thing. Instead, for Harré the experience of emotion is shaped and indeed 
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limited by the linguistic resources available to us, that is we draw upon what he 
terms ‘repertoire[s] of social practices’ (p4) which are themselves one condition of 
possibility for feeling a particular emotion or mood in the first place. Above all Harré 
argued for the re-contextualisation of felt emotion such that the social, cultural (and 
ultimately historical) processes and practices that make up those repertoires can be 
made more visible, and this in turn can enable us to more fully and deeply analyse 
and understand the lived experience and personal meaning of felt emotion. In 
Harré’s words: 
There has been a tendency among both philosophers and psychologists 
to abstract an entity - call it anger, love, grief or anxiety - and then try to 
study it. But what there is are angry people, upsetting scenes, 
sentimental episodes, grieving families and funerals, anxious parents 
pacing at midnight, and so on. There is a concrete world of contexts and 
activities. We reify and abstract from that concreteness at our peril. 
(Harré ,1986: 4) 
For me, this text usefully illustrates the way in which social constructionism 
invites us to question and sometimes to reject the individualising tendencies of 
mainstream psychology in favour of a much more contextually sensitive and 
therefore ‘ecologically’ valid approach. I would also argue that this approach allows 
us to get much closer to the tangible lived experience of human beings – who, as 
Heidegger (1962) reminds us, are never only individuals; we are never an ‘I’ on our 
own.  
The various chapters of Harré’s edited text clearly illustrate the ways in which 
the phenomena that we label as emotions and moods are not only to be understood 
in terms of individual lived experience but also, and just as importantly, as 
fundamentally related and bound to their social, linguistic and historical context. In 
this regard, in a later chapter, Harré and Finlay-Jones (1986) discuss the decline and 
eventual disappearance of an important but now obsolete Medieval emotion called 
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‘accidie’ which, within our current vocabulary, would be defined as mental or spiritual 
sloth and apathy. This emotion manifested itself as ostiositas (idleness), pigritia 
(laziness) and negligentia (negligence), which in turn led to feelings of taedium 
(boredom with life), tristitia (sadness, sorrow) and desperatio (hopelessness, 
despair). There was an important link with religious duty here and Harré and Finlay-
Jones state that the term accidie first appears in the works of Evagrius (AD 345-399, 
see Casiday, 2006) as ‘“the noonday Demon” which distracts a hermit from the 
duties of the ascetic life’ (op cit: 221). Harré and Finlay-Jones go on to describe the 
complex ways in which this emotion was embedded in the moral order of that time. 
So, for example, this emotion was linked to a kind of negligence and to feeling a kind 
of misery, where an association between misery and laziness resulted in particular 
kinds of prescription and proscription, in the words of the authors (op cit: 221): 
In so far as it [accidie] involved a failure to carry on with a tiresome, 
uncomfortable or boring task, the cultivation of fortitude formed part of 
its remedy. But dutiful behaviour without joy (gauduim) was an 
inadequate response. Acedia was truly overcome only when delight in 
the exercise of one’s proper activities returned. 
Thus, Accidie provides a useful illustration of the pitfalls of apprehending lived 
experience (here in relation to felt emotion), in solely individualistic terms. Thus, I 
argue here that properly understanding depression requires an approach that is able 
to get beneath and also beyond the individual experience. Accidie also has historical 
connections to melancholia which I discuss in the following chapter.  
This particular text had a profound impact on my thinking earlier in my career 
and, for me, it still provides many compelling practical illustrations of the ways in 
which social and linguistic practices and structures both enable, and at the same 
time, limit our individual lived experience. In the next section, I discuss some 
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shortfalls of social constructionism with reference to some key critiques of the 
movement. 
2.6 The limits of social constructionism 
As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the incorporation of social 
constructionism into psychology enables both a powerful critique of the realism, 
individualism, and the resultant psychologism of mainstream psychology and at the 
same time offers new theoretical frameworks and new methodologies through which 
to move the discipline forward. However, following its incorporation into critical and 
other aspects of psychology many theorists and commentators came to identify 
some of the shortfalls and limitations of social constructionism as it relates to the 
discipline of psychology (for example Parker, 1998, 2007; Cromby and Nightingale, 
1999; Burr, 2015). Perhaps the most important of which, for this commentary, relates 
to what, for some, was an overemphasis on the centrality of language and the 
linguistic realm. 
Hacking (1999), in his much discussed text ‘the social construction of what?’, 
takes issue in a detailed, philosophical way, with the significant expansion of 
constructionist work in the social sciences and what he sees as an unhelpful lack of 
rigour with regard to a proper conceptualisation of what it is we believe to be 
‘constructed’. He argues that if we look closely at the wider body of work purporting 
to offer a social constructionist analysis it becomes evident that several different 
kinds and categories of things, objects and ideas are all, one way or another, 
represented in this body of work. He invites us to think more carefully about the 
question of what exactly we are claiming as socially constructed. Hacking then goes 
on to argue that social constructionist work is better understood as relating to a 
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range of elements including ideas, material ‘things’ and persons operating in 
complex interaction constituting what he terms a ‘matrix’, which for him equates to a 
much broader social setting than is often found in social constructionist work. He 
defines this matrix as follows in relation to the example of the social construction of 
women refugees (Hacking, 1999:10): 
…as a complex of institutions, advocates, newspaper articles, lawyers, 
court decisions, immigration proceedings. Not to mention the material 
infrastructure, barriers, passports, uniforms, counters at airports, 
detention centres, courthouses, holiday camps for refugee children. You 
may want to call these social because their meanings are what matter to 
us, but they are material, and in their sheer materiality make substantial 
differences to people. 
Hacking’s argument appears to draw upon a Foucauldian conception of 
discourse as always already tied to concrete and material practice(s). Foucault was 
interested in the ways in which relations of power were to be found in heterogeneous 
systems and practices which for him included the complexity of the connections 
between discourse, practices, institutions, architectural forms, moral systems, 
economic relations and so on. In this way, Foucault’s understanding of the 
importance of language and discourse was always conceptualised as a part of wider 
apparatuses which Foucault calls dispositifs. Foucault (1980:196) describes the 
dispositif (apparatus) as follows: 
...the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means 
assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of 
forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, 
stabilising them, utilising them etc. The apparatus is thus always 
inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain co-
ordinates of knowledge which issue from it, but, to an equal degree, 
condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations 
of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge. 
Thus, for Foucault the dispositif is fundamentally tied to power and 
knowledge, which is defined in terms of the strategic relations of force that can be 
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found in our contemporary societies. What is important here is the way that language 
and discourse form only one element of a much more complex and heterogeneous 
apparatus which, in turn, forms the conditions of possibility for us to have certain 
kinds of knowledge, certain kinds of experience at all. For me, in this way both 
Foucault and Hacking provide a broader, more textured and heterogeneous account of 
the place and role of language and discourse (and history) in the social construction of 
reality. While I am not arguing in this thesis that a study of the lived experience of 
depression must necessarily include a detailed analysis of the broader structures and 
apparatuses that surround it, I do wish to argue that such an analysis should not 
constitute the lived experience as solely some kind of origin or foundation but rather 
should take into account the broader context and enabling conditions for that 
experience, which might include some of the structures and processes that Heidegger 
presented in his thinking about Dasein and I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 4, 
part 1. I now turn in more detail to the work of Michel Foucault in order to further 
conceptualise the role of discourse in the social construction of reality. 
2.7 A Foucauldian perspective 
For me, Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse as something always already 
bound up with relations of power and ultimately with history itself, provides a means 
to move beyond social constructionism’s prime focus on the communal, on the space 
in between people (Gergen, 1985; 2001). A Foucauldian version of discourse 
acknowledges the ways in which not only individuals but also the ways they relate to 
one another, are to some extent constituted, made possible but also limited by the 
prevailing ‘systems of thought’ of any particular historical period, including our 
contemporary present. 
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Thus, while I personally sign up to many of the ideas found in the social 
constructionist movement in Psychology, and also have some sympathy with the 
critical realist stance, I turn to the work of Michel Foucault in order to move beyond 
the predominance of language, of linguistic structures in these critiques but in a way 
that, I believe, does not get caught up in the dualism of realism versus relativism. As 
I have already indicated, a key problem that I struggled with for some time, was how 
we can understand the context of lived experience in such a way that moves beyond 
the linguistic realm, moves beyond the ‘text’. Put another way, how can we address 
the question; what is the place of the extra-discursive in social constructionism?  
With Foucault’s work it is important to properly understand the way in which he 
defines discourse - which is so central to each of his projects - as his understanding 
is somewhat different to others who have written about this topic. For Foucault 
discourse always refers to what we might call language-in-use, to language as it is 
spoken, read, created, utilised, interpreted and so on. Furthermore, language is 
always situated - for example in relation to culture, society, history, geographical 
location, moral order, economic relations, institutions and so on. Thus, for Foucault, 
language is never language on its own but rather is always already bound up not 
only with the wider context I’ve just mentioned but also with concrete practices, for 
example the ways in which language-use forms a key part of our practices as 
counselling psychologists and psychotherapists. However, Foucault goes further 
than this in that, for him, discourse, especially what Foucault terms dominant 
discourses, are also bound up with relations of power. Indeed, Foucault offers a 
novel way of understanding power as it operates in contemporary societies and 
cultures which I will now briefly describe. 
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For Foucault then, truth is not a matter of something that pre-exists or stands 
outside language and discourse, neither is it something that can be discovered 
through science and empiricism, rather he was interested in those things that we 
take to be true which for him come into being through relations of power and 
knowledge that at the same time are socially and historically contingent. When he 
was asked during an interview whether he thought that what he wrote was the truth, 
he famously replied: 
As to the problem of fiction, it seems to me to be a very important one; I 
am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not 
mean to say however, that the truth is therefore absent. It seems to me 
that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional 
discourse to induce effects of truth [my italics]. (Foucault, 1980; 193) 
For Foucault truth was always bound up with so much more than facts and/or 
what we might term ‘reality’. Here truth is replaced by the notion of verisimilitude 
which is real in the sense that what we take to be true has concrete, material 
consequences. Put another way, for Foucault history places certain things on what 
he calls a ‘register of truth’ and he set himself the task of analysing and elucidating 
the ways in which particular systems of thought come into being during different 
historical periods, and the ways particular systems of thought come to dominate and 
to subjugate other ways of thinking and knowing. In this vein, the psychiatric, 
nosological accounts found in clinical, abnormal and other areas of psychology could 
be identified as contemporary dominant discourses. 
However, from a social constructionist perspective we would expect that 
multiple ‘repertoire[s] of social practices’ (Harré, op cit: 4) would exist from which 
individuals could draw in making sense of their experience of profound sadness, 
along with multiple (personal) ‘truths’ in relation to what depression is/feels like.  
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As I have developed as an academic I have become less concerned with the 
issues of idealism versus materialism and realism versus relativism and much more 
concerned with a focus upon the question of how we can properly and meaningfully 
account for lived experience in a way that does not fall into the trap of psychologism 
or individualism, and this is what led me towards phenomenology as a way to 
describe and to elucidate the lived experience of depression. 
2.8 A return to phenomenology 
As social constructionism became a key part of critical movements within psychology 
it also became clear to many academics and practitioners that while social 
constructionism had enabled real and useful progress for the discipline, in eschewing 
individualism and psychologism we risked, to a greater or lesser extent, losing the 
experiencing agent. Put another way, with the new and useful focus on the notion of 
the person as an effect of discourse, or better as, in part, constituted through a 
multiplicity of discursive practices, we found ourselves less able to properly and 
meaningfully account for the lived experience of persons, especially their felt 
emotions and their motivations. 
For some critical psychologists this problem of agency leads us back to the 
work of existential-phenomenologists. For example, Burr (1999) argues that although 
the constructionist theory of language posited within social constructionism is 
extremely useful and important for contemporary psychology, the role of embodied 
lived experience is in danger of being lost altogether. Burr argues that (1999:113): 
... largely owing to constructionism’s focus upon language as the primary 
constructive force behind social and psychological phenomena, the 
person as an experiencing subject has been exorcised from our 
understanding of human life. 
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For Burr, social constructionism needs to place much more emphasis on 
personal agency and choice and she suggests that the work of Merleau-Ponty 
provides a useful framework in this regard, in particular, Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the body as the foundation of lived experience. In this way Burr (op 
cit) argues for much greater inclusion of the extra-discursive, embodied aspects of 
personal experience. Likewise, Butt (1999) argues for the central importance of (pre-
reflective) personal experience and embodied perception for a revitalised social 
constructionism. Butt focuses particularly on Merleau-Ponty’s critique of dualism, 
individualism and empiricism and suggests that phenomenology provides a useful 
means to conceptualise lived experience in a way that is compatible with the tenets 
of constructionism. In this way Butt argues against what he sees as 
constructionism’s assumptions that people use emotions in a similar way that they 
use language, following the rules of their operation. Instead Butt asks us to 
incorporate - via phenomenology - what Merleau-Ponty (2013) called the ‘lived world’ 
as a means of understanding and explaining personal experience in a way that does 
not return us to the dualisms of traditional psychology. As Butt (1999: 137) suggests: 
…our emotional engagement is not just made in language; it is a reality 
that is constructed between the person and his or her world. This 
engagement is often ambiguous, and our feelings are often ambivalent. 
They cannot be reduced to simple description of what we really want, or 
feel. There is no internal meter to be read, as the realist would have us 
believe.’ (Butt, 1999: 138) 
This focus on the relation between the person and her or his world is crucial, it 
seems to me, in providing a more contextualised, less objectifying understanding of 
depression while at the same time avoiding the kinds of linguistic determinism that 
have been much criticised in both social constructionism and post-structuralist 
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frameworks. This relational understanding of lived experience is something I return 
to in Chapter 4 and later in the thesis. 
For me, both Burr and Butt very usefully illustrate some of the ways in which 
phenomenology is compatible with the social constructionist framework and, in fact, 
can enhance it. Perhaps what is needed is some form of what May (1992: 3) termed 
‘social existentialism’: 
…which derives from Heidegger, Jaspers, and the late Sartre [and 
which] sees the self as a social construct, and a function of the interplay 
of history, social conditioning, and the chosen behaviour of the individual 
person. 
This notion of ‘social existentialism’ for me illustrates just how useful social 
constructionism and phenomenology are to each other, indeed they are both able to 
enhance one another. By more fully acknowledging the complex social and historical 
context of personal lived experience we are able to gain a much more meaningful 
picture of the relational world, of what it means to be-in-the-world-with-others4. Thus, 
in this thesis the social and relational elements of existentialism and phenomenology 
will be central to an understanding of the experience of depression.  
2.9 Summary 
In this chapter I have described the development of some of the key theories and 
critiques in social constructionism along with the ways that some post-structuralist 
and phenomenological ideas are able to address some of the gaps and shortfalls in 
this alternative approach to Psychology. I have done so – in a spirit of reflexivity - in 
a way that also reflects my own personal journey through these concepts. Following 
the discussion above, in this thesis I adopt a broadly social constructionist 
                                                          
4 The use of hyphens here – in the spirit of Heidegger’s writing/thinking – aims to show the 
interrelatedness/holistic nature of these words/concepts which the standard use of language separates out.  
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conceptual framework but one that is also informed by post-structuralist ideas, 
especially the work of Foucault. At the same time, phenomenology is central to the 
methodology used here and I discuss this approach in more detail in Chapter 4, part 
1. While the focus of this thesis is the lived experience of depression, I have aimed 
to show that it is important to also acknowledge, in some way, the aspects of its 
broader social, cultural and relational setting. Later on, in Chapter 4, I discuss why 
existential-phenomenology, in particular the work of Martin Heidegger, is well suited 
to this aim.   
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I review some of the research and other literature relevant to this 
thesis. Following a discussion of the nature and identity of the profession of 
Counselling Psychology, this review focuses primarily on personal, autobiographical 
accounts of depression, the conceptualisation of depression in clinical/abnormal 
psychology and historical and cross-cultural writing and research, all of which in 
various ways aim to represent, characterise and investigate the lived experience of 
depression. Following a brief account of the social history of melancholia and 
depression, I explicate some of the clinical/abnormal psychological frameworks 
utilised to understand and diagnose depression. I then review key studies concerned 
with clients’ experiences and lay, or ‘everyday’, understandings of depression, where 
the main focus is on a range of autobiographical literature.  I then review some of the 
key cross-cultural research on the experience of depression and finally, I summarise 
the key themes and issues in this literature and relate these to the aims and 
objectives of this project. 
3.2 What is Counselling Psychology? 
In this section I address the topic of the nature and identity of Counselling 
Psychology as a profession in its own right and its place among the other applied 
areas of psychological practice. As the profession has grown and developed there 
have been ongoing debates concerning what exactly the profession is and how it 
differs from related practices such as clinical psychology and general counselling 
and psychotherapeutic practice. I argue here that the early tensions between 
humanism/phenomenology and natural science, between a focus on the core 
therapeutic relationship or ‘alliance’ and the psychiatric/medical models of 
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psychopathology, still abound even though these tensions and debates have 
developed and become more complex, (see Woolfe, 2016 for an up to date account). 
Furthermore, these tensions are also related to the history and development of social 
constructionism in psychology as outlined in the previous chapter and to my own 
personal and professional journey as both an academic and a practitioner 
psychologist. 
Following the establishment of the British Psychological Society Counselling 
Psychology Section in 1982, its transformation into a Special Group in 1989, and the 
subsequent awarding of the status of a full BPS Division (on a par with Clinical 
Psychology) in 1994, the relatively new profession of Counselling Psychology has 
sought to differentiate a philosophy of its own in order to clarify and refine its 
professional identity and to separate it out from other specifically psychological 
practices. In an early (1990) article on the emerging profession entitled ‘Counselling 
Psychology in Britain: An idea whose time has come’ Ray Woolfe (1990: 531) noted 
the lack of not only dedicated training courses and established career paths but 
crucially a foundation in knowledge: 
Britain still lacks an established infrastructure of recognised training 
courses, avenues for occupational employment and advancement, or 
even a clearly defined knowledge base. 
In this article Woolfe sought to explicitly address this perceived lack of a clear 
knowledge base and at this early point in the profession argued that counselling 
psychology needed to develop ‘a scientific basis’, a not uncommon feeling at that 
time (op cit: 533). At this time, Woolfe acknowledged that counselling psychology 
incorporates aspects of art as well as science and here the current and ongoing 
tensions between the two major poles of the identity of Counselling Psychology – 
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natural science/experimentation/objectivity and phenomenology/humanism/social 
science - are clearly evident at this early stage. On the one hand there is an 
emphasis and commitment to humanistic counselling practice with a focus on the 
value and efficacy of the therapeutic or helping relationship (and this includes a 
questioning stance towards science and psychopathology) and on the other a need 
for a ‘scientific basis to counselling’ concomitant with its status as psychology rather 
than more general counselling and/or psychotherapeutic practice. However, in spite 
of this call for a scientific basis, Woolfe takes a clearly anti-pathology stance in this 
paper (which he continues to take today) and compares counselling psychology to 
clinical psychology thus, coming down on the humanist side of the tension: 
…it does seem to me that there is a difference of emphasis here and 
that counselling psychology is focused more centrally towards thinking 
in terms of prevention and enhancing development rather than cure. This 
is characterised by an emphasis on wellness as opposed to pathology 
and one of its key aspects is the adoption of a more holistic view of the 
client. This means examining emotional and mental health in the context 
of an individual's location in the life cycle, as well as their lifestyle and 
relationships. (Woolfe, 1990: 532) 
Also in 1990, Emmy van Deurzen (van Deurzen-Smith, 1990) argued – as she 
has continued to ever since – that the wisdom and insight found in philosophy 
provides a sound basis for counselling psychology practice and described her fears 
that counselling psychology might become subsumed by scientific/experimental 
psychological methods and frameworks: 
…how much of psychology has become caught up in the scientific 
model, involving outcome studies, with less attention given to the 
wisdom and hope that the author feels is explored within practice with 
clients …counselling psychology should be based upon the methods of 
critical comparison and philosophical insight rather than the rigid 
frameworks of experimental psychology. (van Deurzen-Smith, 1990: 8) 
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In the second edition of the much cited Handbook of Counselling Psychology, 
Strawbridge and Woolfe (2003: 5) usefully re-frame this tension as between ‘being-
in-relation’ and ‘technical expertise’ and suggest that the root of the tension lies in 
the way we define science and its relationship to values. Once again there is a 
strong commitment here to broadly humanist concepts and values and these authors 
see this commitment as an important aspect of that which differentiates Counselling 
from Clinical psychology. With respect to the medical model, they go on to argue that 
the scientific language of psychological diagnosis places an increased distance 
between experts and those who experience particular mental states: 
…as the terms describing mental states become apparently ever more 
‘scientific’, they are increasingly distanced from the language of those 
who experience these states and it becomes more difficult for the non-
expert to challenge such ‘expert diagnoses’. (Strawbridge and Woolfe, 
2003: 17). 
I very much concur with Strawbridge and Woolfe and in this chapter I place a 
great emphasis on the autobiographical ‘first-person’ literature concerning the 
experience of depression in addition to providing a review of the clinical/abnormal 
psychology accounts. Moreover, following from the social constructionist perspective 
adopted in this thesis, I also review some key relevant historical and cross-cultural 
research. 
One crucial element in the debates concerning the identity of the profession is 
the image/metaphor of the ‘scientist’-practitioner’ which found its way from clinical 
psychology into counselling psychology and which has been defined as a model 
which ‘aims to integrate science and practice to provide a uniquely qualified 
professional to work in a range of health, human service, organisational and 
educational settings’ (O’Gorman, 2001: 164).  More recently, this notion has, to 
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some extent, been displaced (though by no means entirely) by the already 
established model of the ‘reflective practitioner’, defined as a practitioner who: 
…reflects-in-action [and] tends to question the definition of his [or her] 
task, the theories-in-action that he brings to it, and the measures of 
performance by which he is controlled. And as he questions these things, 
he also questions elements of the organizational knowledge structure in 
which his functions are embedded. (Schon, 1983: 337). 
This model of the ‘reflective-practitioner’ could be argued to have addressed 
something of the tension between ‘being-in-relation’ and ‘technical expertise’. As 
Clegg and Gall (1998: 330) have suggested ‘The idea of reflective practice cuts across 
the theory-practice axis, making personal knowledge and interaction as important as 
command of technical skills.' However, while the significance of natural/objective 
science in more contemporary definitions of counselling psychology practice may 
have been questioned (Woolfe, 2016; Strawbridge, 2016) and, for some, side-lined, I 
argue here that, by definition, and given the nature of the discipline of psychology, it 
can never be straightforwardly overstepped or entirely removed.  
Thus, these earlier and more recent reflections on the nature of the discipline 
point to continuing ambiguities and possible conflicts. However, even though for 
these influential authors scientific and psychopathological perspectives must be 
treated with caution, for me, it is clear that the emergence and continued existence 
of a profession which brings together counselling practice with psychological theory 
and research means that there must always be some degree of tension and even 
contradiction between these different elements. Indeed, it could be argued that these 
contradictions and tensions are part and parcel of psychology itself and have been 
since very early in its development. Importantly, these tensions can still be seen in 
the current agreed definition of Counselling Psychology which can be found in the 
BPS professional practice guidelines: 
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Counselling psychology has developed as a branch of professional 
psychological practice strongly influenced by human science research 
as well as the principal psychotherapeutic traditions. Counselling 
psychology draws upon and seeks to develop phenomenological models 
of practice and enquiry in addition to that of traditional scientific 
psychology. It continues to develop models of practice and research 
which marry the scientific demand for rigorous empirical enquiry with a 
firm value base grounded in the primacy of the counselling or 
psychotherapeutic relationship. (DoCP, 2005: 1, my emphasis). 
Although this thesis is specifically focused on the experience of depression 
and the literature reviewed in this chapter reflects that, I also wish to emphasise the 
importance of reflection on both the identity of the profession of counselling 
psychology and my own personal professional identity as a counselling psychology 
practitioner. In some ways my own journey as an academic and as a practitioner has 
embodied many of the tensions described above. While I firmly situate myself within 
the social constructionist perspective, I also believe in the value and utility of a 
scientific approach in certain contexts, although I would describe most aspects of 
psychology as a human or social science rather than a natural science. I return to 
these issues throughout the thesis and in more detail in Chapter 7.  
3.3 A brief social history of depression and melancholia 
One key means of understanding the complexity of the experience of depression is 
through exploring its historical development, especially in relation to the early 
accounts of the experience of ‘melancholia’. Indeed, there is a complex and 
illuminating history of melancholia and depression which can enable a more 
extensive understanding of the meaning and experience of depression in our 
contemporary present. Here, for the sake of illustration and brevity, I highlight some 
of the major shifts in its understanding in the West. 
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This social historical analysis begins with three key observations. Firstly, the 
reality of melancholia in the past was different to the reality of current day 
‘depression’. Secondly, at any particular point in history, different realities or 
understandings may exist together; for example, the reality of ‘melancholia’ for the 
inmate of Bedlam was very different to that of the ‘world weary’ poet and traveller. 
Thirdly, constructed realties provide the individual with a means by which to organise 
their experience, in Harré’s (1986: 226) words, ‘…in the course of the long history of 
melancholy, the accounts of it take on a prescriptive force over and above their 
original role in the medical symptomology’. 
In Ancient Greece, melancholia was considered to be a temperament and an 
illness, both of which related to a physical condition caused by the predominance or 
excess of black bile which was conceptualised as one of four humours; blood, choler 
(or yellow bile), phlegm and melancholy (or black bile). Porter (2002) describes these 
humours as ‘vitality-sustaining juices’ (p37) and describes the way in which these 
humours became linked to notions of health and ill-health and also to the 
temperaments or what we would now call psychological dispositions: 
...humoral thinking had ready explanations for the plunge from health 
into illness, both physical and psychological (though in a holistic system, 
these were never polarised). All was well when the vital fluids cooperated 
in their proper balance. Illness resulted when one of them gathered 
(became ‘plethoric’) or dwindled… Specifically in terms of mental 
disorder, excesses both of blood and of yellow bile could lead to mania, 
whereas a surplus of black bile – being too cold and dry – resulted in 
lowness, melancholy, or depression. (Porter, 2002: 41) 
As Bennett (1978:18) states ‘a black and bitter mood was associated with a 
black and bitter substance’. The four humours referred to by Aristotle and 
Hippocrates remained as the basis of medieval characterology where an excess or 
dwindling of one of the four humours was still seen as causing illness, while different 
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seasons and times of day were seen as amplifying the effects of the associated 
humour. Autumn and night were the most likely times for melancholia to occur. 
Furthermore, throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance melancholia 
remained fundamental to constructions of personality types and mental illness. In 
fact, by the late Middle Ages, the favourable and unfavourable aspects of 
melancholia were well established; as indicative of either a particular temperament, 
intellectual aspiration or as diabolical possession.  
During the Elizabethan period in Britain melancholia came to mean general 
madness (Skultans, 1979) and was seen in a pathological context where a great 
number of different aspects of melancholy were described though in a moral context; 
‘melancholics’ were still subject to continued witch hunting. A mad/gifted dualism 
emerged during this time and continued into the Eighteenth century and, as the 
importance of melancholia as a way of understanding personality and mental illness 
spread, it came to have new names; the spleen, the vapours, hypochondriasis, 
hysteric fits, the ‘hyp’, and even the ‘English Malady’. The English Malady was 
restricted to literate or more accurately literary circles, but alongside the fashionable 
nervous ailments Bedlam and other houses of confinement existed where inmates 
were treated as less than human. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century 
and the beginning of the nineteenth century that the concept of melancholia began to 
move closer to our concept of depression, with its emphasis on ‘psychological’ 
factors such as fear, guilt, hopelessness and inertia, primarily through the rise of 
psychiatry. 
From 1750 onwards, a distinctly psychological explanation of madness (and 
melancholia) emerged. Following the appearance of the philosopher John Locke’s 
highly influential ideas, Cartesianism (where rational, sane, reasoning consciousness 
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was contrasted with madness as a physical, bodily illness) was replaced with the 
belief that madness (and depression) must be a product of mis-associations of 
thoughts and ideas, where madness was ‘…essentially delusional, a fault in 
cognition rather than in will or passion’ (Porter, 2002: 60), thus melancholia becomes 
transformed into a ‘mental’ disorder. This new way of understanding madness (and 
depression) gradually became medicalised throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries while the term ‘depression’ (from the Latin deprimere ‘to press down’) 
progressively came into use during the eighteenth century and beyond (Jackson, 
1986: 145-146).  
This gradual medicalisation of depression culminated in the emergence from 
the 1940’s onwards - following the development of penicillin and anti-biotics - of 
modern psychopharmacology, which led to the development of drug treatments for 
depression including so-called ‘designer’ anti-depressants, currently the SSRI’s 
(Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors) and SNRI’s (Serotonin-Norepinephrine 
Reuptake Inhibitors). In the last few years, there has been an explosion of 
psychopharmacological treatment for depression both in the UK and globally and a 
recent study (Spence, Roberts, Ariti and Bardsley, 2014) found that there was a 
165% rise in the prescribing of anti-depressant drugs in the UK between 1998 and 
2012.  
Alongside the rise of psychopharmacology there has been the development of 
comprehensive and international diagnostic systems, most notably the ICD 
(International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems) 
and the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). Much has 
been said about the proliferation of categories and types of mental disorder as these 
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systems have steadily developed and of relevance here is Porter’s (2002: 214) 
observation regarding what he calls the ‘explosion of scale’: 
Most telling of all has been the sheer explosion in the enterprise’s [DSM] 
scale: the first edition [1952] was some hundred pages; DSM-II run to 
134 pages, DSM-III to almost 500; the latest revision, DSM-IV-TR (2000) 
is a staggering 943 pages. More people seem to be diagnosed as 
suffering from psychiatric disorders than ever; is that progress?’ (Porter, 
2002: 214) 
The newest edition DSM-5 (2013) runs to 1000 pages. 
From this very brief sketch of some key events in the social history of 
melancholia, it becomes clear than an experience such as depression should not be 
abstracted from its social and historical context. Ancient Greek melancholy was a 
somatic disorder which varied according to the weather; the melancholy of the 
‘malcontent’ from the end of the sixteenth century, a fashionable pose; the 
melancholy of the Elizabethan lower classes, madness which required subjugation. 
The rise of psychiatry and then psychopharmacology evidence new constructions of 
madness and depression which continue to develop through the expansion of the 
comprehensive diagnostic systems. Finally, the variety of ways in which melancholy 
and depression have been constructed and experienced, both across time and within 
the same cultures, suggests that a narrow, clinical/abnormal psychology based 
conception of contemporary depression may be overly restrictive given that this form 
of understanding individualises and psychologises the experience, removing it from 
its broader social, cultural, relational and moral context. Such a conception also risks 
objectifying and even dehumanising those who experience depression. 
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3.4 Clinical and ‘Abnormal’ psychology 
Mainstream psychological theorising concerning depression comes primarily within 
the remit of the sub-discipline of ‘Abnormal Psychology’, where Clinical Psychology 
forms its related practice-focused domain. Here I will briefly outline the key 
conceptualisation of depression within this sub-discipline and critically reflect on 
some of its strengths and shortcomings.  
Major depression is conceptualised under an umbrella category of ‘mood 
disorders’ which includes for example ‘bipolar disorders’, ‘disruptive mood 
dysregulation disorder’, ‘persistent depressive disorder’ (previously dysthymia), 
‘premenstrual dysphoric disorder’ and other types of ‘abnormal’ mood. The different 
labels and diagnoses have changed and developed over many years through the 
different iterations of the DSM, up until its current form the DSM-5, published in 2013 
(please see chapter 1 for a summary of the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for major 
depression). Another commonly used diagnostic system with an alternative, though 
similar, set of criteria is that found in the ICD-10 or the International Classification of 
Diseases version 10, originally published in 1992 and regularly revised, although a 
new version is due for publication in 2017. The ICD-10 (2016) diagnostic criteria for 
major depression are as follows, where depression is measured/diagnosed as either 
mild, moderate or severe according to the number of criteria/symptoms that have 
been identified: 
In typical mild, moderate, or severe depressive episodes, the patient 
suffers from lowering of mood, reduction of energy, and decrease in 
activity. Capacity for enjoyment, interest, and concentration is reduced, 
and marked tiredness after even minimum effort is common. Sleep is 
usually disturbed and appetite diminished. Self-esteem and self-
confidence are almost always reduced and, even in the mild form, some 
ideas of guilt or worthlessness are often present. The lowered mood 
varies little from day to day, is unresponsive to circumstances and may 
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be accompanied by so-called "somatic" symptoms, such as loss of 
interest and pleasurable feelings, waking in the morning several hours 
before the usual time, depression worst in the morning, marked 
psychomotor retardation, agitation, loss of appetite, weight loss, and loss 
of libido. Depending upon the number and severity of the symptoms, a 
depressive episode may be specified as mild, moderate or severe. (ICD-
10, 2016 version).  
Earlier versions of the ICD-10 (1992) provided a list of symptoms as follows, 
which were also similar to the DSM criteria: 
The individual usually suffers from depressed mood, loss of interest and 
enjoyment, and reduced energy leading to increased fatiguability and 
diminished activity. Marked tiredness after only slight effort is common. 
For depressive episodes of all three grades of severity, a duration of at 
least 2 weeks is usually required for diagnosis, but shorter periods may 
be reasonable if symptoms are unusually severe and of rapid onset. 
Other common symptoms are: 
(a) reduced concentration and attention;  
(b) reduced self-esteem and self-confidence;  
(c) ideas of guilt and unworthiness (even in a mild type of episode);  
(d) bleak and pessimistic views of the future;  
(e) ideas or acts of self-harm or suicide;  
(f) disturbed sleep  
(g) diminished appetite 
The ICD-10 definition along with the DSM-5 definition described earlier in 
Chapter 1, give a good sense of the clinical/abnormal psychological understanding of 
major depression as a syndrome, as a cluster of related, associated and consistent 
symptoms which are conceptualised as the expression of some underlying ‘disorder’. 
The medical model is central to these conceptualisations where psychological 
disturbance is seen in terms of disease, in the same way as physical, bodily 
conditions would be. 
One key element of abnormal/clinical psychological definitions of depression 
(and other mental disorders) is the central defining feature of deviance or 
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abnormality. The following description clearly illustrates this centrality of the notion of 
deviance: 
Depression is defined as a persistent and deviant lowering of mood 
and/or a loss of interest in usual activities, accompanied by a variety of 
distinctive signs and symptoms. The depressed mood differs from 
normal sadness or unhappiness by its inappropriateness to the situation, 
intensity, duration and the effect it has on the life of the person who is 
experiencing it so that it interferes with normal living. (Ramsden, 2013: 
269) 
Usually this notion of abnormality refers to deviance from some statistical and/or 
behavioural norm or some other version of ‘normality’, and of course much has been 
written about the complexity and pitfalls of defining what we take to be ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ (for example, Foucault, 2006; Rose, 1985, 1999; Szasz, 2007).  Here I 
simply wish to make the observation that despite claims to a scientific and objective 
(disinterested) stance, any theory of the human condition must, by definition, come 
from a particular perspective or standpoint, it must draw upon some notion of what it 
means to be human and, in turn, what it means to be a ‘normal’ human; what it 
means to behave ‘appropriately’. Moreover, the ways in which we define normality 
and abnormality will always be bound up with the social, cultural, political, economic 
and especially historical process through which they are shaped and constructed, 
and crucial among these is what is termed the ‘moral order’ – defined as a body of 
unwritten rules and prescriptions and proscriptions which maintain what is good, 
right, virtuous in any culture or society – and this is fundamental in that it affords a 
kind of compass for where to direct our attention in our understandings of persons 
and the wider world.  
One useful example of the ways moral order is bound up with psychological 
theories and categories can be taken from the following definition of a ‘normal’ 
person, posted by psychiatrist Frederic Neuman in Psychology Today during 2013: 
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What sort of person is a normal person? He is someone, first of all, who 
feels happy a considerable part of the time. Not all the time, of course. 
He is angry when he is frustrated, disappointed when he fails. He grieves 
when he has lost someone. Sometimes he is frightened. But he is not 
characteristically in any single mood, for there is an aptness to his 
feelings, a fit between them and the circumstances of his life. Since the 
circumstances of every person’s life are varied, so are his feelings. Still, 
in general he thinks of himself as being happy. He can relate to other 
people, being assertive when appropriate and conciliatory at other 
times. He may not feel comfortable with everyone, but he does feel 
secure within his family and among his friends. And there are groups - 
religious, perhaps, or social - with whose members he feels an identity. 
And he can love, which means he can be trusting and affectionate. And 
he can make love without feeling oppressed or uncomfortable. Such a 
person often finds himself committed to other people, or even to an idea, 
to a degree where he loses himself in a larger purpose. Consequently 
when he has children, he becomes part of them and continues on in their 
lives, so that personal death becomes less real and less frightening. 
(Neuman, 2013) 
This version of normality illustrates on the one hand that descriptions such as 
this can resonate with our common sense, we might not agree with everything here 
but we know what the author is trying to convey. On the other hand, it also illustrates 
the minefield that one enters once we try to define what is ‘normal’ for a single 
culture, let alone the entire human race. It is interesting that the ‘normal’ person 
depicted here is a male who will inevitably have children, and whose (always 
appropriate) behaviour and emotions conform to a version of what might be 
described as the emotionally adjusted citizen. ‘His’ feelings always fit with, and are 
always appropriate to his circumstances, there is a sense of security and trust and 
this ‘normal’ person often finds himself committed to other people and/or to a larger 
purpose. Here we can begin to see the implicit moral order in this version of the 
‘normal’ person, indeed this description might serve as a useful representation of 
how persons should conduct themselves, the kinds of conduct they should aspire to. 
As Burman (2007) has so cogently argued, in psychology what begins as description 
can often meld seamlessly into prescription.  Moreover, ‘making love without feeling 
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oppressed or uncomfortable’ assumes a social and cultural situation where this 
would be possible, difficult for example if you are lesbian, gay, bisexual or trans in a 
country which hands out prison or even death penalties to members of sexual 
minorities, reminding us again of the kinds of assumptions being made here.  
As I have said, my purpose here is not to dismiss the value and utility of the 
vast amount of knowledge and experience tied up in the current diagnostic systems 
but to properly acknowledge their limitations and, more importantly, their historical, 
cultural, political, and economic conditions of possibility. Indeed, some have argued 
that key members of the DSM-5 panel had financial links with drug companies 
(Cosgrove and Krimsky, 2012) while others point to the continued reduction of the 
thresholds of ‘abnormality’ in the latest version of DSM: 
Successive revisions of psychiatric diagnostic manuals have generally 
reduced their thresholds for making this distinction [between major 
depression and just feeling miserable], such that someone who would 
have been considered miserable but healthy in the 1950’s might be 
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder from 2013 onwards. (Field 
and Cartwright-Hatton, 2015: 3) 
Further on in their text, Field and Cartwright-Hatton (op cit) posit a fictional 
world where psychological disorders are not categorised at all, for these 
psychologists such a world would mean that mental health disorders could not be 
treated without a category to make sense of and to label the ‘disorder’: 
Imagine a parallel universe in which psychological disorders are not 
categorised, everyone is treated as an individual and similarities 
between people are ignored. Bob goes to see his doctor complaining of 
hearing voices… The doctor has no idea what to do, so he just tries 
different treatments at random. He refers Bob for some counselling but 
this doesn’t help. Neither do antidepressant drugs. If only somebody had 
recorded the details of previous patients who had similar symptoms and 
signs to Bob! (Field and Cartwright-Hatton, 2015: 7) 
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This scenario, rather than convincing me that categorisation and 
generalisation is essential, instead points to the difficulty and complexity of 
acknowledging both that some psychological distress does seem to fall into distinct 
patterns with similarities between different people who suffer and - contrary to the 
above quote – the importance of treating everyone as an individual, as a unique 
human being who occupies their own complex, unique life-world. 
3.5 ‘Lay’ and autobiographical accounts 
There is a significant body of writing concerning ‘lay’ or everyday experiences of 
depression which includes personal, autobiographical narratives and there has been 
some proliferation and an intensified interest in these personal accounts over the last 
few years. Vicky Rippere (1977), who was at the forefront of the early work in this 
area, found that non-depressed lay persons have extensive and accurate knowledge 
about depression and this led her to argue later that the distinction between 
depressed and non-depressed clients is difficult to sustain given that most clients 
who attend therapy are depressed to some degree, (Rippere, 1994; Rippere and 
Williams, 1994). This blurring of the boundaries between depressed and non-
depressed clients, I suggest, also applies to the lay population more generally and is 
further reflected in the powerful ways in which depression, melancholia and sad 
‘blue’ mood are so profoundly embedded in Western culture, including art, fiction, 
literature and music. Everyday accounts of depression from those who may or may 
not have been formally diagnosed enable a more complete picture of the experience 
of depression to emerge - in comparison with that given through the diagnostic and 
clinical accounts - and in a way that fully allows for wide variation in accounts and 
experiences as well as for the similarities between them. 
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Many writers in this area convey the real difficulty in finding the right words to 
describe their depression and their struggle to communicate the fullness and depth 
of the lived experience. For example, in Rippere and Williams’ (1994) ground 
breaking text ‘Wounded Healers’ one contributor (Clinical Psychologist, anonymous), 
finds the use of metaphor helpful and this appears to be the case for so many who 
try to describe their depressed feelings. Here she/he describes their experience of 
‘failing powers of thinking’ (Rippere and Williams, 1994: 100), and of finding any kind 
of activity extremely difficult: 
It is exceedingly difficult to give a description that does full justice to the 
scope of a global condition such as depression. One of the best 
metaphors for depression, as I experienced it, is ‘wading through mud’. 
The expression captures the feeling of powerful resistance opposing and 
impeding any kind of action: thought, word or deed. (Clinical psychologist 
in Rippere and Williams, 1994:101). 
Not being able to find the words to convey one’s depression is also tied, for 
some, with a compounding of the negative feelings. Here a former mental health 
worker describes the way that not having a vocabulary made the depression worse: 
What was so bad about it [was that] I had no words for it. I didn’t 
understand [what is was]. It was definitely like a total abyss, you know, 
where everything that I’d ever counted on was gone somehow. Yeah it 
was terrifying to me… you know and the pain is really kind of raw just 
because you have no vocabulary for it, and you’d never experienced it 
before [female health worker, aged 27]. (Karp, 1996: 40) 
The onset of depression is also widely depicted in these personal accounts. In 
his recent best-selling text Reasons to Stay Alive (2016), Matt Haig opens with a 
description of the moment when his first bout of serious depression began: 
It started with a thought. Something was going wrong. That was the start. 
Before I realised what it was. And then, a second or so later, there was 
a strange sensation inside my head. Some biological activity in the rear 
of my scull, not far above my neck. The cerebellum. A pulsing or intense 
flickering, as though a butterfly was trapped inside, combined with a 
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tingling sensation. I did not yet know of the strange physical effects 
depression and anxiety would create. I just thought I was about to die. 
And then my heart started to go. I sank, fast, falling into a new 
claustrophobic and suffocating reality. And it would be over a year before 
I would feel anything like even half-normal again. (Haig, 2016: 9) 
The notion of falling into another world or experience is something that many 
other writers in this area describe. Kelly (2014) depicts in detail her sensation of 
falling, which for her recalled a memory of an actual emergency landing. Kelly’s 
depiction also provides a striking example of the extent to which depression is 
experienced as an embodied as well as a psychological or ‘mental’ phenomenon: 
I had this terrifying sensation that I was continuously falling, hurtling 
downwards as if on a crashing plane. I had once been on a plane that 
landed under emergency conditions in Dubai. The feeling was similar: I 
was braced, rigid with fear, waiting for the crash. This time the landing 
didn’t happen… I had a permanent headache, as though dozens of 
vicious, heat-maddened wasps were massed behind my eye sockets, 
stinging my soft, unprotected brain. My rancid stomach fiercely knotted 
and re-knotted itself, spinning in a sharp pointed pirouette. I no longer 
even seemed to be able to throw up. I kept repeating that I was going to 
crash. (Kelly: 2014: 9-11) 
For Haig (op cit) above there was, in retrospect at least, a clear beginning to 
his depression, whereas others have depicted a more nebulous onset. Here Ruby 
Wax portrays her gradual journey into what she describes as ‘a tsunami of despair’ 
(Wax, 2003:182): 
The minutiae of life started eating me alive; I had lost the big picture. I 
knew this because my life became consumed by making lists and when 
one thing got crossed off the list, more things grew in its place. I was 
holding on to sanity by giving myself ‘things to do’: buy toilet paper, 
change light bulb, get car washed, clip children’s toenails, brush teeth. 
The inside of my head became like Hong Kong: strobing neon on big 
billboards flashing day and night, day and night. (Wax, 2003: 181) 
Depression can begin in many different ways and the autobiographical 
literature reminds us of the necessity of acknowledging the wide variety of 
experiences of the onset of depression. Lewis (2011), for example, depicts an 
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initiating event in which she was unable to stop crying, followed by a long period of 
sleep, and also illustrates how, for some people who suffer from depression, 
recovery can be a very long road: 
I gave in to my most recent bout of depression when I started driving to 
work one day and found that I couldn’t stop crying. I thought this was 
odd and drove home… I went to bed and slept almost continuously for 
two weeks. It was five weeks before I could read again and I was off 
work for eleven months in all. It was two years before I began to feel like 
myself again. (Lewis, 2011: xiii) 
There are also descriptions of the intensity, depth and power of the feelings 
experienced during major depression. The following quote provides a compelling 
illustration of the experience of breaking down, widely reported in these accounts, 
where there is an experience of a complete disintegration of oneself: 
Sometimes the final realisation that you can no longer function or 
continue with life is called a breakdown. It’s a phrase rarely used by 
mental health professionals; it’s considered too patronising or 
demeaning. It’s sufferers themselves who use the expression most 
often, perhaps because it perfectly describes that state of total collapse. 
You no longer have control over anything: thoughts, emotions, sleep, 
appetite. You are, quite literally, broken down. To me it felt like the total 
disintegration of everything I had ever known about myself. (Brampton, 
2009: 42) 
In another description, the author William Styron stresses that major 
depression is very different from what he termed the ‘manageable doldrums’ (Styron, 
1990: 7). The ICD-10 lists ‘depression worse in the morning’ as one possible somatic 
symptom, however Styron experienced something different: 
While I was able to rise and function almost normally during the earlier 
part of the day, I began to sense the onset of the symptoms at mid-
afternoon or a little later – gloom crowding in on me, a sense of dread 
and alienation and, above all, stifling anxiety. (Styron, 1990: 12) 
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Styron goes on to describe the gradual diminishing of his ability to concentrate 
and then his inability to do any work (writing) at all. Fear and anxiety were also at the 
heart of Styron’s experience of depression: 
…I felt an immense aching solitude. I could no longer concentrate during 
those afternoon hours, which for years had been my working time, and 
any act of writing itself, becoming more and more difficult and 
exhausting, stalled, then finally ceased… There were also dreadful, 
pouncing seizures of anxiety. One bright day on a walk through the 
woods with my dog I heard a flock of Canada geese honking high above 
trees ablaze with foliage; ordinarily a sight and sound like that would 
have exhilarated me, the flight of birds caused me to stop, riveted with 
fear, and I stood stranded there, helpless, shivering, aware for the first 
time that I had been stricken by no mere pangs of [alcohol] withdrawal 
but by a serious illness whose name and actuality I was able to finally 
acknowledge. (Styron, 1990: 46) 
Styron’s depiction illustrates well the role of extreme fear and anxiety in some 
experiences and he goes on to say that he felt at this time as if he was going mad, ‘I 
couldn’t rid my mind of the line of Baudelaire’s… “I have felt the wind of the wings of 
madness” (Styron, 1990: 46). 
In addition to an experience of loss of self, of dread, anxiety and alienation, 
there are descriptions of hopelessness and a sense of being overwhelmed by the 
depression: 
I would say it kind of feels like somebody is holding a match that’s lit and 
just the flame is really hot and you’re trying to stand it, and it’s just 
consuming you more and more and then it just gets down to the end and 
there’s no more, and the consuming part is just complete hopelessness. 
You start off as a whole person and then little by little things that you 
care about start floating away and they’re not important anymore and 
they get harder to hold on to… the easiest thing to do is to just to lie 
down and let it consume you. (female Nanny, Karp, 1996: 21) 
There are also accounts of suicidal thoughts and suicide attempts throughout 
this literature. What comes through from these accounts is the deep and dreadful 
anguish and despair that can occur when there really seems no way out of the 
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depression, or the ‘prison of depression’ as Dorothy Rowe described it, other than 
taking one’s own life. Moreover, these thoughts of and/or planning of suicide can 
endure even after the depressive episode. Here a Senior Nursing Tutor describes 
her feelings of isolation, helplessness and her continued belief that suicide would be 
a way out of similar circumstances should they happen again: 
What went with this [‘crying and complaining’ over health difficulties] was 
my firm conviction, not only that I would never get any better, but also 
that life was not worth living. It seemed quite obvious to me that I ought 
to have committed suicide, but I was too incompetent, indolent, and 
helpless to do it. My preoccupation with ending life was very pressing for 
a long time and has certainly not left me entirely. At the moment life is 
good but given the cumulative difficulties, as I perceived them at the 
time, it would have been better to be dead. Should a similar set of 
circumstances ever happen again, I hope to be better prepared than I 
was the last time to take my life. (Senior Nursing Tutor, Rippere and 
Williams, 1994: 168) 
Sadly, one of the contributors, a General Practitioner succeeded in taking her 
own life shortly after Rippere and Williams’ (1994) book was published. Here she 
ends her account with her wish that if her situation worsens circumstances will not 
prevent her from carrying out her suicide plan: 
Even in my happiest periods, when I look forward to a long and fruitful 
life, and the very thought of suicide is abhorrent, I am still not at all 
grateful for being rescued from attempts in the past… I am fortunate now 
in having the means and opportunity to kill myself without fear of failure 
should the need once more arise. My strongest wish is that if the present 
depression deepens, then it will progress too rapidly to allow anyone to 
detain me compulsorily before I have time to reach the point at which 
suicide becomes mandatory. (General Practitioner, Rippere and 
Williams, 1994: 175) 
Many of these autobiographical accounts of depression are also stories of 
recovery, of lessons learnt, of the slow path back to oneself. For example, for Lewis 
(2011: 207) depression should be seen as a call to identify what is wrong with, and 
to make changes to, one’s life: 
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This is where you need to turn detective. Your depression is the most 
important case of your life: you must probe, agitate and investigate until 
the whole sordid story is out in the open. If you weren’t ashamed of it, 
you wouldn’t have hidden it in the first place. This may take a long time, 
and psychotherapy or therapy may be necessary… Your mission is to 
find out what needs to change in your life and to change it. (Lewis, 2011: 
207) 
Haig (op cit) describes an event at the start of his recovery when he attended a 
party, always a difficult experience for him he says, where he had a kind of relapse 
and hastily left the event. However, this time his panic attack stopped: 
…my panic attack had gone. In the old days, my panic attacks didn’t just 
go. They simply morphed into more panic attacks, breaking me down, 
like an army, until depression could come in and colonise my head. But 
no. I was feeling quite normal again. A normal person who was allergic 
to parties… That itself was progress. A year later I would be better 
enough to not only go to the party, but to travel there on my own. 
Sometimes on the rocky, windy path of recovery, what feels like a failure 
can be a step forward. (Haig, 2016: 200-201) 
There are also concerns over stigma and prejudice. A very common theme in 
these accounts is the experience of feelings of shame along with the stigmatisation 
of mental disturbance and illness and the ways this makes telling others and getting 
help so much harder: 
I am mentally ill. It doesn’t mean I will stab you or stalk you or demand a 
low-calorie recipe for cheesecake when I am sitting next to you on the 
Tube. It doesn’t mean I will dribble or smell or abduct your infants or 
infect your pets. It doesn’t mean I want to rule the world or take risks with 
your money or corner you at a party and talk about depression… I don’t 
think it’s a condition that should invite prejudice. People with lung cancer 
and heart disease are not ostracised or humiliated or debarred from jobs 
or opportunities, even though in some cases their lifestyle will certainly 
have contributed to their affliction… No wonder most of us keep our thing 
to ourselves. (Rice-Oxley, 2012: 280) 
With regard to other research into the experience of depression, there is an 
emphasis on finding commonalities within samples of participants, identifying types 
of narratives used in conveying the experience of depression and a focus on issues 
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concerning gender. For example, Kangas (2001) conducted in-depth interviews with 
depressed people with a particular focus on the participant’s narrative structures. 
Kangas distinguished three narrative types. Firstly, a storyline based around early-
life development, in particular shortcomings in childhood. A second storyline focused 
on overwhelming demands and work-related burn out. A third storyline centred on 
causative factors which included severe life events in adulthood. Kangas also found 
that in each key narrative there was reflection upon other narratives of depression 
and a presentation of the experience as a ‘legitimate form of suffering’ (Kangas, 
2001: 90) and as a form of illness rather than a type of madness. 
Other studies have explored the relationship between gender, gender-identity 
and depression in everyday accounts and narratives. For example, Emslie, Ridge 
and Ziebland (2006) used narrative analysis to explore the relation between 
masculinity and help seeking in depressed male patients. They analysed sixteen in-
depth interviews with depressed men across the UK. It was found that reconstructing 
a valued sense of masculine-identity was a key element of the participants’ recovery. 
Various strategies were identified in this regard including the incorporation of 
hegemonic masculinity into the illness narratives. In addition to these positive 
strategies there was evidence that pressures to conform to hegemonic masculinity 
could contribute to suicidal behaviour. 
Walters (1993) in a study of 356 Canadian women, found that stress, anxiety 
and depression were the most frequently reported health problems. Walters found 
that when the participants talked about the sources of their mental distress these 
were often located within a broader context of social influence and often in relation to 
gender identity: 
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They emphasized the social aetiology of mental health, noting the 
importance of gender roles and images of women. They described the 
heavy workload of women, issues of identity and their social legacies. 
(Walters, op cit: 393). 
Walters concluded that the women in her sample tended to normalise their 
distress and that this may reflect the wider societal and cultural lack of validation and 
reinforcement of women’s experience of health problems.  
The complex and subtle ways in which gender inequalities are reproduced in 
discourses of madness and mental illness have long been recognised (for example, 
Chesler, 1972/2006; Ussher, 1991; 2005). Part of this reproduction of inequality is 
related to a wide-spread lack of recognition of the specificity of women’s experiences 
and a concomitant lack of cultural and medical validation. LaFrance (2009) 
conducted a discourse analytic study of understandings of depression using a 
women-only sample. She found that women’s accounts were deeply influenced by 
medical discourse. By objectifying their depression as an independent identity (or 
diagnosis), women were able to seek comfort and validation for their feelings. 
Negative experiences of stigmatisation were also discussed by these women, and 
despite placing their distress within a medical framework, their experience still felt 
illegitimate in comparison to other more validated diseases.  
3.6 Cross-cultural analysis 
Although many cultures have expressions or concepts that appear similar to our 
Western term ‘depression’, it is crucial to understand that such ‘equivalent’ terms are 
often embedded in an entirely different social and cultural context. Furthermore, as I 
have previously argued, an important part of this context is the culture’s prevailing 
moral order, often downplayed or even ignored in the mainstream clinical/abnormal 
psychological literature. In this section I review some cross-cultural research in order 
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to provide an example of the relevance of the cultural context to understanding 
personal experiences of depression.  
There is a significant body of work in critical/alternative psychology which 
explores the social construction of emotions. This work makes a case against 
physiologically and otherwise reductionist accounts of emotions in favour of accounts 
which are sensitive to the (local) social, cultural and historical construction of 
emotional experience. If we take fear as one emotion that may form part of the 
experience of depression (and many other psychological disturbances), our western 
understanding of this term does not necessarily relate to concepts of fear in other 
cultures. Catherine Lutz (1986) in a well-known study of emotion words on the 
Micronesian atoll of Ifaluk showed that the word ‘metagu’ is used in contexts that are 
similar to those in which we use the word fear, that is, in the presence of a 
threatening or dangerous object. However, in other ways the concept of ‘metagu’ 
operates in quite a different sense. In the words of Harré (1986: 10): 
Among the Ifaluk, those who are submissive and passive in metagu 
[during provoking situations] are commended, while those who display 
an aggressive stance are condemned. The moral qualities with which 
the concepts are associated are such that it would surely be a gross 
mistranslation to treat ‘metagu’ as equivalent to ‘fear’. 
This example illustrates the role of the moral order in emotional experience, a role 
which is often more visible in cultures other than one’s own.  
Another example of the role of culture here is provided by Tanaka-Matsumi 
and Marsella (1976) who looked at the subjective experience of depression among 
Japanese nationals, Japanese Americans, and Caucasian Americans through the 
use of word associations to the terms ‘depression’ and ‘yuutsu’ (which through 
extensive back translation was considered to be closest to our term depression). 
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Word association patterns were very different for the Japanese National and the 
American sub-samples. The Japanese samples tended to use ‘external’ reference 
words such as ‘rain’, ‘cloudy’ and ‘dark’ whilst the two American samples tended to 
use internal reference words such as ‘sadness’, despair’ and ‘loneliness’. It appears 
then that where equivalent words do exist for depression they may be embedded in 
a different context which alters their meaning in complex ways.  
More recent work has continued to show the culturally specific nature of 
depression. For example, Pritzker (2007) interviewed Chinese participants 
diagnosed with depression to explore the ways in which Chinese metaphorical 
language is employed to make sense of the experience. Pritzker argued that 
following a Cartesian mode of thinking, Western cultures have a tendency to split the 
mind and the body which are typically referred to using symbols of the brain and the 
heart respectively. In contrast, Chinese medico-philosophy enables the heart to be 
used as a metaphor for both thinking and feeling and this was largely confirmed in 
Pritzker’s study. 
Ryder, Yang, Zhu, Yao, Yi, Heine and Bagby (2008) sought to further explore 
the consistent findings that Chinese people are much more likely to report somatic 
symptoms of depression. In a Study of 175 Chinese and 107 Euro-Canadian 
outpatients, data was collected using a symptom questionnaire, structured clinical 
interviews and spontaneous problem reports. Chinese outpatients reported more 
somatic symptoms whereas Euro-Canadians reported more psychological 
symptoms. Ryder et al (op cit: 300) concluded that ‘the relation between culture and 
somatic symptom presentation was mediated by a tendency towards externally 
oriented thinking’. Moreover, the psychological symptom effects were found to be 
larger than the somatic symptom effects. Given this and the findings from other 
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studies, which suggest the worldwide occurrence of somatic symptom reporting, the 
authors conclude that western psychologisation may be more culturally specific than 
the tendency towards somatic symptom reporting among Chinese people.  
Mallinson and Popay (2007) undertook a qualitative exploration of Pakistani 
and White participants living in the UK who self-identified as depressed. There was a 
tendency for both groups, across age, gender and ethnic boundaries, to employ 
everyday and colloquial language to express their experience. Terms and tropes 
such as ‘low’, ‘down in the dumps’, ‘stressed’ and ‘under pressure’, enabled 
participants to make potentially alien feelings more familiar. This process was 
echoed with the use of metaphors, analogies and similes, for example ‘it just crashes 
over me’ and ‘washes over me’ were water related analogies used by participants in 
an attempt to express the overwhelming nature of depression. Whilst these themes 
were found in both groups, White participants had a greater tendency to refer to 
suicide, whilst the Pakistani group did not. Moreover, the White participants relied 
upon biomedical accounts of depression more than their Pakistani counterparts. 
Similar findings emerged in a study examining explanatory models of depression in 
Indian women of low income, with participants rarely drawing upon a medical 
discourse but emphasising somatic problems such as body aches, sleep and 
gynaecological difficulties (Pereira, Andrew, Pednekar, Pai, Pelto and Patel, 2006).  
Finally, Kokanovic, Dowrick, Butler, Herrman and Gunn (2008) explored 
concepts of distress among different communities resident in Australia. They 
collected data from 62 Anglo-Australian residents concerning their experience of 
depression and 30 East African refuges. Participants were either interviewed or took 
part in focus groups. The following findings were reported: 
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Anglo-Australian accounts frequently portray depression as an individual 
experience framed within narratives of personal misfortune, and which 
is socially isolating. In the accounts of distress from the Somali and 
Ethiopian refugees living in Australia, family and broader socio-political 
events and circumstances featured more frequently, and ‘depression’ 
was often framed as an affliction that was collectively derived and 
experienced. (Kokanovic et al., 2008: 454) 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter the experience of depression has been considered in different ways 
and from different perspectives. Looking at the social history of melancholia and 
depression, it becomes evident that what we currently term ‘depression’ has 
markedly changed across time having been shaped by many different beliefs, ideas, 
practices and events. Likewise, cross-cultural research clearly evidences the cultural 
variation in the ways in which the experience of depression is described and made 
sense of, along with some of the problems encountered in trying to make translations 
of psychological and other terms across languages and cultures.  
As would be expected, the abnormal and clinical psychology/psychiatric 
conceptualisation of depression, based upon a medical, nosological approach, 
presents a somewhat narrow, reduced account of major depression rooted in 
symptomology and the notion of depression as a syndrome. In contrast, the 
personal, autobiographical accounts of depression show a wide range of different 
experiences and the use of everyday language, as opposed to a clinical/biomedical 
vocabulary, enables the richness and complexity of the different experiences to 
emerge. However, it is also striking that the different autobiographical accounts 
share many key elements and themes, and some of these themes also correspond 
with the diagnostic criteria set out in the DSM and ICD; albeit where the personal 
accounts evidence many different and more varied events, patterns and 
interpretations. Thus, on the one hand the personal accounts support, to some 
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extent, the overall diagnostic criteria but at the same time these accounts highlight 
the reduced, restricted and partial nature of the nosological, diagnostic descriptions.  
One important aim of this project is to allow participants to convey their 
experience of depression in a way that includes the key DSM diagnostic criteria but 
where participants are not limited to them. I will give participants a wide range of 
relevant statements with which to describe their depression (through an online 
sorting task) and these will include nine statements taken from the key DSM 
diagnostic criteria for major depression, which generally encompasses most types 
and severity of depression other than those with mania or psychotic symptoms. This 
way it should be possible to discern the role and meaning of the DSM criteria in 
participants’ own accounts of their lived experience of depression.  
As I previously stated (Chapter 1), my key objective is to document and 
explore the variety of experiences of depression among participants who have been 
diagnosed and/or self-report as having had an experience or experiences of 
depression, either currently or in the past. I ask the questions ‘How do participants 
experience (clinical and non-clinical/self-identified/diagnosed5) depression? How do 
participants’ experiences resemble or differ from established psychiatric and clinical 
psychology accounts of depression and how might the findings be relevant to 
existential counselling psychology practice? 
  
                                                          
5 Self-disclosed diagnosis 
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Chapter 4 (Part 1): Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the methodology and the methods used in this project. As 
described in Chapter 2, this study utilises a qualitative design within a social 
constructionist conceptual framework.  From a social constructionist perspective, I 
am primarily interested in the subjective meanings which participants ascribe to the 
experiences and events under examination, where language is conceptualised as, in 
part, playing a role in constructing the subjects and objects referred to in participants’ 
accounts. Moreover, given the constructionist position of this thesis, I take a 
somewhat relativist stance to the data and do not assume these accounts represent 
more or less fixed or ‘accurate’ versions of the experience of depression but rather 
conceptualise them as versions (which are of course personal and experiential) that 
are in some sense situated; in part bound to their social, cultural, relational and 
temporal context and location. In terms of methodology I utilise an existential-
phenomenological approach to method which at the same time should be seen as 
interlinking conceptually with social constructionism, in particular through a shared 
focus on both the nature and the conditions of possibility of lived experience.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. In part one I focus on methodology 
with an account of the particular form of phenomenology used in this thesis, along 
with some historical and conceptual contextualisation of two key existential-
phenomenological philosophies. In part two I provide an account of method for the 
preliminary phase of the study where data was collected using two focus groups 
constituted with a ‘clinical’ and ‘nonclinical’ sample. I then go on to describe the 
method for the main Q methodological phase of this research in which participants 
were asked to sort a series of statements concerning the experience of depression. 
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Q methodology allows participants to express their subjective experience while factor 
analytic statistical methods enable the researcher to uncover the major accounts or 
experiences (which emerge as statistical factors) conveyed by participants in the 
sample. In this study each factor will represent some broadly shared experience of 
depression found among the participants. 
4.2 Existential-Phenomenology 
In this section I outline my understanding of existential-phenomenology as a broad 
and multi-layered philosophical movement, and in particular the distinction between 
descriptive and hermeneutic approaches. I then go on to describe the approach to 
phenomenological methodology that I take in this research. The term 
‘phenomenology’ – in use from the early 19th century and more fully developed as a 
philosophical project by Edmund Husserl - denotes a wide range of sometimes 
fundamentally different approaches to not only philosophy, but also the social 
sciences, a range of research methodologies, the theory and practice of psychology 
and psychotherapy and much more. Here I am interested in what is termed 
existential-phenomenology. Existentialism and phenomenology as two areas of 
concern can and have been understood as entirely separate; in the mid-20th century 
there were passionate debates about the relationship between these two areas and 
whether or not there were, in fact, any commonalities between them at all (Dreyfus 
and Wrathall, 2006:1). I do not intend to detail those debates here but it is important 
to acknowledge the complexity of bringing these two areas together and that some 
philosophers and theorists have objected to this union. However, there are many 
links between the two movements and many common themes.  
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Existential-phenomenological approaches all, in one way or another, address 
questions concerning the structure and meaning of embodied and lived everyday 
human experience and pose fundamental questions concerning what it means to be 
human, what it means to exist. Existentialism, as a branch of philosophy, moves us 
away from a metaphysics of substance and replaces this with a metaphysics of 
freedom and for some this relates to what Neitschze referred to in his now famous 
description of the ‘death of God’ (see Nicolaus, 2011): 
Existentialists are not primarily concerned with human life in general, but 
with the life of particular existing individuals. They are concerned with 
human life viewed as a series of decisions and choices, and the first goal 
is to make us aware of ourselves as living individuals who, in our 
freedom, make decisions and are responsible for them. (Oaklander, 
1996:3) 
This metaphysics of freedom signifies a move away from what we might call 
‘academic’ philosophy towards an approach which grounds itself in concrete, 
embodied, here-and-now lived experience. Moreover, this new approach to 
philosophy also includes the assertion that existential themes, both in part and in 
profound ways (through what have been termed existential ‘givens’), play a role in 
shaping other, seemingly unrelated forms of experiencing and knowing. For me, it is 
important to include here (related to the work of Foucault) knowledge itself, or 
systems of thought which in turn link to (dominant and subjugated) discourses. In 
fact, Dreyfus (2004) suggests that there is a rough parallel between Heidegger’s 
central concept of Being and Foucault’s central concept of power: 
The history of being gives Heidegger a perspective from which to 
understand how in our modern world things have been turned 
into objects. Foucault transforms Heidegger's focus on things to a focus 
on selves and how they became subjects. And, just as Heidegger offers 
a history of being, culminating in the technological understanding of 
being, in order to help us understand and overcome our current way of 
dealing with things as objects and resources, Foucault analyzes several 
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regimes of power, culminating in modern bio-power, in order to help us 
free ourselves from understanding ourselves as subjects (Dreyfus, 
2004:1). 
Dreyfus (op cit) provides many interesting and useful comparisons between these 
two great thinkers and in particular he emphasises their shared interest in providing 
a critical space in which we can acknowledge the constructedness of, and think 
anew, our existence.  
Phenomenologists take an interest in the ways, and the forms through which, 
reality appears to us or manifests itself to us. Rather than assuming that ‘real’ 
objects are perceived by a wholly separate consciousness, as with for example a 
Cartesian understanding (though the early work of Edmund Husserl provided less of 
a departure in this regard), phenomenologists take an interest in the ways that things 
are constituted within a field of subjective experience and where personal meaning 
and significance are a fundamental part of that field. Put another way, what Husserl 
termed the ‘life world’ or lebensweld (Husserl,1936/1970) is something within which 
we are fully immersed, and most importantly, rather than the world existing in some 
kind of objective state that then comes to us through our senses, the ‘life world’ is 
always already imbued with meaning, judgements, social and cultural 
representations and understandings; things have significance to us in varied and 
complex ways which are not fully reflected in an objectivist version of reality. Thus, 
here there is an important contrast with scientific and positivist approaches regarding 
their claim for some kind of objective, material world of facts ‘out there’ to be 
discovered through empirical means. There are also links here to a broader 
philosophical interest in the relationship between how things appear to us and what 
is real; for Husserl reality always presents itself to us through appearances. 
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It is primarily Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre who have been 
categorised as both phenomenological and existentialist thinkers although they had 
very different views about these philosophies. Heidegger always rejected the label of 
existentialist (see Cohn, 2002) as he believed that existentialism merely persisted 
with the errors of modernism, whereas Sartre fully and readily embraced it. In the 
words of Dreyfus and Wrathall, (op cit: 1-2): 
Heidegger's standing in the existential tradition is secured by his 
exploration of the existential structure of Dasein or human being, his 
historicised account of essences, his critique of the banality of conformist 
everyday life, and his reflections on guilt, anxiety, and authenticity… 
[Whereas] Sartre shared Heidegger's focus on existential, worldly 
relationships, but sought to account for those relationships in a 
Husserlian fashion by focusing on consciousness. 
4.3 Which Phenomenology? 
I now wish to move on to consider the ways in which existential-phenomenology 
relates to the theoretical framework and research methodology used in this project 
through a focus on the traditions initiated by Husserl and Heidegger. I then go on to 
outline some elements of Heidegger’s thinking, especially with respect to his 
observations about mood, which are relevant to this thesis. It is generally accepted 
that phenomenological approaches can be split into two key traditions; descriptive or 
transcendental phenomenology (exemplified by the work of Husserl and later 
championed by Moustakas, 1994 and Giorgi, 2009) and hermeneutic or interpretive 
phenomenology (exemplified by the work of Heidegger,1962 and his subsequent 
followers, for example Paul Ricoeur,1983).  
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is credited with developing phenomenology as 
a fully-fledged philosophical and methodological framework. He emphasised the 
need for the detailed, repeated description of lived experience in order to get back to 
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‘the things themselves’ (Husserl, 1901/2001:168). To enable this detailed 
description, he devised methods of reduction or epoché, an example of which is 
eidetic reduction, which is a process of continued imaginative variation of the 
phenomenon being studied in order to eventually reveal what is essential to its 
structure. Moreover, for Husserl a central element of the reduction is that in order to 
gain any access to these essential structures there must be some form of 
suspension of judgement on the part of the researcher. This did not necessarily 
entail taking a position of doubt concerning the existence of certain objects in the 
world but was rather a means to bracket off, to set aside, our judgements and 
assumptions. 
Spinelli (1990: 18-19) summarises the three interrelated steps within Husserl’s 
phenomenological method as follows: 
Step A: the rule of epoché which ‘urges us to set aside our initial biases 
and prejudices of things, to suspend our expectations and assumptions, 
in short, to bracket all such temporarily and as far as is possible, so that 
we can focus on the primary data of our experience.’ 
Step B: the rule of description which ‘urges us to remain initially focused 
on our immediate and concrete impressions and to maintain a level of 
analysis with regards to these experiences, which takes description 
rather than theoretical explanation or speculation as its point of focus’ 
Step C: the role of horizontalisation (the equalisation rule) which ‘further 
urges us to avoid placing any initial hierarchies of significance or 
importance upon the items of our descriptions, and, instead, to treat each 
initially as having equal value or significance’. 
For Husserl, the epoché enables the researcher to adopt what he called the 
‘phenomenological attitude’ which, as outlined above, consisted of bracketing, or 
placing to one side, our normal, taken for granted assumptions and values and which 
operates in contrast to the ‘natural attitude’, which for Husserl is the usual 
unreflective and assumption and value laden attitude that all human beings adopt in 
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their everyday lives. Furthermore, in this way, the method of reduction or epoché 
enables researchers to gradually and methodically gain access to the transcendental 
elements of human experience. In fact, for Husserl, the terms ‘phenomenology’ and 
‘transcendental’ were often interchangeable. Thus, Husserl believed it was possible, 
through his phenomenological method of reduction, to gain access to the 
transcendental ego or ‘pure’ consciousness. However, in his later work he moved 
somewhat away from the idea of the transcendental ego and a consciousness of 
experience towards what we would now understand as the existential, lived world, 
(Finlay, 2011). It was Heidegger and others who then took this shift towards the lived 
world much further and I will return to this shortly.  
Husserl’s early focus then, on the ways in which things are constituted within 
the field of subjective experience, entailed moving away from scientific and positivist 
claims to provide a more basic or foundational account of the ‘real’ world that we 
encounter in our experience and perception. For Husserl, phenomenology must 
always study the life-world as opposed to the objective ‘real’ world brought to us by 
science. Here he was also drawing from Kant the idea of a priori elements within 
consciousness - meaning that which is presupposed in, and necessary for and to, 
experience. Furthermore, Husserl suggested that intentionality (and here he draws 
upon the work of Brentano) was at the heart of human consciousness and for him 
transcendental phenomenology fundamentally meant a phenomenology of 
consciousness. Thus, in his model there remains some form of consciousness which 
in some sense constitutes that which we experience and this is one of the key 
elements challenged and critiqued by those that followed, especially his most 
famous student Martin Heidegger. 
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Heidegger (1889-1976) critiqued and developed Husserl’s project in a way 
that Heidegger described as returning to the fundamentals of the phenomenological 
project. For Husserl transcendental subjectivity was understood as something which 
constitutes the subjective fields of significance and meaning whereas for Heidegger 
this conception of subjectivity did not properly move beyond Cartesian dualism. In 
this vein, for Heidegger the notion that we are all rational beings is a kind of 
anthropologism.  
Heidegger was interested in the primal nature of Being, the specific ways in 
which consciousness discloses itself to us. In this way he seeks to account for the 
underlying nature of Being or Dasein - loosely translated as Being-there, ‘human 
entity’ or existence - which offers a way to rethink the ‘entity’ we understand as 
ourselves, in a way that releases us from previous conceptualisations and 
understandings, and in a way which moves beyond the subject/object dualism - 
where subject and object become rather a ‘being-in-the-world’. It has been 
suggested that one useful way to understand the difference between the work of 
Husserl and Heidegger is that while Husserl’s was an epistemological project, where 
the cogito remains intact, Heidegger’s project was ontological, he was concerned 
with understanding Being itself, asking the question; what is Being? (Phillips, 2014: 
611). Thus, Heidegger seeks to begin with the question of Being, as fundamentally 
that which comes into being precisely because Being is an issue for us, ‘[Dasein is] 
that entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue…’ (Heidegger, 1962: 
68). 
Heidegger suggests that we are ‘thrown’ into the world - this of course is not 
something we choose - and that Dasein is not only ‘being-there’, but also and 
fundamentally a being-there-with-others or ‘Being-with’ (Heidegger, 1962: 149). 
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Moreover, ‘thrownness’ not only leads Dasein to be-with-others, but also constitutes 
Dasein in its temporality because, just as we are thrown into life, into existence, we 
are also at the end of our lives thrown out. We are then, in Heidegger’s words, a 
Being-towards-death. Crucially, it is death, through our projecting ourselves into the 
future and anticipating death or non-being, knowing that our lives are finite, that 
makes time itself meaningful for us. In this way Being, life, death and time are all 
ontologically intertwined. Furthermore, for Heidegger a self-consciousness always 
exists for another self-consciousness and this links to Hegel’s dialectic of 
recognition. Drawing on this, Heidegger suggests that mutual recognition is a 
condition of possibility for Dasein. Thus, the mutual recognition which is a 
fundamental part of Dasein’s Being-there-with-others is central to our understanding 
of death and temporality, as Osborne illustrates: 
…as a self-interpreting, self-conscious being, Dasein’s individuality 
cannot be derived from its anticipation of death independently of its 
relations with others. Rather, Dasein must first, or simultaneously, be 
constituted as a self-conscious being through its relations with others, in 
a dialectic of recognition, in order that it may become the kind of being 
which is capable of anticipating its death as the end towards which it is 
thrown, and hence of constituting itself existentially as a Being-towards-
death.’ Osborne (1995:70)  
In this way death makes existence an issue for us, death gives us existential 
awareness or put another way, ‘it is recognition which “temporalises” time’ (Osborne, 
op cit: 80). 
4.4 Heidegger’s understanding of mood  
For Heidegger, Dasein can be compared to a clearing (something like a clearing in 
the forest or the woods), as that which discloses the world to us, ‘Dasein is its 
disclosedness essentially’ (Heidegger, 1962: 263), however the question of what 
Heidegger means by this and what it is that Dasein discloses is in fact complex not 
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least because Heidegger said different things about this issue (Haugeland, 1992). 
However, here I wish to focus on Heidegger’s understanding of emotion and of 
particular relevance for this study of depression is Heidegger’s notion of mood as a 
fundamental aspect of how we find ourselves (how the world is disclosed to us) and 
as contributing to the sense we have of belonging to a world. A mood ‘comes neither 
from “outside” nor from “inside”, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of 
such being’, (Heidegger, 1962: 176). Thus, Heidegger’s understanding of mood is 
not synonymous with the way we would normally use the term - to mean a 
generalised affect - as Ratcliffe (2013b: 159) further elucidates: 
A mood, for Heidegger, does not add emotional colour to pre-given 
objects of experience. We can only have objects of experience insofar 
as we already find ourselves in a world, and we would not find ourselves 
in a world at all without mood. For the same reason, a mood is not a 
generalised emotion. 
Cohn (2002) points to the difficulties in translating the two key terms that 
Heidegger uses in this area of emotion; Befindlichkeit, literally meaning how we find 
ourselves and which Cohn (op cit) suggests best translates as ‘attunement’ and 
Stimmung which translates as something like ‘mood’ or ‘feeling’ (Cohn, op cit prefers 
the latter). Others have translated Befindlichkeit as ‘disposition’, ‘situatedness’, 
‘affectedness’, ‘so-foundness’ and these different translations give a sense of both 
the complexity of what Heidegger means by this term and the difficulty of translation 
to English given Heidegger’s complex vocabulary. However, what is perhaps most 
relevant here is the relationship between these two concepts. For Heidegger 
‘attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) is existential (or ontological) and is expressed ontically 
as our everyday ‘feeling’ (Stimmung): 
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What we indicate ontologically by the term “state of mind” [Befindlichkeit] 
is ontically the most familiar and every day sort of thing; our “mood”, our 
Being-attuned. (Heidegger, 1962: 172) 
Thus Heidegger offers a way to understand what is underneath our everyday 
feelings and the way those feelings are inextricably linked to our situatedness; where 
our feelings are always bound up with the way we find ourselves in the world: 
[Dasein]… always finds itself already situated; being in the midst of 
things is being, in each case, already in some definite situation. The 
expression “finds itself” is Heidegger’s. With it he is clearly adverting to 
the constitutive item in being-amidst that he calls Befindlichkeit: that 
essential character of living Dasein that, in each case, it always finds 
itself already situated. (Haugland, 1992:37) 
Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit, I argue provides an important alternative 
understanding to the established clinical and psychological accounts of feelings and 
mood, one in which it is possible to get beneath the lived experience, to get to 
something deeper, something existential, that is to begin to consider the ontological, 
existential aspects of sad mood and depression. Ratcliffe (2013b: 157) offers a 
further useful exposition of Heidegger’s use of this term Befindlichkeit: 
Being in some mood or other is, according to Heidegger, a fundamental 
“existentiale” of Dasein. In other words, it is essential to the distinctively 
human way of having a world… In the absence of mood, we would not 
find ourselves in a world at all and would therefore cease to be Dasein. 
Heidegger refers to the characteristic of finding oneself in a world 
through a mood as “Befindlichkeit”, a notoriously difficult term to 
translate. 
In order to more fully understand this notion of finding oneself in a world 
through a mood it is also important to consider Heidegger’s description of what he 
called ‘care’ or ‘concern’ (Sorge) as a primordial state of Being, as ‘the structure of 
Dasein itself’ (Heidegger, 1992: 293). Heidegger posits three basic elements of 
existence or existenziale; Befindlichkeit, Verstehen (usually translated as 
understanding) and Rede (usually translated as discourse) which are all interrelated 
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and should not be separated out from one another. This tripartite structure of care 
(Sorge) alerts us to the ways in which mood, understanding and discourse need to 
be understood together in order to move towards a deeper, existential understanding 
of our feelings and emotions. Thus, Heidegger’s understanding of emotions as 
always bound up with situations, or in other words that ‘feelings belong to the ‘Da’ of 
‘Sein’, to the ‘there of Being’ (Cohn, 2002: 61), might shed further light on what it 
means to be depressed and what a depressed mood discloses to us. In the words of 
Polt (1999: 66 cited in Cohn, op cit: 61) ‘they [feelings] show us things in a more 
fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can’. In this way, Heidegger’s 
conceptualisation of emotions may enable an analysis of the existential (ontological) 
elements of depressed mood that provides one possible alternative to the 
established, mainstream psychological and medical models. Indeed, depression, 
particularly severe depression, would seem particularly apposite as a form of mood 
in which the world appears changed in a deep and profound way, as Ratcliffe, 
(2013b: 261) suggests: 
…[A]lmost every account of severe depression includes references to 
changes in mood or feeling that are inextricably bound up with profound 
alterations in how one finds oneself in the world. For some, the possibility 
of encountering things as mattering in certain kinds of way is altogether 
gone from experience. People often report that all sense of practical 
significance has vanished and, alongside it, a sense of the potential for 
emotional connectedness with other people.  
Thus Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, along with his related concepts of care 
and the way that mood and emotions are fundamentally bound up with this structure, 
is something that may shed light upon, and help to further explicate, participants’ 
experiences of depression. I return to these concepts later in the thesis. 
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4.5 Personal reflection 
For me phenomenology is something that I had been aware of in my academic work 
for some time, particularly as a crucial area of philosophy and theorising which 
preceded structuralism and post structuralism, but until recently it remained an 
approach that I had not engaged with at a deeper level. Of late, I came across 
phenomenology through my teaching of qualitative methods and in particular my 
teaching and project supervision involving Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis 
(Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009), which is becoming increasingly popular in 
psychology, especially health psychology. Much IPA research always seemed to me 
to have a very thin, watered-down version of phenomenology which seemed only to 
add on a minimal engagement with reflexivity (a kind of reflexivity which, in any case, 
is typical of much qualitative work in Psychology), adding a ‘double hermeneutic’ to, 
in practical terms, a method of doing qualitative analysis which seemed to me to be 
fundamentally straight forward thematic analysis.  
However, my reading and my classes for my DCPsych course have enabled 
me to learn much more about phenomenology and to try to better understand the 
way in which it fits into 20th-century theorising and philosophy and in particular recent 
critiques of mainstream psychology. As I have read in the area and conducted my 
research for this thesis I have come to understand that much of my work and 
teaching to date, especially my understanding of qualitative methods in psychology, 
was already profoundly shaped by phenomenology and, without naming it as such, I 
had been teaching some phenomenological ideas for some time. I now have a 
deeper sense of the complexity and utility of this approach and this experience has, 
in some way, felt like a kind of returning ‘home’. 
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I also want to say something about my feelings concerning Heidegger’s links 
to Nazism. It is clear to me that Heidegger’s association with, and personal views 
about, Hitler and National Socialism are complex and difficult to fully ascertain. While 
there appears to be contradictory evidence about the extent to which he personally 
supported Hitler’s regime, it is beyond doubt that Heidegger was a member of the 
Nazi party and that there is evidence that he, at the very least outwardly, participated 
in the party and in the anti-Semitism of the time. Furthermore, some of his speeches 
and actions were ambiguous in this regard to say the least. My own feelings about 
this issue are mixed. On the one hand I fully understand those academics and 
practitioners who will not engage with Heidegger’s work on principle because of his 
Nazi past, and on the other I can see that the form and meaning of his Nazi 
associations are somewhat opaque and difficult to conclusively define. For me his 
work is of such importance that I wish to engage with it and to learn from it, however 
I can never shake my uneasy feelings about this issue and continue to read his work 
with ambivalence and anxiety.  
4.6 What about the truth? 
Finally, I wish to consider the issue of the extent to which psychological (including 
counselling psychology) research can or should be understood as providing an 
account that we might take to be true, or to represent the ‘real’ world in some way. 
My own long-standing way of making sense of the issue of truth and reflexivity in 
relation to psychological research has been through the idea of an opposition 
between truth and representation, where representations and the ways these 
circulate in our cultures both provide possibilities for and at the same time place 
limits upon our understandings and experiences. For me, all research produces 
particular kinds of representations which may be taken to be true, or have some kind 
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of truth value applied to them, however we can never have unmediated access to 
some form of absolute truth, in the words of Edward Said: 
‘the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of 
anything, or whether any or all representations, because they are 
representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the 
culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representor. If the latter 
alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is) then we must be prepared 
to accept the fact that a representation is eo ipso [by that very act] 
implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other 
things besides the ‘truth’, which is itself a representation, (Said 1979: 
272-273). 
For Heidegger phenomenological method is always interpretive, moreover he 
argues that there is never pure description but rather description is always in some 
sense already interpretation. Thus, from a Heideggerian position research must 
always be seen as an interpretation, transcendental consciousness is never possible 
and our research findings must be seen as a product of both that which is studied 
and the person, the Being, that studies it. Finlay (2008: 3) provides a useful threefold 
account of the issue thus: 
First, hermeneutic phenomenologists argue that any description of lived 
experience by participants has to be seen in the context of that person’s 
life situation and projects… Secondly, interpretation is further implicated 
as researchers empathise with, and make sense of data by drawing on 
their own understandings (which arise out of their life experience). 
Thirdly, interpretations are filtered through a spatial-temporal lens and 
arise out of particular cultural and historical fields… We cannot help but 
bring ourselves into the research. 
However, it is important to remember that Heidegger’s account of truth is very 
different to the social constructionist/post-structuralist notion of truth as 
representation or as an effect of discourse. For Heidegger, truth is understood as 
‘aletheia’ – as something that is disclosed or unconcealed. ‘Aletheia’ is not 
equivalent to a notion of correspondence or accuracy but rather describes the 
disclosure of Being, and this operates at the ontological level. Therefore, the kinds of 
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representational and discursive processes described in social constructionism would 
only be possible because of this unconcealment of Being, which is more elemental 
or foundational to existence and lived experience. A full account of the complex and 
interesting differences between the work of Heidegger and the social constructionist 
perspective(s) outlined earlier is beyond the scope and remit of this thesis, however 
it is important to acknowledge these sometimes fundamental differences and that 
bringing the different approaches together is not without its difficulties and limits.  
Given this, I primarily take a social constructionist approach to truth in this 
project which acknowledges the very fine line between description and interpretation, 
however I also take on board Heidegger’s notion of ‘existential truth’, or a ‘lived/living 
truth’, which I return to towards the end of the thesis. For me there can never be 
such a thing as pure description, by definition any description is always already an 
interpretation. Moreover, our interpretations are made possible through not only our 
personal experiences but also and perhaps primarily through the social and cultural 
meanings (representations) that exist (and which we have internalised, introjected) at 
any particular time. It is those social and cultural meanings which operate through 
the discourses that we draw upon in order to make sense of ourselves, others and 
the world around us. Without an acknowledgement of this we are unable to 
meaningfully account for the (historical) limits which form the horizon of what it is 
possible to say, to think and to do. 
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Chapter 4 (Part 2): Methods 
4.7 Introduction 
In this second part of the chapter I present a detailed description of the two methods 
that were used in this project. Of these two, thematic analysis - adopted for the 
preliminary focus group phase of data collection - clearly falls under the rubric of 
qualitative methods. However, the second method, Q-methodology, combines 
elements of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.  
The first phase of this research consisted of a preliminary study of a small but 
diverse sample of participants who had experienced depression either currently or at 
some point in the past (or both). Two focus groups were conducted which were 
subsequently qualitatively coded (using thematic analysis) and the results were 
incorporated with other sources and a wide range of literature for the development of 
materials (statements) for the main study. This second, principal, phase of the study 
utilised Q-methodology where 46 participants were asked to sort (online) a series of 
58 statements concerning the experience of depression, placing these statements 
along a continuum ‘most like me when I’m depressed’ to ‘least like me when I’m 
depressed’. The Q-sorts can then be factor analysed (person by person) to reveal a 
number of factors, each of which represents a common experience of depression 
within the sample.  
In relation to methodology, as I’ve already indicated in part 1, while this 
research utilises an existential-phenomenological framework to situate and make 
sense of what participants tell us, overall I take a social constructionist perspective to 
this thesis which, for me, offers a useful way to question and to problematise many 
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taken for granted aspects of more mainstream (often quantitative) methods and 
approaches within psychology and counselling psychology. 
4.8 Phase 1: Method for preliminary focus group study 
4.8.1 Design 
The initial data collection phase of this research involved a small scale qualitative 
exploration of participants’ self-reported experiences of depression. This preliminary 
study deployed focus groups to collect qualitative data which was subsequently 
analysed using thematic analysis (please see details below). Two focus groups (with 
a total of eleven participants) were conducted with visual stimuli (a range of images 
of depression, please see Appendix 2 for examples) used to elicit as much personal 
description (and group discussion) as possible from participants concerning their 
experiences of depression. The key aim was to uncover as full a range as possible 
of descriptions of this phenomenon so that these could contribute to the preparation 
of materials used for constructing the final Q-sample (statements). 
4.8.2 Participants 
11 participants were recruited through purposive and snowball sampling, aged 26-
48, average age 33. All participants were required to have self-identified as having 
experienced depression at some point in their lives. For the purposes of this study, 
two contrasting groups were identified, one where participants had not been treated 
for depression or any related condition, and one where all but one participant had 
been treated. The first group was composed of persons who had experienced mild to 
moderate depression and the second group was composed of persons who had 
experienced severe depression. In this way each group was fairly homogeneous in 
terms of perceived severity of depression and ‘clinical’ versus ‘non-clinical’ 
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experience – which here I define as having been professionally diagnosed and/or 
treated in some way now or in the past for depression or a related disorder.  
Group one was recruited through a contact of the researcher and comprised a 
group of work colleagues (Marketing professionals) and group two was recruited via 
a social network site, Facebook. Most of the participants in group two did not know 
each other although two did have a relationship (siblings). Group one was 
predominantly male, group two was more mixed but was predominantly female.  
Table 4-1 Participant demographics for the focus group research 
Focus Group 1 (mild-moderate depression/’non-clinical’) 
Participant Gender Age Self-identified ethnicity 
Treated for 
depression? 
Prescribed anti-
depressant 
medication? 
1 Male 48 White/British No No 
2 Female 48 Indian No No 
3 Male 43 British/Pakistani No No 
4 Male 32 British/Asian No No 
 
 
Focus Group 2 (severe depression/’clinical’) 
Participant Gender Age Self-identified ethnicity 
Treated for 
depression? 
Prescribed anti-
depressant 
medication? 
1 Female 27 White/British Yes Yes 
2 Female 26 Mixed Race/French Yes Yes 
3 Male 29 White/British No No 
4 Female 26 White/Irish Yes Yes 
5 Female 30 White/British Yes No 
6 Male 26 White/Australian Yes Yes 
7 Female 31 White/British Yes Yes 
4.8.3 Materials 
A focus group protocol was designed (see Appendix 2) drawing upon reading and 
research in the area and in line with established focus group practice (Bloor, 
Frankland, Thomas and Robson, 2002; Morgan, 1997; Puchta and Potter, 2004). 
Thirty-five pictures were sourced from the internet using Google Images. These 
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pictures were all elicited using the key words ‘depression’ and ‘depressed’ and the 
researcher selected a range of pictures which gave a wide coverage of available 
images - having surveyed a large number of images from this source. Several 
example pictures are given in Appendix 2. Other materials included an information 
sheet, participant information questionnaire, consent form and debriefing information 
sheet (all can be found in Appendix 1).  
4.8.4 Procedure 
Both focus groups took place at the University of Westminster in central London.  
Participants were asked to carefully read the information sheet before the group 
discussion and had also been given this information prior to attending. Participants 
were then asked to complete the consent form and the participant details 
questionnaire and were reminded that participation is fully confidential. After 
introductions and a warm up exercise the researcher briefly explained that the main 
research interest was looking at experiences of depression which had lasted more 
than 2 weeks (roughly following the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria of two weeks minimum 
duration). Following a warm up exercise participants were asked to select one or 
more images as follows: ‘Choose an image or images that represent a sad, 
depressed feeling (or feelings) you’ve experienced or are experiencing now’. 
Participants were then asked – each in turn – to explain their choice of picture(s) and 
to tell the group something about the feelings and events they felt the picture(s) 
represented. Once all participants had talked about their pictures, a more general 
discussion was facilitated by the researcher. At the end of the discussion participants 
each – in turn – stated how they were feeling at that moment and were asked to 
identify something positive that they would take from the group. Participants were 
then given the final debriefing information sheet to take away with them.  
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4.8.5 Analysis 
The data was analysed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Boyatzis, 
1998; Patton, 1990; Tuckett, 2005) and taking a ‘semantic’ approach (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006: 13). The analysis was conducted in six phases (adapted from Braun 
and Clarke, op cit: 16); 1) transcription of the data, 2) reading and familiarisation with 
the data, 3) generating initial codes, 4) searching for themes, 5) reviewing themes, 6) 
defining and naming themes. However, there was an additional step (between 5 and 
6) where the themes from the two groups were combined so that the final themes 
reflected experiences from both groups. In this way, a more detailed, in-depth 
understanding of the experiences of participants was assembled in a form suitable to 
contribute to the subsequent construction of the Q-sample (for an overall summary of 
themes, please see Chapter 5). 
4.9 Phase 2: Q Methodological study 
4.9.1 Design 
An analysis of the lived experience of depression requires a method that assumes 
no a priori definition and therefore – in terms of data collection - imposes no prior 
conceptual framework (for example in the form of a hypothesis) upon the experience 
to be studied. I will now outline the origin of Q-methodology and describe its 
operation in more detail. 
Q methodology, developed by Stephenson (1935), is a statistical technique 
which allows the emergence of each participant’s particular interpretation, 
understanding or experience. In terms of procedure, Q methodology is very much a 
quantitative (factor analytic) technique, however Stephenson reversed the usual way 
in which factor analytic techniques had been used, up until then, within psychology. 
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This reversal, which was in fact an inversion of the existing R-methodology (the 
usual way of using factor analysis in psychology which correlates participants’ 
responses to scale items/questions), makes Q methodology very different to other 
factor analytic techniques and procedures normally used within psychology. In Q 
methodology, persons rather than items are correlated, so that the emerging factors 
represent shared experiences and understandings rather than internal psychological 
characteristics or essences. In this way Q methodology is somewhat radical in its 
approach within psychology prioritising as it does, lived experience over theoretical, 
often essential constructs. McKeon (1990: 28) describes the significance of 
Stephenson’s new approach: 
The method’s origins can be traced to a brief letter Stephenson 
published in Nature 1935 in which he proposed applying factor analysis 
to persons rather than to traits. By way of this “inverted” use of the 
technique… Stephenson was advancing a new concept as well as a 
different employment of a powerful statistic.  
William Stephenson (1902-1989) was trained in physics at Oxford and 
Durham universities and gained his PhD in this field in 1926. He then went on to 
study psychology and psychometrics at University College London under Charles 
Spearman, and while he was there he also worked with Cyril Burt. In 1929 
Stephenson completed a second PhD this time in the field of psychology. 
Throughout his career Stephenson sought to marry the scientific rigour, that was 
such a central aspect of academic psychology at that time, with an approach to 
subjectivity that properly enabled participants’ own experiences and viewpoints to 
come to the fore - in a way that was far less shaped by or, for some, distorted by the 
subjectivity and viewpoints of the researcher. In this sense while Q methodology is 
fundamentally quantitative in nature, drawing upon factor analytic statistical 
techniques originally pioneered by Charles Spearman, its broader methodology fits 
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better with current qualitative approaches to psychology. The somewhat more 
contemporary aim that participants’ lived experiences should be central to qualitative 
psychology is very relevant here, where respecting difference and giving voice to 
participants is seen not just as a methodological requisite (Larkin, Watts and Clifton, 
2006) but also as an ethical and political strategy (Stainton-Rogers, Stenner, 
Gleeson and Stainton-Rogers, 1995). 
Q methodology enables participants to make their own sense of the ‘items’ (in 
this case a series of statements concerning the topic or experience in question), so 
that participants, through the act of sorting statements, are able to more or less 
represent their own personal experience and understanding. Steve Brown, (1980: 3) 
- probably Stephenson’s best-known student - makes the case for enabling 
participants to convey their own subjectivity in this way: 
Language-in-use is by its nature symbolic and self-referential, with each 
combination of words being capable of carrying a wide range of 
meanings. For an investigator to regard his own understanding as in 
some sense objective or correct is therefore pretentious in the extreme. 
Thus Q methodology, while on the one hand utilising rigorous and powerful 
statistical techniques, on the other hand can accommodate the many possible ways 
that participants can bring their own personal experience into focus. This is in stark 
contrast to established psychometrics where the meaning of items, for example in a 
psychological scale, is predetermined by the researcher and their theoretical stance. 
Brown, (1980: 3) goes on to remind us that: 
When a subject responds to a scale item… the meaning and significance 
his [sic] response has for him may differ in major respects from the 
meaning assumed by the Observer or anyone else, and to ignore this 
possibility is to be unwilling to accept what is before one’s eyes, to be 
aspect blind, and to prefer the artificial to the natural.  
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Thus, Q methodology eschews the hypothetico-deductive methodology of 
mainstream psychology and provides an inductive method for understanding 
participants’ subjectivity, or more precisely their self-reference. Stephenson (1980: 8) 
himself emphasised the element of discovery with regard to his technique; ‘what is 
involved is the discovery of hypotheses and reaching understandings, instead of 
testing hypotheses by way of predictability and falsifiability.’ Thus, in contrast to R-
method, here the concept/topic/phenomenon in question is assumed to have no 
meaning apart from the respondent’s self-reference,6 that is Q-method is a method 
of ‘impression’ as opposed to ‘expression’ (Beeb-Center, 1929). With methods of 
expression (R-methods), participants are measured for traits, attitudes and so on as 
if they ‘resided’ within the individual as (measurable) essences. Q-method however, 
as a method of impression, allows the individual to assign their own meaning to the 
research question in terms of her or his own frame of reference. Q-method then, 
allows the individual to make their subjectivity operant (Brown, 1980; McKeown and 
Thomas, 2013; Watts and Stenner, 2012). 
While Q-method has been utilised with a range of conceptual frameworks 
such as discursive, narrative and other qualitative methodological approaches, I wish 
to utilise it as a phenomenological research method. Shinebourne and Adams (2008: 
103) have argued - following a study of the attitudes, beliefs and experiences of 
therapists working with clients with problems of addiction – that Q-methodology: 
…can make a contribution to expanding the repertoire of 
phenomenological research methods available to psychotherapists…Q 
methodology is particularly suitable for identifying commonality and 
                                                          
6 It should be noted that Q-method attaches no truth value to the ‘voice’ articulated by the participant, 
it assumes that each of us has access to many different voices or ‘texts’. In this study I would ascribe 
participants’ experiences the status of subjective truth but would not assume that this truth is 
necessarily fixed or unchanging. 
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diversity and has a powerful capacity for thematic identification and 
analysis. 
4.9.2 Participants 
Q-method requires a highly diverse person sample (P-sample) so that participants 
reflect a wide range of demographic variables in order to ensure inclusion of as 
many different experiences as possible. Forty-six participants (a sample of 40-50 is 
usually recommended for most Q studies), aged between 19 and 83 (mean age = 
44.2, SD = 13.90) were recruited using a variety of methods, including personal and 
professional contacts (using snowballing), my placements, and a dedicated 
Facebook page. Ethnicity was not purposively sampled for and accordingly the 
sample was predominantly White/British with some White Welsh/Irish. There were 
also some participants identifying as Black and Asian/British and a small number of 
participants from Europe and beyond. Only participants who self-identified as having 
experienced depression currently or in the past were sought. Sampling aimed for 
diversity, such that as broad as possible a range of demographic variables could be 
achieved, including age, severity of depression, whether or not diagnosed and a 
rough balance between genders. Demographic variables were recorded in 
confidence.  
Of the forty-six participants, 28 (61%) were female and 18 (39%) were male. 
23 (50%) had been diagnosed with a depressive illness and 17 (37%) were either 
currently taking medication or had done so in the past. In terms of severity, 15 (33%) 
self-identified their depression as mild, 19 (41%) as moderate and 10 (22%) as 
severe (2 [4%] did not give any information in this regard). 
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Table 4-2 Participant demographics for Q-methodological study (* denotes author’s 
Q-sort) 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-identified 
ethnicity 
Ever 
diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed anti-
depressant 
medication? 
1 Male 39 Spanish Yes Severe No 
2 Female 40 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
3 Male* 50 White/British No Mild No 
4 Female 49 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
5 Male 50 White/Welsh No Mild No 
6 Female 21 Indian No Moderate No 
7 Female 48 White/Irish Yes Moderate Yes, currently 
taking 
8 Female 49 White/British Yes Severe Yes, currently 
taking 
9 Female 26 Black/British No Moderate Yes, currently 
taking 
10 Female 48 Polish No Mild No 
11 Female 29 White/British Yes Moderate No 
12 Female  35 Black/British Yes Moderate No 
13 Male 45 White/British Yes Severe Yes, in the past 
14 Female 36 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
15 Female 47 Black/British Yes Severe Yes, in the past 
16 Female 44 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
17 Female 59 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, currently 
taking 
18 Male 46 White/British No Mild No 
19 Male 45 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
20 Male 48 White/British No Mild No 
21 Female 58 British/ 
Malaysian 
No Mild No 
22 Female 47 Brazil Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
23 Male 46 White/British No Mild No 
24 Male 29 White/British No Moderate No 
25 Female 29 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, currently 
taking 
26 Female 45 White/British Yes Moderate No 
27 Female None 
given 
None given None given None 
given 
None given 
28 Male 47 None given None given None 
given 
None given 
29 Male 36 White/German No Severe No 
30 Female 19 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
31 Female 48 White/British No Mild No 
32 Male 52 British/Asian No Mild No 
33 Male 50 White/British No Mild No 
34 Male 67 White/British Yes Mild No 
35 Female 57 White/British No Mild No 
36 Female 24 White/British Yes Severe Yes, in the past 
37 Male 58 White/German Yes Moderate No 
38 Female 83 White/British No Mild No 
39 Female 71 White/British Yes Mild No 
40 Female 28 Egyptian No Mild No 
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Participant Gender Age 
Self-identified 
ethnicity 
Ever 
diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed anti-
depressant 
medication? 
41 Male 27 Black/British Yes Severe No 
42 Female 42 British/Asian No Severe No 
43 Female 44 White/British Yes Moderate No 
44 Female 71 White/Welsh No Severe No 
45 Male 25 White/British No Moderate No 
46 Male 31 White/British No Severe No 
 
4.9.3 Materials 
For Q-method to elicit the fullest range of experiences within the sample it is 
important that the statements which the participant sorts (called a Q-sample) are 
representative of as many of the prevailing experiences or discourses as possible. 
Thus the Q-sample must broadly represent the wider array of whatever it is possible 
to say about a particular topic or experience, and Stephenson (1978) called this the 
concourse. Thus one key task in a Q-methodological study is to produce a Q-sample 
(or Q-set) from the wider concourse in an organised and methodical way. For 
Stephenson any concourse will obey the role of finite diversity, meaning ‘that 
whenever and wherever persons are applied to a sample of elements [this] results 
not in chaotic proliferation but in the expression of several ordered patternings of… 
understanding (Stainton Rogers, 1995: 180). Sampling from the concourse requires 
careful and detailed collection and analysis of the available accounts, 
understandings and experiences, in this case relating to what it is like to feel 
depressed. This stage of the research requires a great deal of time and effort on the 
part of the researcher. (Stainton Rogers, op cit: 186) describes the process thus: 
This stage of a Q methodological study does not look unlike a structural 
analysis, or the proper ground work to the generation of questionnaire 
items, or, indeed, some form of discourse analysis. Many of the same 
craft skills hold. Open-ended material is sifted, ordered, condensed, to 
yield a representative pool of propositions. 
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Thus, the Q-sample was constructed through close reading of a wide range of 
relevant academic and popular literature and other sources (for example 
autobiographical accounts, some of which are presented in the literature review in 
chapter 3), as well as the results from the preliminary focus group study, so that the 
Q-sample included as many of the relevant experiences and issues as possible. 
Nine statements were also produced based upon the diagnostic criteria for major 
depression in DSM-5, so that these statements could be sorted alongside the others, 
please see Appendix 4 for these statements.  
To produce a viable sample of representative statements for the study, the 
following procedure was adopted: 
 A wider sample of approximately 400 statements concerning the 
experience of depression was drawn from the range of materials described 
above. 
 These 400 statements were then grouped under 14 emergent themes 
where the number of statements for each theme was also noted. 
 All 14 themes identified above were included as the basis of the final Q-
sample where each theme included a number of statements which roughly 
represented the frequency of occurrence of statements/themes in the 
original sample. 
 The statements were then continually refined and edited for readability and 
comprehension to produce 58 statements with all 14 themes represented 
(please see Appendix 4). 
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4.9.4 Procedure 
Q-method requires each participant in the sample to sort a series of statements into 
a particular order/pattern that reflects that person’s experience of the question or 
topic under investigation. No definition of the experience is assumed beforehand but 
is inferred from the location of the statements sorted by the respondents, as she or 
he distributes them along the Q-sort continuum. For this study the statements were 
rank ordered from ‘least like me when I’m depressed’ (-5) to ‘most like me when I’m 
depressed’ (+5). This means there were 11 columns including the zero column which 
was available for participants to place items that they felt ambivalent or unsure 
about, or where they did not understand the meaning. The following grid was used 
for participants to arrange their statements: 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
Figure 4-1 Q-sort grid with sort values for each column 
 
An HTML software package was used to present the Q-sort (HTMLQ version 
1.0.0) so participants were able to complete the sort on-line. This programme 
presents statements in random order and participants are asked firstly to sort the 
statement into 3 piles; ‘least like me when I am depressed’, ‘most like me when I am 
depressed’ and ‘neutral/unsure/ambivalent’. Participants then place the statements 
onto the grid, one pile at a time, and can change the placement of any statement as 
many times as they wish until they are happy with their sort. Once the sort is 
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complete participants are then asked to describe why they placed the statements in 
the ‘5’ and ‘-5’ columns and there is also a space for any additional comments.  
The arrangement of items in each Q-sort is then compared with the arrangement of 
every other Q-sort in the sample using factor analysis so that the emergence of 
orthogonal factors is evidence of different experiences in the sample; an individual’s 
positive loading on a factor indicating his or her shared subjectivity with others on 
that factor.  
4.9.5 Analysis 
Once the data had been collected, the placement of each statement for each 
individual Q-sort (in numerical form) was entered into a specially designed statistical 
programme (PQMethod version 2.35). The data were then factor analysed using the 
Principal Components technique and then programme rotated (as opposed to hand 
rotation) using the Varimax facility in the software. The Principal Components 
analysis automatically produces eight factors and all eight of these factors satisfied 
the criteria for going forward to rotation (having an eigenvalue of 1 or above). Once 
the rotated factors have been produced a decision must then be made concerning 
which of these factors is interpretable (I present the details and results of this 
process in Chapter 6). Once the calculations and factor selection procedures have 
been performed the programme produces a data file which includes a table of all 
factors showing each participant’s loading, and marks where any loading is 
significant, (see Appendix 5). The programme also provides factor arrays for each 
factor showing the placement of all statements for each factor, which are then used 
to interpret the factor along with any comments participants have given regarding the 
statements they placed in the +5 and – 5 columns. In addition, statements which are 
sorted in significantly different ways for each factor (distinguishing statements) and 
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statements which are sorted similarly for each factor (consensus statements) are 
also reported which, in turn, are used as part of the process of interpretation. 
4.10 Validity of phenomenological research 
Issues of validity need to be thought about in different terms for phenomenological 
research compared with other psychological methods, given that this approach takes 
a more complex and nuanced stance on the nature of truth and objectivity, including 
the role and effect of the researcher’s own subjectivity. Rather than validity being 
judged in terms of correspondence to some real or actual facts, objects or events, 
here validity is understood in terms of other concepts, such as applicability, 
transparency, coherence and fruitfulness. Finlay (2011: 264-265) suggests the 
following four evaluation criteria (which she terms the ‘four R’s’) for 
phenomenological research: 
Rigour: has the research been competently managed and systematically 
worked through? 
Relevance: concerns the value of the research in terms of its applicability 
and contribution. 
Resonance: taps into emotional, artistic, and/or spiritual dimensions 
which can probably only be judged in the eye of the beholder. 
Reflexivity: is a broad category which refers to the researcher’s self-
awareness and openness about the research process. 
I have endeavoured to fulfil all these criteria while conducting this research, 
however readers must ultimately decide on the extent to which they feel these 
criteria have been satisfied. 
4.11 Ethics 
This project operated at all times within BPS ethical guidelines and was given prior 
ethical approval from the NSPC ethics committee. All participants were fully briefed 
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and de-briefed and required to give full consent to participate. Participation was fully 
confidential and the identities of participants were protected at all times. Participants 
were able to withdraw from the study at any point and were given a debriefing 
information sheet concerning depression after taking part which included signposting 
to services, websites and self-help groups. Participants were also able to contact the 
researcher (myself) at any time if they had questions or concerns. A summary of the 
research findings - upon completion of the project - was also made available to 
participants on request. Likewise, focus group participants were able to request a 
copy of their transcript. 
With regard to the focus groups, the sensitive nature of the topic was partly 
managed through the way the group discussions were structured. The protocol 
included a gentle warm up exercise and the use of visual stimuli to help participants 
share their experiences. The groups finished with participants sharing their final 
feelings about the group and any positive aspects of the experience that they would 
take away. 
For me, the ethical duty of care in research and in psychological practice not 
only concerns abiding by certain professional values and standards, but more 
importantly is reflected in my personal conduct and the individual stance I take 
towards participants and clients. It was crucial for the success of this study that 
participants trusted me enough to share their often deeply personal and sometimes 
very painful experiences and life events. I do not believe that such trust can be 
created through any formula or solely through abiding by certain rules, rather I had to 
be open and honest with participants - where for example they contacted me with 
questions about the study prior to participating – so that they were able to see who I 
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am, how I work and how I understand and make sense of depression and mental 
health more generally. This, for me, is just as important, possibly more important, 
than the practical issues, for example fully briefing participants on the nature of the 
task they are being asked to undertake. As with so much of this work, ethics is 
essentially personal and it always feeds in to the relationships we create in our 
research and through our work as practitioners. 
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Chapter 5 Results of preliminary focus group study 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present the results of the preliminary study which involved collecting 
data using two focus groups. I begin with a general summary of the group process 
and the main issues and experiences raised in each of the two groups and then go 
on to present four related higher order themes that emerged from the thematic 
analysis.  
5.2 Overall description of focus groups 
Group 1 was a smaller group (four participants) comprised of three males and one 
female. No one in this group had experienced severe depression or ever been 
treated for depression or a related condition. As the facilitator I had to take the lead 
in enabling the (male) participants to talk about their feelings and in fact overall there 
was less discussion of how depression feels in this group. Towards the end of the 
session there was a general consensus that ‘real’ depression (as something deeper, 
more profound and longer term) was not something anyone had experienced but 
rather they had experienced feeling ’very low’, feeling ’overwhelmed’. Depression felt 
‘stuck’, ‘lonely’, ‘heavy’, ‘black’, isolated’, lacking in hope and related to hiding away 
and shutting people out. There was a strong emphasis on losing and gaining 
motivation, taking action, taking control and getting things done. Being active in 
changing one’s thinking and problematic situations were seen as key means of 
‘digging’ oneself out of depression. Overall, this group gave a snapshot of what 
might be termed non-clinical, everyday depression. 
Group 2 was a larger group (seven participants) comprised of two males and 
five females. All members of this group had experienced severe depression and all 
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but one had been treated for depression or a related condition. Three participants 
had been prescribed medication for depression or a related condition. As the 
facilitator I had a much easier task with this group who after the initial warm up and 
discussion of chosen images were very keen to share their experiences with me and 
each other. With this group there was a great deal of talk about the feelings 
associated with depression and a rich picture emerged of what depression is like for 
the group along with how participants made sense of this experience. Depression 
here felt ‘heavy’, ‘frustrating’, ‘isolating’, ‘ambiguous’, like a ‘deep hole’, a ‘black 
hole’, ‘stuck’, ‘difficult to vocalise’, ‘self-conscious’, ‘confusing’, ‘indulgent’, ‘not 
understood’ and something to hide or cover up. There was a strong emphasis on the 
difficult and painful aspects of the experience including dealing with and anticipating 
the often unhelpful reactions of others. There was also an emphasis on depression 
as something which might recur, something participants had to learn, over time, to 
live with and to accept. Overall, this group seemed to represent a snapshot of a 
more ‘clinical’ type of depression.  
5.3 Results/themes 
From the thematic analysis, four related higher order themes emerged which I have 
represented diagrammatically below. Please also see the table of themes in 
Appendix 3 and sample transcripts in Appendix 6. All themes are fully interrelated. I 
describe each theme in more detail below. All excerpts below are referenced as 
follows (group number: speaker number: line number). 
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Figure 5-1 Main themes and their relationships 
5.3.1 Theme 1: Feeling depressed/depressed feelings 
Feeling depressed/depressed feelings emerged as the central, overarching theme 
and reflected the most immediate experience of depression with the least reflection 
and sense making. Feeling depressed was ‘black’, ‘dark’, like being in a ‘deep hole’ 
(2:S5:43). One participant likened it to having a black hole inside her: 
…because I actually physically feel a black hole somewhere around here 
[points to lower chest] that’s kind of like twisting and pulling on itself.  
That’s usually around like around the height of it [points to chest] 
(2:S5:132). 
Because for me I feel like, if you feel like kind of like a black hole and 
you’re like sort of everything that you say to yourself and do is kind of 
like it’s just like sucking negative things down into it (2:S4:131). 
…it feels heavy and black (1:S4:203). 
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Feeling alone and not wanting to be with others was another common 
experience and, in part, was linked to a fear of being judged or not properly 
understood: 
I appreciate and understood a lot of what people were saying about sort 
of feeling uncomfortable talking to other people because you don’t want 
to be a burden.  You also don’t want them to kind of go like, “Get over it.  
Oh it doesn’t matter.”  Like to have your sort of pain or sadness ridiculed 
(2:S8:82). 
A key difficulty that emerged in Group 2 was not knowing the cause of the 
sadness which was, in part, linked to a societal and cultural ‘pressure to be happy’: 
…even though I have no reason, supposedly no reason to be depressed 
you still kind of feel depressed and that sets the frustration.  And also 
that kind of pressure to be happy.  That’s where depression often comes 
from for me.  That sense of kind of needing to be [inaudible 00:04:25] 
and get on with things and enjoy what you have and make the most of 
the things and to succeed.  So, but then still to feel depressed is a sense 
of kind of I guess failure or not being able to sort of get on in that but 
yeah… Depression for me is that ambiguity not knowing what the source.  
If I feel sad, I’m sad about a particular thing and it’s quite clear how to 
process that or deal with that.  The depression is that murky ambiguity 
as to where it’s coming from and not knowing what to do about it 
(2:S3:18). 
Overall, depression was a deep, difficult, very painful and intense sadness 
combined with hopelessness, fear and sometimes anxiety. Feeling different and self-
conscious while with others added more difficulties and challenges. Depression is 
not the same as being sad – where sadness will have an identifiable cause. Rather, 
for some, depression is intense sadness with no identifiable reason. It is heavy, 
murky, tangled, difficult to change, isolating, not easily understood by others. 
5.3.2 Theme 2: Dealing with others’ reactions 
The reactions of others were a key aspect of all participants’ depression and often 
added an additional burden.  Other people often failed to properly understand the 
experience and wanted to either fix participants or for the participants to fix 
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themselves, to ‘suck it all up’. For many participants there was a fear of being a 
burden. Tied in with this is the issue of the risk/fear of others not taking the 
depression seriously, not considering it to be real but rather imagined or ‘indulgent’.  
There was a great deal of anticipation of others’ reactions which – in different ways - 
could add greatly to the pain experienced through the depression. For example, this 
participant described a battle between not wanting to burden others but wanting help 
from others too: 
I find it also becomes like a bit of a battle between wanting to not burden 
others whether or not get [inaudible 00:06:27] but then also trying to sort 
of, I guess a cry for help a little bit and try to want people to sort of find 
out and ask you and sort of help.  But even that you don’t so it becomes 
this kind of two-way thing where you know…you don’t know the source 
and you don’t know it yourself but you want, so you don’t want to like 
burden others but then you just don’t want to…you don’t want to cope 
alone (2:S4:23). 
There was also a link between (being with) others and feelings of difference 
and isolation. In particular others often seemed happier, able to get on with life and 
to enjoy a stable mood: 
I still have this like jealousy of you know there’s people that it’s like 
always the same.  That they’re always seemed to be in the same mood.  
They’re always happy.  And I’m just like, “How is this?  How do you do 
that?”  Like I want to be that person.  You know you don’t have to worry 
about like how are you going to feel when you wake up the next day.  
You know it’s not question of that.  It’s just this kind of like you know 
neutral, happy, gliding through life thing.  But I see in others that’s like 
that amaze me (2:S2:120). 
And I guess in a way when I feel really low I feel isolated in my low 
feeling.  And I feel somewhat removed from everybody else and can’t 
really [group laughter]… can’t really reach out to anybody else.  So it’s 
almost like this is how I feel.  [Looking at image] I feel that for me, I’m the 
one without the umbrella.  So it’s almost like everybody else is lovely and 
dry and happy and I’m the one who doesn’t have an umbrella and I’m 
getting all wet.  And I guess my…when I’m feeling that desperate and 
low, I feel like nobody else would understand or nobody else would be 
there.  And I sort of feel like everybody else’s life is perfectly okay and 
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happy and cheery and then there’s me who’s alone in my sadness 
(1:S4:60). 
5.3.3 Theme 3: Living with depression 
For all participants, depression was something which came and went, often 
described in a cyclic way and having particular known and unknown triggers. 
Depression and feeling ‘very low’ can be ‘re-triggered’ at any time.  
And I was like now that I sort of starting to happen again I don’t know if 
it’s like just to realise that or maybe just the realisation that it becomes 
more of a long term kind of thing I have to deal with more than I thought 
I did.  I think, yeah I think because I thought that it was gone completely.  
I can just sort of go back to doing the things that would sort of re-trigger 
it but yeah (2:S4:204). 
All participants had different ways of coping with their depression, including 
ways to notice and anticipate the signs of falling back into depression, of some kind 
of relapse. These included giving in to the feelings, keeping busy, finding creative 
outlets, knowing the depression would pass, reminding oneself of the ‘good things’ 
and taking prescribed medication. Alcohol, smoking and recreational drug use were 
also identified as ways of coping but were not perceived in a positive way. Escape, 
retreat and getting away from others were key strategies in both groups: 
If I really can’t bear it then I have to go to sleep because it’s almost like 
it’s too overwhelming.  It’s too out of control.  It’s too difficult.  And so 
then I just shut down.  And I think I find it easier to cope with it if I can 
have a period away from it where I don’t have to think about it.  Then I 
feel like, “Okay, maybe I’ll resolve it in a different way.  Or find a different 
solution by hiding myself away from that thing (1:S4:126). 
One participant found shopping lifted his sprits: 
I like shopping [group laughter]. And sometimes I buy stuff just to feel 
happy again.  But I think in a way, in a way it’s also…it gives you a small 
change in your life.  So you have something new.  You just...new shoes 
for example.  You’re just like feeling excited about it and then wear it on 
the next day.  And actually, they probably look like the shoes I bought 
two months ago [group laughter].  But it’s just a small change in my life 
and it just distracts me maybe (1:S5:205). 
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Another interesting aspect raised only in Group 2 was an issue of not always 
wanting to leave the depression. This was also described as resisting and even 
resenting efforts by others to help and to make it better. Part of this resistance was 
linked with the fear that if participants could help themselves in some way then 
others would feel justified in thinking that the depression was imagined or less ‘real’. 
However, there was also something deeper in the desire to stay ‘in the hole’, 
something associated with the value of the depression, not wanting to ‘undermine’ 
the depression:  
Yeah, I wouldn’t just say that talking about going for a walk or something 
and your resistance to that, a suggestion of helping you out of 
depression.  I think for me I often have a resistance to those kind of 
suggestions so go for a walk or do this it will be nice or whatever.  If you 
do suddenly feel better it’s like it undermines the depression in the first 
place.  So that’s, it’s like you do want to wallow in it because you’re just 
saying to everyone this is real (2:S3:209-210). 
Yeah, but overall actually it’s you resist it but it’s not really something 
that you’re choosing to do because you’re consciously trying to like make 
sure that this has its value.  It’s just like just really hard to actually to do 
it [trying to overcome the depression] like it’s such a big resistance 
(2:S4:219). 
Acknowledging responsibilities to others and maintaining a sense of purpose 
also helped for some participants: 
I think having other people to worry about gives you...you know you don’t 
have time to think about yourself and it also gives a sense of purpose, a 
sense meaning so if you’re looking after a child then that...it’s like you 
don’t have to...it gives you that sense of purpose and sense of 
responsibility so you just don’t have time to really dwell on yourself.  But 
then again that introduces a new problem for neglecting yourself.  But 
that has helped me to have a responsibility to someone else (2:S3:246). 
Some participants had taken anti-depressants and these were perceived as 
having both positive and negative effects. One participant had recently decided to 
avoid this option: 
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I went on them and I just recently come off.  And it was like I just need...I 
just was so much more neutral but like I used to like cry if I heard a song 
that moved me or a painting or whatever it was and it was almost like I’d 
rather have to like deal with this lows and maybe that will teach 
something for myself or like turn, make me turn to things that I wouldn’t 
have otherwise turned to but it’s a natural thing.  And I think I’d rather be 
who I am and be moved by things than be shut off to them and just kind 
of feel okay all the time (2:S2:168). 
5.3.4 Theme 4: Making sense of depression 
All participants framed their depression in some way, made sense of their 
experience in a wider context beyond themselves. In Group 1 there was a clear 
distinction between ‘real’ depression and intense sadness, feeling ‘very low’. In 
Group 2 there was a distinction between ordinary sadness (which has an identifiable 
cause) and depression (where there is no obvious cause), although this was not the 
case for all participants. There was also reflection on what leads to or causes 
participants’ depression and low mood, for example the following participant 
described his lack of motivation as a cue that he may be depressed: 
What you said about motivation as well I think for me that’s a really big 
thing.  Because if I don’t have, I think you have to be motivated in this 
level.  I think if I don’t have that motivation then I’m in a bad place.  And 
I feel that on occasion where I just don’t feel motivated to go into work 
or do anything or be bothered with anything and that’s a real cue for me 
yeah (1:S3:146). 
Finally, several existential issues emerged. There was reflection on a type of 
attitude or tendency towards depression which was shared by several participants in 
Group 2: 
…so it comes down a lot of the time to a sort of a general outlook on 
existence as much as and some people have like a more optimistic and 
some people have more pessimistic attitude towards just like the very 
fact of one’s existence (2:S4:238). 
Another participant felt that too many choices contributed to his depression and that 
having his choices limited (externally) helped him cope: 
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It’s like too many options for me made me dwell on which one I would 
choose.  But if it’s lack of options pulls you through and makes you kind 
of...it just shows you the way.  It’s like you don’t have to, that is like I 
always felt that too much choice and lack of direction that’s often what I 
consider depression for me.  That having you know having to make it, 
the decision quickly or having to think about someone else it’s just, 
there’s no choice (2S3:251). 
The dualistic nature of sadness/depression and happiness was questioned by 
one participant in making sense of her depression: 
...happiness isn’t necessarily the flipside or the opposite.  But I mean 
one of the things that certainly helped me was understanding that you 
have a range [inaudible 01:05:26].  You have to go through all of them.  
But sometimes I think, I felt depression and sadness at times when I’ve 
gone, “Mm.  Actually, I’m not happy.  Why am I not happy?”  And I sort 
of like this pressure to be constantly happy and if you aren’t constantly 
happy then you must be kind of sad or depressed or like there’s never 
an in between or like normal (2:S8:226). 
5.4 Construction of Q-set 
The data derived from these two focus groups provided a wealth of material which 
contributed towards the construction of the Q-set. While this preliminary aspect of 
the research formed only one element of the various sources of statements, these 
focus groups were particularly useful in indicating some of the main themes that 
needed to be included. The focus group research also usefully enabled reflection on 
the boundaries between the more immediate experience of depression and related 
processes of sense making, for example understandings of causes, triggers, 
predispositions, ways to cope and so on and how those boundaries related to this 
study and especially the development of the Q-set. Finally, the detailed accounts 
gleaned from this preliminary study enabled me to get a deeper and richer sense of 
what mattered to the participants along with the common and unique elements of 
their experiences which I took forward to the main Q-methodological study. 
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Chapter 6 Results 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present the results of the main Q-methodological study, explicating 
each of the factors that were obtained following the principal components factor 
analytical procedure described in Chapter 4 (section 4.9.5). Here each of the 
(orthogonal) factors represents a different experience of depression, where each 
experience is shared among at least two participants. Of particular interest at this 
point is the dispersed nature of the results given that eight distinguishable 
experiences have emerged. Thus, rather than the study revealing a small number of 
factors which explain a large proportion of the variance (as would be the case with a 
2 or 3 factor solution), all 8 factors satisfied all 3 criteria for selection and 
interpretation, please see the section below (6.2) for a description of these. This 
shows that given an inclusive range of statements concerning the experience of 
depression, participants report a diverse array of experiences.  
In the first part of this chapter I present the overall outcomes of the study 
(tables of the overall statistical results can be found in Appendix 5). I then provide an 
explication of each factor incorporating the relative placement of statements, 
distinguishing statements and participants’ follow-up comments. The nine statements 
taken from the key diagnostic criteria for major depression in the DSM-5 are shown 
in bold throughout the chapter for ease of identification and the placement of these 
particular statements is also interpreted and discussed. I then conclude by providing 
a summary of the findings. All participants are referred to by their participant number. 
I go on to discuss the relevance of the results in more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
120 
 
6.2 Statistical results for all factors 
There are three accepted criteria for the selection of interpretable factors (Brown 
1980; Watts and Stenner, 2012). The first two are that an interpretable factor should 
have an eigenvalue of 1 or above and that at least two participants load significantly 
on the factor. All eight factors satisfied these criteria. A final criterion for selection is 
to determine whether there is a point in the data where the cumulative explained 
variance for each factor levels off. This is determined by making a graph of 
cumulative explained variance for each factor. As can be seen in Figure 6.1 below, 
this final method of selection indicates that all factors should be interpretable as 
there is no point after which a (roughly) flat line appears, which would show that one 
or some factors do not explain sufficient variance within the data. Instead, all factors 
appear to be interpretable, giving a clear indication that there are several different 
experiences of depression emerging in the study:
 
Figure 6-1 Graph of cumulative explained variance by factor 
11
18
23
31
37
46
53
61
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5 FACTOR 6 FACTOR 7 FACTOR 8
%
Cumulative explained variance for each factor
 
121 
 
All defining Q-sorts for each factor were positively loaded, meaning that there 
were no mirror image significant loadings, please see Appendix 5 for the rotated 
factor matrices showing defining sorts.  
Table 6-1 Factor Scores for Each Statement 
No Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone 
and cut off from other people 
2 4 -2 5 4 5 0 1 
2 Although on the outside I seem okay, on 
the inside I'm going through hell 
1 2 5 -1 4 5 0 3 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how 
truly awful the experience is 
1 0 5 -1 3 4 3 -2 
4 I experience all sorts of aches and pains 
around my body 
1 3 2 -3 -5 -2 0 -1 
5 I feel tense and anxious most of the time 0 2 5 3 2 2 0 2 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of 
my body clock is seriously disrupted 
-1 -4 -1 0 -3 -3 4 1 
7 I notice that most of the time my bodily 
movements have slowed right down 
-2 -2 -2 -3 3 -2 0 -1 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy 
nearly every day 
4 0 -4 0 2 1 0 2 
9 I have little or no interest in sex 1 2 3 -2 -1 -3 1 5 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example 
cutting or burning my skin 
-5 -3 -5 -5 -5 2 -5 -5 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of 
the day 
5 1 2 4 5 4 2 2 
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that 
I've lost 
2 1 0 3 5 -2 -3 4 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost 
all of my activities is very diminished 
3 2 4 2 1 1 -2 3 
14 Most of the time my ability to 
concentrate and make decisions is 
diminished 
2 0 3 2 1 3 -1 -1 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive -3 0 -1 1 0 -3 2 2 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling 3 -1 2 5 -1 0 1 0 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless 4 -3 1 0 1 3 -1 4 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to 
survive and get through it 
0 3 3 -1 5 -1 5 3 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of 
death and of taking my own life 
5 -5 -5 -2 -4 0 -5 -1 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape 2 -1 -3 0 -4 2 1 -1 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite 
nearly every day 
-1 -1 -5 0 -1 -4 -3 -5 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly 
every day 
0 0 -4 -4 -3 -1 -3 -1 
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23 I feel worthless and/or excessively 
guilty nearly every day 
5 2 -4 4 -2 1 0 1 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just 
being selfish 
-2 -1 3 -3 -1 1 3 -2 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative 
and very critical of myself 
4 -4 4 4 4 0 1 2 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get 
myself out of it 
-1 4 2 -1 1 -4 4 0 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take 
control of my thoughts and my feelings. 
1 4 -2 1 -1 4 -2 1 
28 My normal self-control, for example with 
smoking, drinking and recreational drugs, 
goes out of the window 
-3 1 0 0 4 -2 3 4 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than 
I would normally   
-4 -2 -3 3 0 -4 -1 -3 
30 Time seems to slow down for me 0 -2 -2 -2 2 -1 -1 0 
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or 
better future 
3 -5 2 1 1 0 -3 -1 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down 
and when I'm up 
1 5 -1 4 1 -2 -1 1 
33 I feel as though something, like a 
chemical, has been released in my brain. 
-2 -1 3 -2 -4 0 -2 -2 
34 My feelings could be best described as 
the 'blues' 
-3 5 -1 1 -2 -3 5 -1 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for 
creativity 
-4 1 -3 -4 -2 0 -1 1 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical 
illness 
-2 -1 0 -5 -2 -5 -3 -3 
37 I am aware that I need to get some 
sunshine 
0 1 1 2 2 -3 4 0 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's 
part of the cycle of life 
-1 3 0 -3 3 -4 2 5 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 
'how do you live this life?' 
4 -3 1 4 0 2 1 2 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is 
happening to me 
-3 -2 -1 -1 0 0 1 3 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point 
of my life? 
1 0 1 2 2 4 2 4 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless 3 -5 0 1 0 3 -1 5 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my 
problems for myself 
-1 4 2 -2 2 5 5 1 
44 Professional help is the last thing I need -4 -1 -1 -1 -5 -2 2 0 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps 
me 
0 -4 -3 -3 -3 -5 -2 -4 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God 
who cares 
-2 -2 3 -5 -3 -5 4 -5 
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, 
they make me feel like I've lost a part of 
myself 
0 2 0 -4 -1 -1 -2 -2 
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48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, 
everywhere 
-1 -2 -3 -4 0 1 -4 -4 
49 I fear being judged if I tell others about it 0 0 1 1 -1 1 3 -4 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory 
or my judgment 
-1 -3 0 -1 -4 -1 -4 -3 
51 I feel ashamed of my depression 2 1 -2 -2 -2 3 2 -3 
52 I worry about the effect that my 
depression will have on my family and 
close relationships 
3 5 -1 1 0 2 3 -3 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I 
know I'll make them feel bad too. 
-2 1 -2 2 3 3 -2 -2 
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself 
together 
2 3 4 0 3 0 0 -1 
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know 
what's causing it 
-4 3 1 3 0 -1 -4 2 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and 
what I've imagined 
-3 -3 -4 -1 -3 -1 -4 -3 
57 I find myself becoming secretive and 
paranoid 
-5 -4 1 3 -2 2 1 -1 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and 
delusions 
-5 0 0 1 1 1 -5 -4 
The above table shows the different ways that participants sorted statements 
for each factor. 
Table 6-2 Consensus statement for the study 
No Overall Consensus Statement Q-sort z-scores 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've 
imagined 
-1 to -4 -0.44 to -1.37 
There was only one consensus statement that emerged from the study, that is 
only one statement showed significantly similar sorting across all factors. Thus, there 
is relative consensus across the factors (overall shared disagreement) about this 
statement. However, while this statement did not (significantly) distinguish factors, it 
still provided a useful element, when considered alongside other statements, in the 
overall explication of individual factors. 
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6.3 Explication of factors 
For each factor, I present the factor Q-sort grid, followed by a table of biographical 
details for the associated participants, before giving a detailed description of the 
characteristics of each factor. The explication of each factor should be read in 
conjunction with Table 6.1 above and the results tables found in Appendix 5. 
6.3.1 Factor 1: ‘Clinical’/suicidal depression 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
10 29 15 7 6 5 2 1 13 8 11 
57 35 28 24 21 18 3 12 16 17 19 
58 44 34 33 26 22 4 14 31 25 23 
 55 40 36 38 30 9 20 42 39  
  56 46 43 37 27 51 52   
   53 48 45 32 54    
    50 47 41     
     49      
Figure 6-2 Factor Array for Factor 1 
Participants exemplifying this factor were all female and self-identified their 
depression as either moderate or severe. Three participants were White/British, one 
was Brazilian. Three of the four participants had been diagnosed with depression 
and had taken prescribed anti-depressant medication, one participant was currently 
taking medication.  
Table 6-3 Biographical details of participants who exemplify Factor 1 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-identified 
ethnicity Diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed anti-
depressant 
medication? 
14 Female 36 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
22 Female 47 Brazil Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
25 Female 29 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, currently 
taking 
44 Female 71 White/Welsh No Severe No 
 
Of all the factors, Factor 1 most closely maps on to the diagnostic criteria for 
major depression found in DSM-5. Three of the nine DSM statements (closely 
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resembling the key DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for major depression) were placed at 5 
and one at 4. 
Table 6-4 Highest scoring statements for Factor 1 
Number Statement Grid 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every 
day           
5 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                         5
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking 
my own life           
5 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day                 4
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself         
4 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                               4 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live 
this life?’            
4 
 
Two other DSM statements were placed at 2 and 3: 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my 
activities is very diminished          
3 
14         Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished 
2 
 
Factor 1 represents an experience of depression that is exemplified by 
feelings of sadness and emptiness (11: 5), guilt and worthlessness (23: 5), fatigue 
and loss of energy (8: 5): 
I am just overwhelmed with sadness and grief and anxiousness, nothing 
was able to distract me. (P44) 
I feel like I am a project of human being that has irredeemably failed and 
that all that can be done is to wait for this meaningless life to come to an 
end… (P22) 
Participants associated with this factor also experience (seemingly to a lesser 
degree) a diminished ability to concentrate and make decisions (14: 2) and a 
diminished interest in almost all of their activities (13: 3). In addition, there are some 
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feelings of shame (51:2) and guilt at not being able to ‘pull myself together’ (54: 2). 
Participant 25 describes her lack of energy and difficulty in concentrating, she also 
describes her sense of weakness and embarrassment at being depressed: 
I just feel depleted and it’s unimaginable having energy or ever feeling 
better. I end up sleeping very badly and needing to nap in the afternoon. 
It’s a struggle to concentrate and take part in things when I feel so tired 
and it makes everything seem hopeless... How can I be so pathetic to 
feel like this? It feels like a personal weakness and extremely 
embarrassing… (P25) 
The experience also involves feelings of hopelessness (17: 4) and a negative 
and critical inner voice (25: 4): 
The pain of being depressed is overwhelmingly linked to negative 
thoughts and feelings about myself, life and the world… I get stuck into 
a stream of recurrent negative thinking. It is as if everything I am or have 
in life was wrong… (P22) 
There are also worries about the effect of the depression on family and close 
relationships (52: 3) and an experience of struggling with the question ‘how do you 
live this life?’ (39: 4). 
An essential element of this factor is the strong presence of thoughts of death 
and suicide. Indeed, experiencing recurrent thoughts of death and suicide was the 
sole distinguishing statement for this factor and was placed at 5 (19: 5): 
On the worst days these [suicidal] thoughts constantly hammer through 
my head. I end up seeing everything in the world through a lens of 
looking for means of killing myself e.g. seeing pipes on the ceiling in my 
office as a place to hang from, rail lines and high buildings take on the 
significance of places to throw life away. These thoughts feel like a 
plague, they are logical thoughts arising and not something I want to do 
or have any intention of really doing. Last year I had a particularly rough 
time with this so I stayed in bed for three days for fear that if I got up and 
went out I wouldn’t be able to control the impulse of harming myself… 
(P25) 
 
 
127 
 
In contrast, self-harm, for example cutting or burning the skin was strongly 
rejected in this factor (10: -5) and participants made a clear distinction between self-
harm and suicide: 
Self-harming is not part of my episodes of depression. In fact, this is not 
something that has ever crossed my mind – whether when I’m 
depressed or in good mental and emotional state. As a consequence of 
my depressive thinking (feelings of helpless and hopeless, feelings that 
life and myself are not worthwhile), I come across suicidal thoughts – 
which I fight against and manage to get out of my mind. But I never 
consider as an alternative to submit myself to more pain (through self-
harm). I just don’t see it as an alternative or a possible solution. In fact, 
this is a behaviour that just doesn’t make sense to me and I’ve never felt 
like doing it… (P22) 
The thought of wishing I could cut out the pain occurred a lot but it never 
occurred to me to physically harm myself in that way [as in statement 
10]. It was either death, by suicide, or simply continue to suffer. (P44) 
Here intentional self-harm is understood as bringing more pain while struggling with 
suicidal thoughts was something that all three participants described as a major 
element of their depression. 
Table 6-5 Lowest scoring statements for Factor 1 
Number Statement Grid 
44   Professional help is the last thing I need                          -4 
55   I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it          -4
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity               -4 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally          -4
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                           -5 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or 
burning my skin       
-5 
57    I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                      -5 
In this factor there is a very strong rejection of what might be termed 
‘psychotic’ experience, for example being ‘secretive and paranoid’ (57: -5), 
experiencing ‘bizarre thoughts and delusions’ (58: -5) and, to a lesser degree, 
distinguishing between what is real and what is imagined (56: -3): 
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I don’t think I have this kind of feelings or behaviour [statement 57]… I 
don’t get paranoid or secretive because I just isolate myself from the 
world. (P22) 
I don’t think suicidal thoughts are bizarre [statement 58]. I don’t believe I 
was ever deluded. My judgment may have been a little skewed and my 
cognitive abilities a little diminished but I was always intensely aware of 
what was going on with me and around me. (P44) 
There is also a rejection of the idea that this experience can be seen as the 
price to pay for creativity (35: -4) or understood as the ‘blues’ (34: -3), in contrast 
Participant 22 describes her sense of her depression as a disease: 
There is somewhere the awareness… that it is part of a disease and a 
temporary state, that I need to fight against what is placing me in this 
position (P22) 
In addition, there is a strong rejection of the idea that professional intervention 
will not help (44: -4): 
I know full well from experience that professional help, medication and 
other treatments really do help. (P25) 
There is also a rejection concerning increased risk taking (29: -4) and 
becoming more aggressive (15: -3), exemplified by participant 44: 
No [disagreeing with statement 15], because no matter how bad I feel I 
would never bring it out on someone who didn’t deserve it. (P44) 
In summary, Factor 1 appears to most closely resemble ‘clinical’ depression in 
that six of the nine DSM statements were placed in the ‘most like me’ part of the 
scale. Three of these statements were placed at 5, and one at 4, and this agreement 
with so many of the DSM statements is unique to this factor. Recurring thoughts of 
death and suicide are a key feature of this experience and this is reflected through 
the relevant statement (19) emerging as the only distinguishing statement for this 
factor. This means that participants loading on Factor 1 sorted this statement 
significantly differently compared to all other factors. There was a high level of 
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severity of depression for participants exemplifying this factor and all but one 
participant had been diagnosed with depression, giving some further support for the 
‘clinical’ nature of this factor. Here feelings of sadness, fatigue, guilt, shame, 
hopelessness and worthlessness are combined with diminished pleasure and 
concentration, fears about the effect of the depression on family and close 
relationships and a struggle with the question ’how do you live this life?’. There is a 
strong rejection of ‘psychotic’ experience and the idea that this experience of 
depression can be understood as the ‘blues’. There is a generally positive view of 
professional help and a clear distinction between thoughts of suicide and intentional 
self-harm, such as cutting or burning the skin. 
6.3.2 Factor 2: The ‘blues’/overcoming loss and bereavement 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
19 6 10 7 16 3 11 2 4 1 32 
31 25 17 29 20 8 12 5 18 26 43 
42 45 39 30 21 14 28 9 38 27 52 
 57 50 40 24 15 35 13 54 43  
  56 46 33 22 37 23 55   
   48 36 41 51 47    
    44 49 53     
     58      
Figure 6-3 Factor Array for Factor 2 
Three participants loaded significantly on Factor 2, one male and two females, 
all White/British. Two had been diagnosed with depression and one had taken 
antidepressants in the past. Participants described their depression as either mild or 
moderate. All three participants associated with this factor were middle aged or 
older, including one participant over 80. 
 
130 
 
Table 6-6 Biographical details of participants who exemplify Factor 2 
 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-
identified 
ethnicity Diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed 
antidepressant 
medication? 
16 Female 44 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the 
past 
34 Male 67 White/British Yes Mild No 
38 Female 83 White/British No Mild No 
 
Factor 2 represents an experience of depression that is very strongly 
identified as the ‘blues’ (34: 5) which here appears to contrast with the more 
‘conventional’ (clinical) experience conveyed through Factor 1. Given that all but one 
of the DSM statements were placed within the central grid values (-2 to 2), these 
diagnostic criteria appear to have far less relevance for those participants associated 
with this experience. 
Table 6-7 Highest scoring statements for Factor 2 
Number Statement Grid 
34 My feelings could be best described as the 'blues' 5 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up            5 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships          
5 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for 
myself 
4 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people             
4 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it               4 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my 
thoughts and my feelings          
4 
 
Here there is a strong sense of feeling cut off and alone along with an 
awareness and concern with others noticing the mood: 
My mother would say ‘I feel as though I stick out like a sore thumb’. (P38) 
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What appears to, in part, identify this experience as the ‘blues’ is an emphasis 
on knowing the reasons or causes of the depression along with a sense that the 
symptoms may reflect something other than depression: 
My depression, if it is depression, is never very severe and always can 
be rationally related to events that have occurred to do with work or 
personal life. It may be more a symptom of stress as much as depression 
(P34) 
This aspect of awareness is also reflected in an agreement with the following 
statement (which was placed at -4 in Factor 1), here it seems that not knowing the 
cause of the depression may be more anxiety provoking: 
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it 3 
 
There is also a key concern with the effects of the depression on others (52: 
5), while at the same time there is a strong sense of self-reliance and the importance 
of self-help: 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself 4   
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it 4 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get through 
it 
3 
 
For Participant 34 this self-help is linked to the notion of dealing with the source of 
the depression rather than the symptoms: 
Although I have been offered anti-depressants I have never taken them 
as I don’t believe they would help as my depression, if that’s what it is, 
has a rational basis and therefore needs dealing with at source so to 
speak rather than covering up the symptoms. (P34) 
Interestingly, this emphasis on self-help is coupled with an experience of not being 
able to control one’s thoughts and feelings: 
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27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings. 
4 
 
Tied up with this form of the ‘blues’ is an experience of alternating moods, of 
highs and lows (32: 5), however these moods are presented as part and parcel of 
the depression (and perhaps of life) rather than as something separate or more 
‘clinical’: 
I try to even out my emotions to avoid the roller coaster but there are 
always highs and lows (P16) 
In addition to the importance of a strong sense of awareness concerning what 
the depression is about, participants associated with this factor describe loss and 
bereavement as a key cause, where depression is a rational response: 
The times I feel depressed are when I can’t share a feeling with 
somebody. Losing a partner means losing a whole piece of myself, 
others can’t know how it feels. (P38) 
My sadness, if depression, is usually related to the loss of people, 
particularly family members. But this is I believe a quite rational response 
to the loss of someone as part of a healthy grieving (P34) 
There is a clear reluctance here to use the term depression to convey these 
emotions; for these participants it does not seem to fit with their experience. For this 
form of the ‘blues’, most of the time there is a clear (external) reason for the sadness 
which appears more a natural part of life rather than something ‘clinical’. Indeed, 
there is also agreement with the notion that the depression will pass, which in turn 
confirms a sense that depression is part of a natural cycle: 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life. 3   
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Table 6-8 Lowest scoring statements for Factor 2 
Number Statement Grid 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted          
-4 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself          
-4 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -4 
57 I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                         -4 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking 
my own life         
-5 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                               -5 
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or better future         -5 
Only one DSM statement has a noteworthy placement in this factor (19: -5) 
and this denotes a very strong rejection of thoughts of death and suicide. 
Furthermore, there is strong rejection of several of the aspects associated with more 
‘severe’ depression (exemplified in Factor 1); meaninglessness (42: -5), not being 
able to imagine a better future (31: -5), hopelessness, (17: -3), negative and self-
critical thoughts (25: -4), struggling with the question ‘how do you live this life?’ (39: -
3). Also there is a rejection of the more ‘psychotic’ aspects of depression (57: -4, 56: 
-3), and not being able to trust one’s senses, memory or judgement (50: -3). Indeed, 
all five of the distinguishing statements for this factor are rejections (-3 to -5) of these 
more ‘severe’ aspects of depression. In addition, and concomitant with the emphasis 
on self-help and the depression having a clear cause in life events, medication is not 
seen as helpful for this type of depression (45: -4). 
In summary, Factor 2 represents an experience of depression best described 
as the ‘blues’ (which appears to be reflected in participants’ lower self-identified 
severity), where a strong sense/awareness that the cause of the mood is external, 
related to life events, especially loss and bereavement, is central. There is a very 
strong rejection of thoughts of death and suicide as figuring at all in this experience. 
Here the role of self-reliance and self-help are central, those who experience this 
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form of depression have a strong sense that they will be able to survive and get 
through it. There is also a strong feeling of being cut off from others, an alternation of 
periods of feeling up and down, along with concern for the effect that this depression 
may have on family and close relationships. Of interest here is that all but one (19: -
5) of the DSM statements were distributed through the lower values of the grid, 
suggesting these statements do not have much salience for this factor. Finally, the 
distinguishing statements indicate an important rejection of some of the more 
‘severe’, and to some extent ‘clinical’, aspects of depression, for example 
hopelessness, meaninglessness, critical self-thoughts and not being able to imagine 
a better future.  
6.3.3 Factor 3: Anxious/’anti-clinical’ depression 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
10 8 20 1 6 12 17 4 14 9 2 
19 22 29 7 15 28 37 11 18 13 3 
21 23 35 27 32 36 39 16 24 25 5 
 56 45 30 34 38 41 26 33 54  
  48 51 40 42 49 31 46   
   53 44 47 55 43    
    52 50 57     
     58      
Figure 6-4 Factor Array for Factor 3 
Two participants loaded significantly on Factor 3, both were males, one was 
White/British and one was British/Asian. Both participants self-identified their 
depression as mild and neither had ever been diagnosed with depression nor been 
prescribed medication for it. Both participants were middle aged. 
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Table 6-9 Biographical details of participants who exemplify Factor 3 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-identified 
ethnicity Diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed 
antidepressant 
medication? 
18 Male 46 White/British No Mild No 
32 Male 52 British/Asian No Mild No 
 
Factor 3 represents an experience of depression in which tension and anxiety 
are central aspects (5: 5), indeed statement 5 was given the highest score here of all 
the factors. 
Table 6-10 Highest scoring statements for Factor 3 
Number Statement Grid 
5         I feel tense and anxious most of the time                      5 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell    
5 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is            
5 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my 
activities is very diminished          
4 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself           
4 
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together                  4 
9 I have little or no interest in sex                                    4 
At the same time there is a strong sense of covering or concealing the 
depression and anxiety, where one possible consequence of this covering appears 
to be a feeling that others simply don’t understand the magnitude of the depression: 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell    
5 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is            
5 
 
Interestingly, this masking/covering is not necessarily the same experience as 
isolation or feeling cut off: 
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1        I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people    
-2 
 
Instead here there seems to be a covering of the experience which then links to 
others not knowing about the extent of the depression - where the experience is a 
private one, an experience that stays ‘inside’. Furthermore, there is a sense of 
independent self-reliance here too: 
It can be a private battle of which I’m not seeking sympathy (P18) 
 
Other key features of this experience include a loss of interest and pleasure 
which includes a loss of interest in sex, a critical and negative internal voice and a 
diminished ability to concentrate and make decisions: 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my 
activities is very diminished          
4 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself           
4 
9 I have little or no interest in sex                                    4 
14 Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished           
3 
 
Statements 13 and 14 (along with statement 11) were the only DSM 
statements that were agreed with in this factor. For one participant associated with 
this factor, the experience of loss of pleasure and energy are pronounced: 
I do experience a lowering of my energies and my sense of joy. This has 
been a part of me, I think, from a young age. I have always struggled to 
connect to the feelings of joy and pleasure. So when I am feeling 
depressed, this state becomes particularly prominent… thoughts of sex 
or physical pleasure become terribly subdued. Perhaps it’s an age-
related phenomenon as well (I’m in my 50’s)! (P32) 
There is also a role of faith in God, here this appears to offer some 
consolation to participants associated with this factor: 
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46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                   3 
 
There is also a link here between faith and spirituality and a focus on the inner life: 
My understanding about life is that the purpose of this life is to get to 
know the nature of the self, and its relationship to the soul. The various 
afflictions we experience in life are a reflection of this disconnection 
between the self and the soul. When the self is aligned to the soul, then 
it tends to produce greater harmony. So, in a sense, when I am 
experiencing periods of depression, low mood, hopelessness etc., then 
I cling to the knowledge that the answer, the solution, lies within. (P32) 
 
Feelings of sadness and emptiness (11: 2) are a part of this experience but 
do not appear central, and this is in contrast to several other factors (1, 4, 5 and 6). 
Table 6-11 Lowest scoring statements for Factor 3 
Number Statement Grid 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day               -4 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've 
imagined          
-4 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every 
day           
-4 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                     -4
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking 
my own life          
-5 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every 
day               
-5 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or 
burning my skin          
-5 
 
One key element of this factor is a very strong rejection of intentionally injuring 
the body (10: -5): 
I have never engaged in physically self-injurious behaviour: it’s too 
painful! It’s not something that would help me. (P32) 
I have never done these things (P18) 
Appearing to be related to this is a very strong rejection (matching Factors 2 and 7 
but contrasting with Factor 1) of thoughts of death and suicide (19: -5): 
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I haven’t experienced major suicidal thoughts, partly related to my beliefs 
about God. I have occasionally had thoughts about what it would be like 
to cease to exist, the possible effects of general anaesthesia, etc. 
However, I haven’t engaged in any planning of death etc. (P32) 
Indeed, an important defining feature of this factor is the level of rejection of 
the DSM statements. There was overall disagreement with 6 of the 9 DSM 
statements and five of these are placed at either -5 or -4. Thus, there is, as 
mentioned, a strong rejection of thoughts of death and suicide (19: -5), of a decrease 
it appetite (21: -5), of sleeping too much (22: -4), of feelings of worthlessness and 
excessive guilt (23: -4), of fatigue or loss of energy (8: -4), and to a lesser extent, of 
slowed bodily movements (7: -2). This placement of so many DSM statements in the 
negative area indicates that this factor is substantively different from the 
conventional ‘clinical’ notion of depression, not easily fitting into the pattern 
recognised by standard clinical diagnostics. Furthermore, the two distinguishing 
statements for this factor are both rejections of DSM statements (8: -4; 23: -4). 
In addition to a rejection of many of the DSM statements, there is also strong 
rejection of one of the more ‘psychotic’ aspects of depression:  
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've 
imagined          
-4 
 
I am very cognisant of my environment [responding to statement 56] 
(P18) 
And a rejection of generalised feelings of being unsafe: 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                        -3 
 
To summarise, this factor represents an experience of depression with anxiety 
and strong rejection of much of the key DSM diagnostic criteria at its core. There is 
also an emphasis on the diminishing of interest and pleasure, including interest in 
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sex and a diminished ability to concentrate and make decisions. A negative, critical 
internal voice and a feeling of guilt at not being able to ‘pull myself together’ are also 
key to this experience. There is also a masking or covering of the depression 
combined with a feeling that others are not aware of just how difficult the feelings 
are. This is also reflected in a view of depression as a ‘private battle’. At the same 
time there is a focus here on inner (for some, spiritual) experience and the positive 
impact of a belief in a God who cares. The strong rejection of many of the DSM 
statements signals that this experience is substantively different to the accepted 
‘clinical’ type of depression. This includes a very strong rejection of thoughts of death 
and suicide along with rejection of loss of energy, feelings of guilt and worthlessness, 
reduced appetite and excess sleeping as figuring in this experience. This is also 
accompanied by strong rejection of some of the ‘psychotic’ aspects of depression, 
for example not being able to distinguish between what is real and what is imagined, 
and intentional self-harm. 
6.3.4 Factor 4: Emotionally devoid/isolated depression 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
10 22 4 9 2 6 15 13 5 11 1 
36 35 7 19 3 8 27 14 12 25 16 
46 47 24 30 18 17 31 31 29 32 23 
 48 38 33 19 20 34 37 55 39  
  45 43 26 21 49 41 57   
   51 40 28 52 53    
    44 50 58     
     54      
Figure 6-5 Factor Array for Factor 4 
Two participants loaded significantly on this factor, one female and one male, 
ages 29 and 45, both White/British and both self-identifying their depression as 
moderate. Both participants had been diagnosed with depression at some time and 
one had taken prescribed medication in the past.  
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Table 6-12 Biographical details of participants who exemplify Factor 4 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-identified 
ethnicity Diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed 
antidepressant 
medication? 
11 Female 29 White/British Yes Moderate No 
19 Male 45 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
Factor 4 represents an experience of depression with very strong feelings of 
being alone and cut off (1: 5), feelings of worthlessness and guilt (23: 5) and a strong 
sense of sometimes being devoid of all feeling (16: 5), at its core. There is also a 
questioning of ‘life’ and how to live it (39: 4; 41: 2), alternating periods of being up 
and then down (32: 4), a negative and critical internal voice (25: 4) and some 
feelings of anxiety (5: 3; 55: 3). 
Table 6-13 Highest scoring statements for Factor 4 
Number Statement Grid 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling 5 
1         I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people    
5 
23   I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every 
day          
5 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up               4 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live 
this life?’            
4 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                         4
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself           
4 
 
The experience of being devoid of all feeling is key to understanding this 
factor and the associated statement is distinguishing (16: 5), having been given a far 
higher score here than for any other factor. The two participants associated with this 
factor both describe a bleak feeling of emptiness, experiences of being numb, of 
fragmentation and disorientation, of just sitting and staring for long periods: 
I find myself just sitting staring into space, not thinking, not noticing time 
pass. I don’t feel anything except empty. Also I’ve found that I can 
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happily talk to anyone, be ‘friends’ with anyone, but it’s not a genuine 
friendship. It’s like it’s an act, I don’t care. I’ve also separated sex from 
all feeling. I sleep with people I have no interest in and I can’t tell if I 
actually like someone or if I’m just filling a gap in my life. I do it and then 
hate myself after. (P11) 
I always thought depression was feeling down, at worst it encapsulated 
feelings of being inconsolable with sadness or grief or despair. I came to 
realise what depression was when my sister came to see me one day 
and I had been sitting in my own shit in the dark in silence on the sofa 
for three days unable to move. I had been staring at the remote control 
only feet away from me on the coffee table wishing there was something 
on the TV. I then knew what depression was: fragmentation, 
disorientation, a total eradication of who I was or what I wanted or who I 
loved or what I once hoped I could be. (P19) 
However, this experience of disorientation and fragmentation, of feeling numb 
and empty, of sitting and staring for long periods, is not the same as sleeping too 
much: 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                      -4
 
Another crucial element of this factor is the presence of profound feelings of 
isolation and difference: 
I can be surrounded by people, even people I know, and feel totally 
alone. I feel like I’m the only one that likes the things I like. I feel different 
from 90% of the population and I’m rarely around the other 10%... I feel 
like everyone is getting on with their own lives and have forgotten about 
me. Their other friends are their priority. (P11) 
There is also an increase in risk-taking associated with this factor and the 
relevant statement (29) is the second distinguishing statement: 
29         I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally    3 
 
I swung [following a period of sitting, staring, being unable to move] into 
something quite different – still cut off and fragmented but drug ridden 
and promiscuous. I fucked everything I could, ever more cold and self-
hating, incapable of stopping… not even the despair and anger on their 
faces [of friends and family] could stop me in the pursuit of crystal 
methamphetamine and fucking. (P19) 
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There is also some experience of dwelling on the things that have been lost 
(12: 3): 
I constantly think how I’ve wasted the last 7 years of my life with one 
person, how I made a career decision because of them that wasn’t what 
I wanted, and also how I lost someone I would have given up everything 
for. (P11) 
Table 6-14 Lowest scoring statements for Factor 4 
Number Statement Grid 
48        I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                -4 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                      -4
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me 
feel like I’ve lost a part of myself        
-4 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                 -5 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or 
burning my skin          
-5 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                   -5 
Factor 4 is also characterised by a rejection of the helpfulness of anti-
depressant medication (45: -3), a general feeling of being unsafe (48: -4) and 
depression as a price to pay for creativity (35: -4). There is very strong rejection of 
the notion that depression is a result of physical illness (36: -5) and this aspect of the 
experience appears to be complex, as is evidenced by comments from Participant 
19: 
If I thought it were an illness – I would either feel that it was separate 
from me and therefore I should not feel the shame – but at the same time 
such a radical separation from myself allows me, when I am in the throes 
of self-destroy mode, to abnegate responsibility for my actions ‘because 
I am ill’. (P19) 
For this participant, the notion of depression as the result of an illness suggests the 
possibility of a sense of separation between the ‘condition’ and the self. On the one 
hand an understanding of depression as resulting from an illness may remove the 
feelings of shame, on the other hand a separation between the depression and one’s 
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sense of self may enable a denial of personal responsibility, which in this case was 
linked to a struggle with addiction.  
There is also strong disagreement in this factor with the comfort associated 
with a belief in God (46: -5): 
Please spare me the tedium of God when I am depressed. (P19) 
I have no belief in God (P11) 
And a strong rejection of intentional self-harm as an element of the 
experience (10: -5): 
Never done this – or thought about it. (P19) 
The DSM statements are fairly well spread throughout this factor indicating 
that the more conventional diagnostic criteria do not adequately capture this form of 
depression. There was strong disagreement with the criterion of sleeping too much 
every day (22: -4) and disagreement with slowed bodily movements (7: -3) and 
thoughts of death and suicide (19: -2). This does not mean that suicidal thoughts are 
absent from this experience of depression but rather that they are not necessarily 
central; in other words thoughts of death and suicide may form a part of the 
experience but are not necessarily at its core. Furthermore, suicidal thoughts may be 
linked with other aspects of this experience of depression for example asking oneself 
the question ‘what is the point of my life?’ (41: 2): 
I sank into withdrawn suicidal ideation, as I audited ways to kill myself 
and took tentative steps to perfect my art. Suicidal ideation – the 
overriding sense that I can’t face another 45 years like the 45 years I’ve 
already had [responding to statement 41] (P19). 
In summary, this form of depression is characterised by an experience of 
sometimes being devoid of all feeling, by profound and bleak feelings of isolation and 
difference, guilt, worthlessness, sadness and emptiness. Sitting and staring for hours 
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or days, not noticing time pass, is described by both participants associated with this 
factor. Increased risk-taking and dwelling on the things and people that have been 
lost are also an integral part of this form of depression. The DSM statements are 
fairly evenly spread throughout this factor and there is a very strong rejection of 
depression as a physical illness, of gaining comfort in the belief in God and of 
intentional self-harm. The strong rejection of an understanding of depression as a 
physical illness is here suggestive of a complex understanding of the relation 
between the physical realm (illness) and the mental realm (self), where these may be 
experienced as separate from one another and this, in turn, may impact on feelings 
of shame and the sense of responsibility for one’s actions. Here both participants 
self-identify their depression as moderate and both describe how this form of 
depression can be a deeply stultifying, numbing, isolating and disorienting 
experience.  
6.3.5 Factor 5: Sadness and loss/surviving depression 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
4 19 6 23 9 15 13 5 3 1 11 
10 20 22 34 16 29 14 8 7 2 12 
44 33 45 35 21 39 17 30 38 25 18 
 50 46 36 24 40 26 37 53 28  
  56 51 27 42 31 41 54   
   57 47 48 32 43    
    49 52 58     
     55      
Figure 6-6 Factor Array for Factor 5 
Three participants loaded significantly on Factor 5, one male and two females, 
two White/British and one White/German. All participants were either in their 30’s or 
40’s. Self-identified severity of depression was moderate to severe, one participant 
had been diagnosed with depression and all three had never taken prescribed 
antidepressant medication. 
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Table 6-15 Biographical details of participants who exemplify Factor 5 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-identified 
ethnicity Diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed 
antidepressant 
medication? 
26 Female 45 White/British Yes Moderate No 
29 Male 36 White/German No Severe No 
42 Female 42 British/Asian No Severe No 
 
Factor 5 represents an experience of depression that centres around loss (12: 
5), survival (18: 5) and feelings of sadness and emptiness (11: 5). 
Table 6-16 Highest scoring statements for Factor 5 
Number Statement Grid 
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                   5 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it          
5 
11         I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                5 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking 
and recreational drugs, goes out of the window           
4 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself           
4 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people            
4 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell           
4 
 
Participants associated with this factor describe loss as a central aspect of 
their depressed mood: 
Depression occurs to me most often when someone or something 
(event/experience/possibility) has vanished/gone/disappeared/ended. 
It’s a reminder of temporality and finitude in life. (P29)  
Important losses are hard to get over. I usually linger in melancholia for 
a while, and can’t deal with the subject for a few months. (P26) 
There is another loss reported in this factor, a loss of self-control (28: 4) with 
respect to drinking and smoking: 
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Yes, that happens quite consistently, smoking and drinking seem to be 
my allies and I have little or no control on how much I smoke or drink. 
The only thing I do is drink and drink myself to sleep but at home. (P42) 
This loss of self-control however, does not necessarily equate with increased risk-
taking, although the placement at zero may indicate some ambivalence here: 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally            0 
 
There is a strong agreement that sadness and emptiness are a major aspect 
of this experience, where the relevant statement (11: 5) is given the joint highest 
score among all factors (joint with Factor 1). One participant describes these feelings 
of emptiness and sadness as linked with an inability to comprehend any meaning 
and purpose in life: 
I really don’t understand the purpose and meaning of life when I am in 
this space, so there’s emptiness and sadness, sadness because I have 
a family but even their existence does not matter – nothing makes me 
happy. (P42) 
There is also a deep feeling of being cut off from others (1: 4), as exemplified 
by Participant 26: 
Because it’s hard to tell friends about it, even friends whom I know would 
understand it. I have a tendency to think that I can manage, but then I 
feel lonely. It’s as if I knew people would cut me off, although they 
actually don’t. (P26) 
Also key to this factor is a very strong sense of having to survive the 
experience (18: 5), indeed here this statement is also scored joint highest among all 
the factors (joint with Factor 7). One participant describes how she knows she will 
get through the depression:  
There are moments, many of them, in the day when I know I have to and 
will get through it. As I am a therapist in training, I believe in my 
therapeutic work and know I will get through it. (P42)  
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An internal self-critical voice (25: 4), a disparity between what is shown to 
others and what is happening inside (2: 4) combined with a sense that others don’t 
know how bad the feelings really are (3: 3) are also important elements of this 
experience of depression.  
 
Table 6-17 Lowest scoring statements for Factor 5 
Number Statement Grid 
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been 
released in my brain          
-4 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking 
my own life          
-4 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                   -4 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or judgement                  -4 
4 I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body              -5
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or 
burning my skin         
-5 
44    Professional help is the last thing I need                         -5 
 
Another key element of this experience is a belief in the value of professional 
help and this statement is one of two distinguishing statements for Factor 5 (44: -5). 
Interestingly, all three participants associated with this factor are either therapists or 
therapists in training and this belief in the value of professional help comes with 
some questioning of the utility of medical and drugs based approaches: 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -3 
I believe in therapy and meditation, but not medical intervention! No 
antidepressants for me. (P42) 
Aside from being a therapist, I have been in therapy for the last 15 years, 
so I guess I do believe in professional help [rather than drugs]. (P26) 
Seemingly related to this rejection of medical intervention is a strong rejection 
here of an organic, physiological basis for depression: 
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33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been 
released in my brain          
-4 
Further strong rejection of an association with bodily aches and pains (4: -5) appears 
to be linked to this rejection of a change in brain chemistry, however there is not a 
wholesale rejection of a bodily basis and the utility of medicine and drug therapy: 
I don’t agree with it 100% [depression as a physical illness]. Not every 
depression is caused by chemical unbalance. Eventual, mild depression 
is part of life. Therapy is better than medication in many cases. Would 
only agree to use medication in extreme situations. (P26) 
As with six other factors (1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8) there is a strong rejection of 
intentional self-harm (10: -5) as a part of this experience of depression: 
Certainly not. A horrible scenario but never experienced it. (P29) 
I could never see myself doing that (P26) 
There is also a strong rejection of sleep as an escape (20: -4), thoughts of 
death and suicide (19: -4) and not being able to trust one’s senses, memory or 
judgment (50: -4): 
I feel I have a very strong and stable connection to my perception and 
Being. Although losing control over this would be very scary and 
horrifying, it has never happened to me as yet. (P29) 
In this factor, the DSM statements are spread fairly consistently across the 
factor, where the strongest agreement is with statement 11 (5), referring to sadness 
and emptiness and the strongest disagreement is with statement 19 (-4), referring to 
thoughts of death and suicide. Interestingly, the second distinguishing statement for 
this factor is a DSM statement: 
7 I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down            
3 
Because I want to but can’t exercise, I feel lazy and sleepy. (P26) 
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This suggests that a slowing down of bodily movements, although not central to this 
particular experience of depression may distinguish it, to some extent, from some of 
the other experiences uncovered in this study. 
In summary, Factor 5 represents an experience of depression with feelings of 
sadness and emptiness, a dwelling on loss and a strong sense of survival at its core. 
There are also feelings of being cut off from others, a critical and negative inner 
voice and a loss of normal self-control, especially with drinking and smoking. All 
three participants associated with this factor were either therapists or therapists in 
training and this is reflected in a strong belief in the value of professional help, in 
particular psychotherapy and meditation. There is a strong rejection of intentional 
self-harm as an element of this depression, of thoughts of death and suicide, of 
chemical, bodily causes and medical and drug based treatments. The DSM 
statements are quite consistently spread throughout the factor, indicating a lack of fit 
with the received diagnostic criteria, with five of the nine statements being placed in 
the ‘most like me’ columns, but only two of these statements eliciting a stronger 
agreement, feeling sad and/or empty and a slowing of bodily movements. This 
experience of depression is self-identified by associated participants as more severe 
and overall is characterised by a dwelling on or struggling with loss, feelings of 
sadness and emptiness and feelings of being isolated and cut off from others, along 
with the need to survive the depression.  
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6.3.6 Factor 6: Alienated/helpless depression 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
36 21 6 4 18 16 8 5 14 3 1 
45 26 9 7 22 19 13 10 17 11 2 
46 29 15 12 30 25 23 20 42 27 43 
 38 34 28 47 31 24 39 51 41  
  37 32 50 33 48 52 53   
   44 55 35 49 57    
    56 40 58     
     54      
Figure 6-7 Factor Array for Factor 6 
Three participants loaded significantly on this factor, all female with ages 
ranging from 19-49. Two participants were White/British and one Black/British, all 
have been diagnosed with depression and two have taken anti-depressants in the 
past. All three participants self-identified their depression as moderate.  
Table 6-18 Biographical details of participants who exemplify Factor 6 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-identified 
ethnicity Diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed 
antidepressant 
medication? 
4 Female 49 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
12 Female  35 Black/British Yes Moderate No 
30 Female 19 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
Factor 6 represents an experience of depression which has feelings of 
isolation, being alone and cut off from others (1: 5), avoidance of burdening others 
(43: 5) and a holding in or covering of the depressed feelings (2: 5) at its core. 
Table 6-19 Highest scoring statements for Factor 6 
Number Statement Grid 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell            
5 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people            
5 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself          5 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings           
4 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                4 
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11         I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                4 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is           
4 
These feelings of being alone and cut off are seen by one participant as both a sign 
of the condition and as exacerbating the depression: 
At my most depressed; I isolate myself. That’s when I know for sure that 
I’m depressed as I don’t want any contact with friends. I’m not sure if it’s 
because I don’t want to burden them or because I want to be alone. But 
I do intentionally isolate myself and I know from experience that I recover 
much quicker when I am not alone. I do enjoy my own company a lot of 
the time but this intensifies when I’m depressed. (P12) 
Feeling cut off and isolated (and isolating oneself) seems to be linked with a 
holding in or masking of the experience: 
I am good at putting on a front – I have had to do this as a child in order 
to protect myself and it has become such a force of habit that it is almost 
impossible for me to admit to anyone that I am feeling down… It is awful 
to feel so bad on the inside but feel that it is not OK for me to express 
this externally. The more hurt I feel on the inside the more I try to put on 
a calm and brave face but actually all I want is someone to notice and 
for it to be OK to break down in tears and get support. (P4) 
Possibly linked to this in some way, is a sense that others don’t know or can’t 
properly understand what is happening: 
Everyone tries to say that they understand but it just doesn’t seem like 
they do at all. (P30) 
I just feel that no-one understands me, even those who are close to me 
and do understand me. The ‘black hole’ in the middle of my tummy 
swallows up any kindness that is shown to me – that is, if I am even able 
to let the kindness in. I can feel like I am the only person on this planet… 
I don’t feel the same as anyone else and therefore how could anyone 
else possibly understand me. (P4) 
There is also an avoidance of other people in order to avoid making them feel 
depressed as well: 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them 
feel bad too           
3 
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I don’t like making people feel rubbish and bringing them down with me. 
(P30) 
Combined with feelings of isolation and separation are feelings of 
hopelessness (17: 3), a lack of control over thoughts and feelings (27: 4, given the 
joint highest score among all factors, with Factor 2) and a strong rejection of not 
being helpless (26: -4, the lowest score of all factors for this statement). These three 
aspects indicate a strong sense of not being able to get out of the experience, of not 
being to help oneself, including a rejection of getting some sunshine as being in 
some way curative: 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                          -3 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it              -4 
 
I don’t want to go out, shower or get dressed, let alone get some vitamin 
D! (P12) 
Indeed, both statements 26 and 37 above are distinguishing statements for 
this factor, and reinforce this central sense that nothing can help to alleviate or halt 
the experience. This is also reflected in the following negatively placed statement: 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle 
of life          
-4 
I feel there’s no end to how I’m feeling so I never get this sense. (P12) 
Moreover, this is the only factor where statement 10 concerning self-harm is 
given a positive placement and is also another distinguishing statement, (it is 
strongly negatively placed on all other factors): 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or 
burning my skin           
2 
Although this is a weak agreement it indicates that some intentional self-harm could 
be associated with this particular experience of depression.  
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There are also feelings of sadness and emptiness (11: 4), meaninglessness 
(42: 3), a diminished ability to concentrate (14: 3), and a questioning of the point of 
living (41: 4): 
I experienced a trauma as an adult and since then I have realised just 
how shit life is and how awful human beings are and it has led me to 
really question the point of existing – I do lots of really positive things 
and most people would say I am a good person but it all seems so 
pointless to me as most people have a terrible life and at the end of it all 
that happens is we die. (P4) 
Table 6-20 Lowest scoring statements for Factor 6 
Number Statement Grid 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it              -4 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life          -4 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally            -4 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               -4
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                  -5 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -5 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                  -5 
This factor is also characterised by a strong rejection of a causal physical 
illness (36: -5), the efficacy of anti-depressant medication (45: -5) and comfort in a 
belief in God (46: -5). Here this rejection of Faith as a comfort does not equate to a 
non-belief in God but rather appears to be another manifestation of helplessness and 
hopelessness: 
I believe in God and religion is important to me but I don’t bother praying 
to or speaking to God when I’m depressed and I certainly don’t feel in 
touch with God when I’m feeling depressed. (P12) 
There is also disagreement with the DSM symptom of losing one’s appetite 
(21: -4), describing the experience as the ‘blues’ (34: -3) and becoming more 
aggressive when depressed (15: -3): 
I am not an aggressive person in any way and having experienced an 
aggressive mother it is the last thing I will ever allow myself to become. 
When I feel hurt I tend to swallow down the anger, and translate it into 
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passion for the things I believe in… I don’t think I feel anger very much 
but I am sure my therapist would say I am suppressing it – but I don’t 
know. (P4) 
For this factor, once again, the DSM statements are fairly well distributed 
throughout the grid. Interestingly, here the DSM statement regarding thoughts of 
death and suicide is placed at 0: 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking 
my own life           
0 
This may indicate that either this ‘symptom’ is not important in this experience 
or possibly that there is some ambivalence to this issue. This is the only factor where 
this statement appears at 0 and it is not entirely clear how this fits with the wider 
experience. Overall, only three of the DSM statements have strong salience for this 
factor - feeling sad and/or empty (11: 4), diminished ability to concentrate (14: 3) and 
a rejection of decreased appetite (21: -4) - suggesting a limited relevance for the 
diagnostic criteria for this experience of depression.  
In summary, this factor represents an experience of depression where 
feelings of isolation, feeling cut-off from others, not wishing to burden others (and 
avoiding seeing others), and hiding and masking the depression are central, 
combined with a feeling that others don’t properly understand what is happening. In 
addition to this deep sense of isolation, there are feelings of sadness and emptiness, 
a sense of hopelessness and helplessness and of not being able to take control of 
one’s thoughts and feelings. Here there is also some limited agreement with 
intentional self-harm as forming part of this experience. In contrast, there is a strong 
rejection of depression as being caused by physical illness, of the utility of anti-
depressant medication and of taking comfort in a belief in God. There is also 
rejection of labelling this experience as the ‘blues’ and of a connection with 
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increased aggression. Overall, this form of depression appears to be one of 
alienation - where feelings of distance, separation, withdrawal and isolation are 
central - combined with a sense of helplessness and hopelessness, a strong feeling 
that nothing can really help to alleviate the depression. 
6.3.7 Factor 7: The ‘blues’/surviving through self-reliance 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
10 48 12 13 14 1 9 11 3 6 18 
19 50 21 27 17 2 16 15 24 26 34 
58 55 22 33 29 4 20 38 28 37 43 
 56 31 45 30 5 25 41 49 46  
  36 47 32 7 39 44 52   
   53 35 8 40 51    
    42 23 57     
     54      
Figure 6-8 Factor Array for Factor 7 
Three participants were associated with this factor, two males and one 
female, all a similar age (48-50). Two were White /British and one White/Polish, all 
identified their depression as mild and none had ever been diagnosed or taken 
prescribed antidepressant medication.  
Table 6-21 Biographical details of participants who exemplify Factor 7 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-identified 
ethnicity Diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed 
antidepressant 
medication? 
10 Female 48 White/Polish No Mild No 
20 Male 48 White/British No Mild No 
33 Male 50 White/British No Mild No 
Factor 6 represents an experience of depression which is best described as 
the ‘blues’ (34: 5). 
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Table 6-22 Highest scoring statements for Factor 7 
Number Statement Grid 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it           
5 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for 
myself           
5 
34         My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'            5 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                           4 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted            
4 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                    4 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it               4 
Here Participant 33 rejects the experience as being ‘genuine depression’: 
Does not feel like a genuine depression but more like a feeling of 
negativity. (P33) 
In some contrast to the ‘blues’ in Factor 2 however, this experience is very much 
concerned with surviving the difficult feelings (18: 5): 
I have to carry on as I have others to consider so cannot let negative 
feelings take hold (P33). 
I get upset and angry when I experience depression – at times it feels as 
if I am losing control over myself and everything around me, in fact to 
cope better I tend to try harder in terms of controlling things in a different 
way. (P10) 
Helping oneself, not burdening others and fixing problems for oneself (43: 5) 
are also key aspects of this experience. Here two participants describe their self-
reliance which includes taking responsibility for oneself and the possible 
consequence, for Participant 10, that self-reliance may engender loneliness and 
greater despair: 
Only I can get myself out of a depression (only ever experienced a very 
mild form). There’s no point taking medication, you have to snap out of 
it, and taking responsibility for yourself is one key way. Exercise, social 
contact have always worked. It’s not as if this has been an immediate fix 
or realisation that the solution lies with me, but the penny drops at some 
point. (P20) 
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I tend to feel reluctant, perhaps even ashamed to tell others how I really feel 
when I experience problems, and I would rather try to resolve an issue on my 
own. This often leaves me feeling lonely and more desperate. I end up feeling 
anxious and guilty and angry with myself. (P10) 
This focus on self-reliance is mirrored by strong agreement concerning not 
being helpless and the ability to get oneself out of the depression: 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it               4 
There is always help to turn to. (P33) 
Furthermore, self-help appears to some extent to preclude professional help, 
reflected in some agreement that professional help will not be useful: 
44 Professional help is the last thing I need                             2 
Mainly because I never suffered from a full blown depression. Self-
awareness helps you to look at yourself and why this is happening to 
you so no need for professional intervention. (P20) 
Combined with this emphasis on self-help, self-awareness and dealing with 
your own problems is a strong sense that the depression is a result of some bodily 
disturbance or not getting enough sunshine: 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                           4 
   
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted            
4 
Indeed, statement 6 above is the only distinguishing statement for this factor and this 
reinforces the central notion here of a sense of disruption to the normal workings of 
the body, or both body and mind together: 
When I experience low mood I often cannot sleep and feel excessively 
hungry or lose an interest in food. I tend to feel very anxious during such 
times as if it was something wrong with me psychically/mentally even. 
(P10) 
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Linked with this key recognition of the ‘blues’ as something natural or 
physiological, based in bodily disturbance, is a sense of the experience being part of 
the ‘cycle of life’, implying the ‘blues’ may come and go:  
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle 
of life           
2 
In addition, there is fear of being judged by others (49:3), a concern over the 
effect of the depression on family and close relationships (52: 3), a feeling that 
others may think the depression is selfish (24: 3), and some loss of normal self-
control (28: 3). For participants associated with this factor there may also be some 
comfort taken from a belief in a God who cares (46: 4) and some feeling of sadness 
and emptiness much or all of the day (11: 2). 
Table 6-23 Lowest scoring statements for Factor 7 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've 
imagined          
-4 
48        I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                -4 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or my judgement                  -4
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it            -4
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking 
my own life          
-5 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or 
burning my skin          
-5 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                           -5 
There is strong rejection here of what I have termed the more ‘psychotic’ 
aspects of depression; the experience of bizarre thoughts and delusions (58: -5), 
feeling unsafe at home and at work (48: -4), not being able to trust one’s senses (50: 
-4) and finding it hard to distinguish between what’s real and imagined (56: -4). 
Alongside these there is a very strong rejection of thoughts of death and 
suicide as figuring in the experience (19: -5): 
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I have never had a thought of taking my own life and I find it difficult to 
imagine what it must be like. I think it is an extremely painful issue and I 
feel very disturbed and sad when I hear someone talking about taking 
their own life. (P10) 
There is also a very strong rejection of intentional self-harm as figuring here 
(10: -5): 
I cannot imagine harming myself and I have never experienced a need 
to do it. I cannot imagine what it must be like for a person to do it. On the 
one hand I find the idea repulsive, on the other hand I feel a pain and 
sadness when thinking about this. (P10) 
Never had a depression that was serious enough to even start 
contemplating this. Self-abuse is an abhorrent idea that only leads to an 
ever downward spiral of self-hate and a likely inability to emerge from 
the depression. (P20) 
At the same time, there is some rejection of the helpfulness of antidepressant 
medication which appears to fit with a strong feeling of self-reliance: 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -2 
I have too much knowledge that anti-depressants are a nightmare to 
come off, and I would be labelling myself a depressive if I ever felt the 
need to take them. I would rather try physical activity to try to heal the 
mental issues I was dealing with in the event of a depression. (P20) 
The DSM statements do not appear to figure that significantly in this factor. 
While there is a very strong rejection of recurrent thoughts of death and suicide (19: -
5) concomitant with the description of this experience as the ‘blues’, only one DSM 
statement was agreed with (11: 2), five statements were rejected (-1 to -5) and three 
were placed in the 0 column. So, again here the DSM diagnostic criteria do not 
appear to be able to properly capture this experience of depression. 
In summary, this experience of depression is characterised as the ‘blues’ and 
a need to survive the experience and fix one’s own problems lie at the heart of it. 
There is also fear of being judged by others and the prominence of concern over the 
effect of the depression on others, including a fear that others may see the 
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depression as something selfish. In addition, here there is an understanding of this 
form of depression as resulting from some kind of disturbance or disruption of the 
body and its rhythm, and that the depression is part of the ‘cycle of life’. For some 
who experience this type of depression there is comfort in a belief in a God who 
cares and there are also fears about being judged along with some loss of self-
control. The DSM statements do not appear to figure that significantly in this factor, 
although there is a strong rejection of thoughts of death and suicide and some 
agreement that feelings of sadness and/or emptiness form part of the experience. 
Overall, this experience of the ‘blues’ is something participants who are associated 
with this factor see as manageable through self-help and self-reliance – though 
where self-reliance may lead to loneliness and greater despondency - and as 
resulting from physiological or bodily disturbance. There are also feelings of sadness 
and fear about the impact of the depression on others and about others’ judgements.  
6.3.8 Factor 8: Loss of meaning/depression as part of the cycle of life 
Least like me when depressed  Most like me when depressed 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
10 45 29 3 7 4 1 5 2 12 9 
21 48 36 24 14 16 6 11 8 17 38 
46 49 51 33 19 26 23 15 13 28 42 
 58 52 47 20 30 27 25 18 41  
  56 50 22 31 32 39 40   
   53 54 34 35 55    
    57 37 43     
     44      
Figure 6-9 Factor Array for Factor 8 
Two participants loaded significantly on this factor, both female, however only 
one participant gave any further biographical details. Participant 2 is White/British, 
identified her depression as moderate, has been diagnosed with depression and has 
taken prescribed anti-depressant medication in the past.  
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Table 6-24 Biographical details of participants who exemplify Factor 8 
Participant Gender Age 
Self-
identified 
ethnicity Diagnosed? 
Self-
identified 
severity 
Prescribed 
antidepressant 
medication? 
2 Female 40 White/British Yes Moderate Yes, in the past 
27 Female None 
given 
None given None given None 
given 
None given 
Factor 8 represents an experience of depression in which a sense of 
meaninglessness is central (42: 5), along with feelings of hopelessness (17: 4), a 
questioning of ‘what is the point of life?’ (41: 4) and a dwelling on what has been lost 
(12: 4). 
Table 6-25 Highest scoring statements for Factor 8 
Number Statement Grid 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle 
of life          
5 
9 I have little or no interest in sex  5 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                                 5 
12    I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                 4 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                                4 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                 4 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking 
and recreational drugs, goes out of the window           
4 
One participant associated with this factor describes feeling cut off from the 
world, where part of this disconnection is a loss of interest in sex (9: 5): 
Depression cuts me off from the world and the people in it. I feel 
disconnected from everything. Numb would be a good word to describe 
it. [Loss of interest in sex] is a further expression of disconnection from 
the world around me. (P2) 
In addition to a sense of meaninglessness there is also a discontinuity 
between what is happening on the inside and what is showing on the outside (2: 3) 
and a decrease in normal self-control (28: 4), combined with a sense of having to 
survive the experience (18: 3). Alongside these aspects, there is a loss of interest 
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and pleasure (13: 3), an experience of fatigue and/or loss of energy (8: 3) and, to a 
lesser extent, feelings of sadness and emptiness (11: 2). 
The centrality of meaninglessness and hopelessness in this experience 
appears linked with a rejection of the sense that this depression is a result of a 
physical illness (36: -3). However, this is not straightforward and there is here what 
appears to be a more complex understanding of the relationship between mind and 
body, including a questioning of which comes first: 
I don’t think in terms of the physical/mental – I view myself to be a totality 
of mind/body/spirit (whatever that is), and changes in my mood are not 
solely the result of the physical. However, I always wonder about the 
chicken and egg question, especially with regards to food – when I 
overeat, or eat unhealthily I find this to strongly affect my mood and my 
hormonal/chemical levels. But I overeat when I already feel down, so it’s 
difficult to know what came first. I find that I cannot separate myself into 
compartments. (P27) 
Despite the difficult feelings, for example of meaninglessness and 
hopelessness, which are associated with this factor, there is very strong agreement 
that the experience is part of a ‘cycle of life’ (38: 5), indeed this statement is one of 
two distinguishing statements for this factor. Here Participant 27 describes her 
acceptance of ‘up’s and ‘downs’ as part of her existence:  
I have learnt that these up and downs have always been, and I imagine 
will always be, simply inherent to my existence. There doesn’t seem to 
be a way around it, and this cyclical way of being is mirrored in nature. 
Having read a lot of Eastern philosophy, I try to appreciate all of life. 
(P27) 
Moreover, as well as questions concerning meaning, including ‘the point of my 
life’, there is also a desire to find answers concerning the depression itself (40: 3): 
Because I believe understanding the science of why depression 
happens would make it easier for me to deal with it and work out ways 
to help myself. (P2) 
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Table 6-26 Lowest scoring statements for Factor 8 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                       -4 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -4 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                           -4 
49        I fear being judged if I tell others about it                 -4 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                   -5 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin          
-5 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               -5 
There is very strong disagreement with a symptom of decreased appetite (21: 
-5), for participants associated with this factor, but where over eating is a problem 
rather than loss of appetite: 
When I’m depressed, the first thing I turn to is food, and experience a 
large increase in appetite! (P27) 
The relevant DSM diagnostic criterion includes over-eating as well as under-eating 
(significant change in weight or appetite), and therefore has clear relevance for this 
aspect of the experience.  
As with some other factors there is generally strong rejection of what might be 
termed the possible ‘psychotic’ aspects of depression: 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                       -4 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                           -4 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined          -3 
50   I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or my judgement                -2 
 
There is also a very strong rejection of intentional self-harm as figuring in this 
experience (10: -5): 
This is not something I have ever experienced or felt inclined to do. (P2) 
 
There is also a strong rejection of the fear of being judged and this is the 
second of the distinguishing statements for this factor (49: -4), having been given a 
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much more negative score in comparison with all the other factors, and possibly 
related to this is a rejection of feelings of shame with regard to this depression (51: -
3). Here then, shame and fear of judgment do not figure significantly for participants 
experiencing this form of depression and this is unusual in comparison to the other 
factors.  
In addition, there appears to be a very strong feeling against the idea of a 
belief in God as a comfort (46: -5), which is shared with Factors 4 and 6: 
I have no religious beliefs at all. (P2) 
 
The placement of DSM statements for this factor is quite variable, with 
agreement with four statements and disagreements with five. Interestingly, the 
statement concerning thoughts of death and suicide (19: -1) is given a low score 
here, (this is one of only three factors with low scores for this statement), so that it is 
only very mildly rejected.  
In summary, this experience of depression is characterised by feelings of 
meaninglessness, hopelessness and a loss of pleasure and interest in life, including 
a loss of interest in sex. There is a questioning of the point of life, a loss of normal 
self-control, a dwelling on what has been lost and a need for some answers to the 
question of why this is happening. Combined with these there is also a sense of 
having to survive the experience along with a strong sense that the depression is a 
part of the cycle of life. In addition, there is a strong rejection of the symptom of 
decreased appetite (where an increase in appetite appears to be a major element of 
this form of depression), intentional self-harm and comfort taken from a belief in a 
caring God. There is also strong rejection of a fear of being judged and rejection of 
the potentially ‘psychotic’ aspects of depression. Overall, this experience of 
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depression is one of a loss of meaning, hope and pleasure in life. There is also a 
linked questioning here of the point of life and a dwelling on loss, combined with a 
sense of depression as part of existence and only a mild rejection of thoughts of 
death and suicide. 
6.4 Summary of Results 
This Q-methodological study yielded eight interpretable factors each of which 
represents a different experience of depression shared between at least two 
participants. There is significant diversity between these different experiences which 
includes; 1) an experience that resembles ‘clinical’/major depression as reflected in 
the DSM diagnostic criteria, 2) an experience of the ‘blues’ in which overcoming loss 
and bereavement are central, 3) an ‘anti-clinical’ experience of depression in which 
anxiety plays a major role, 4) an experience of depression where feeling emotionally 
devoid and empty is combined with strong feelings of isolation, 5) an experience with 
sadness and loss at the core where a need to survive the depression is an overriding 
feature, 6) an experience of depression with feelings of alienation and helplessness 
at its heart, 7) an alternative experience of the ‘blues’ where self-reliance and self-
awareness are central, 8) an experience where loss of meaning and hopelessness 
come to the fore, along with an acceptance of the mood, and the up and downs 
associated with it, as part and parcel of existence. 
Examples of the many significant variations between these experiences 
include: differences in immediate symptoms, for example the extent to which 
sadness and emptiness or diminished interest or pleasure are major symptoms; 
differences in vocabulary, where two of the experiences are referred to as the ‘blues’ 
rather than depression; differences in the relational aspects of the depression, 
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including a sense of isolation, feeling cut off from others and feelings of shame and 
fear of being judged; differences in the perceived role of the body and physiology 
and the relationship between body and mind;  differences in feelings about what 
might help or alleviate the depression; different senses concerning whether 
depression is an illness and/or part of the ‘cycle of life’ and existence; different 
feelings about the efficacy of antidepressant medication and professional help and 
differences in the sense of how the depression has come about and how it feels to 
not know what the cause or causes might be. What is also important here is that 
those aspects of the experience which are not obviously immediate ‘symptoms’, for 
example feelings about the causes of the depression and the different possibilities 
for alleviation and/or treatment, appear intricately bound up with the overall lived 
experience of depression for the participants in this study.  
Furthermore, the range of experiences found here evidence very different 
patterns of relationship to the received DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for major (or 
‘clinical’) depression. While Factor 1 provides strong evidence that for some 
participants the DSM criteria would successfully identify their depression, (and in this 
factor the risk of suicide appeared to be greatest), for the other factors the diagnostic 
criteria (DSM statements) were more dispersed, where an alternative picture to that 
presented by the received diagnostic criteria emerged. Thus, it could be argued that 
if one key purpose of the DSM criteria is to identify those persons with depression 
who may be most at risk of suicide then this study appears, to some extent, to 
support those criteria, indeed the statement concerning thoughts of death and 
suicide is a distinguishing statement for Factor 1. In this regard, it is also important to 
acknowledge that there are several other aspects to the DSM diagnostic criteria 
including the level of distress caused by symptoms, the absence of a medical 
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condition or the effects of a substance, and the absence of schizophrenia, mania and 
other ‘psychotic’ disorders. Therefore, the nine DSM statements included in this 
study do not represent the whole diagnostic picture although they do represent the 
key symptoms used for diagnosis.  
Of the remaining seven experiences however, none would be identified or 
recognised as ‘major’ by the occurrence of a minimum of five of the nine diagnostic 
criteria (where one of these must be either depressed mood or loss of interest and/or 
pleasure). Here I suggest that while the experience represented by Factor 1 appears 
to most closely resemble ‘clinical’ or major depression, the other factors also include 
experiences where there is a great deal of pain and distress and for some of these 
experiences this pain and distress may be very severe. Moreover, although the DSM 
statement concerning thoughts of death and suicide was most agreed with (and 
distinguishing) in Factor 1, there was only mild disagreement with two factors 
(Factors 4 and 8) and either neutrality or ambivalence concerning it with a third 
(Factor 6). Further research would be needed to assess the nature and severity of 
suicidal thoughts for these other experiences, however it is possible that the DSM 
criteria may well miss other types of depression where there may still be some risk of 
suicide and/or self-harm (for example with Factors 4, 6 and 8).  
Most importantly though, beyond this immediate issue of the risk of suicide, 
this study has shown that the term ‘depression’ is used and understood by 
participants to describe very different forms of low mood or intense sadness. This 
finding casts some doubt on the abnormal/clinical psychology practice of diagnosing 
depression to the extent that many other experiences of depression (here 7 distinct 
experiences), some of which include severe negative emotional states, may be 
rendered less visible or even invisible when examined though the received 
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medical/DSM/ICD diagnostic lens. Moreover, adopting a relatively singular and fixed 
understanding of the complex phenomenology of depression may also pathologise 
one experience over others, or alternatively trivialise or downgrade some very 
severe and difficult experiences because they do not conform to a notion of ‘serious’ 
or ‘clinical’ depression. Indeed, there are complex issues raised by these findings 
concerning the intentional and unintentional pathologisation of depression and the 
extent to which the abnormal/clinical psychology model is of use in capturing such a 
complex, relational, phenomenon such as depression given much of the 
phenomenology may be overlooked or even discounted in the diagnostic process. In 
the following final chapter, I discuss these issues and the findings in more detail, 
referring back to the conceptual frameworks discussed earlier in the thesis and to 
debates concerning the identity and professional status of counselling psychology. 
6.5 Personal Reflection 
Explicating and interpreting the factors reported in this chapter was both a 
challenging and a rewarding task given the high number of interpretable factors and 
the range and number of statements included in this study. Interpreting factors in this 
kind of research is a complex enterprise requiring analysis both within the pattern of 
sorting for each factor and through comparisons across all the eight factors. There 
are also the distinguishing statements to be included along with the follow-up 
comments from participants. Despite these challenges I very much enjoyed, and felt 
rewarded by, the process of making sense of the results and bringing the different 
experiences to life as best I could, trying to be as fair as possible to the placing of 
statements and the written descriptions of depression given by participants.  
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Analysing and interpreting the factors also had a strong emotional impact on 
me. Many of the follow-up comments and descriptions were very moving and I found 
that as I was working on this chapter and becoming immersed in the often difficult 
and sometimes harrowing experiences of participants – the same was true when I 
was reading and reviewing the autobiographical accounts of depression for the 
literature review – I felt at times sad, low and depressed myself. This was in part 
because working with participants’ descriptions of their depression and sad moods 
brought up my own feelings of sadness and my own recollections of times when I 
had been depressed and had struggled with difficult events in my own life. At the 
same time I also experienced strong feelings of gratitude that so many of the 
participants in the study had been so open and honest about their own experiences. 
Without their frank comments it would have been very difficult to get a proper sense 
of the different experiences that emerged from the factor analytic procedure. Also in 
this regard, I struggled at times with the analysis when there were few and/or shorter 
comments and this shows through at times in the explication, more detailed 
comments bring the factor to life in a way that is not possible where the comments 
are less detailed or partially absent.    
My own Q-sort (Participant 3), although not exemplifying any of the factors, 
correlated with Factor 8, and the experience represented by that factor – especially a 
loss of meaning and feelings of hopelessness - really resonates, including the 
increase in appetite which I always experience when I feel depressed. From a 
personal perspective this helped to validate the procedure for me given that this 
factor so clearly spoke to my own experience of depression which I also discovered 
was, to a great extent, shared with the two participants statistically associated with it. 
This helped me feel that I was on the right track with my analyses. However, it is 
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important to state that the results reported here are interpretations and, although I 
have aimed to ground those interpretations as firmly as possible in the quantitative 
and qualitative data, as I have argued earlier any ‘description’ is always already an 
interpretation bound up with the social and cultural meanings that I have drawn upon 
(including those which have already shaped me) and my own personal beliefs, 
feelings and experiences. In this sense although the main method in this thesis is 
quantitative, the methodology is very much qualitative; where the researcher’s 
subjectivity and their (inevitably personal) interpretations, rather than statistical 
procedures, lie at the heart of the analysis. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter I begin with a review of the overall findings and then move on to 
discuss the results with regard to the social constructionist framework reviewed 
earlier in Chapter 2. I then present an existential-phenomenological interpretation 
followed by a discussion of the implications of the study for existential-
phenomenological counselling psychology practice. I go on to discuss my sense of 
what counselling psychology means for me and lastly, I review the strengths and 
limitations of the study, suggest some possible follow-up research and give a final 
personal reflection. 
7.2 Overall Findings 
The key aim of this thesis was to uncover the complexity and variety of participants’ 
experiences, starting with a very open definition of depression operationalised in a 
Q-set of 58 experiential statements. Each of the eight factors found in this study 
represents a distinctive but shared form of experiencing depression. Principal 
components factor analysis produces factors which are orthogonal, meaning that 
they are entirely statistically independent and therefore not correlated with each 
other. This orthogonality is also evidenced in the factor explications where it can be 
seen that each different factor/experience is characterised by a different focus, a 
diverse sense of what is at the heart or the core of the depression, along with an 
equally diverse sense of what the experience is not.  
Of the 58 statements only one consensus statement emerged (statement 56) 
which indicates that the Q-set enabled meaningful differentiation between divergent 
experiences. There were also 19 distinguishing statements so that 33% of the Q-set 
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enabled statistically significant differentiation between experiences. Thus, using the 
Q-set, participants were able to express their own experience of depression in a way 
that enabled both a statistical and a qualitative/interpretive differentiation between 
the participants and their different (shared) experiences. The detailed presentation of 
the results in the previous chapter shows just how varied the experience of 
depression can be, how the same term or category can be used to represent and 
communicate very different lived experiences.  
The range of experiences found here also evidences very different patterns of 
relationship to the received DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for major (or ‘clinical’) 
depression. Factor 1 was the only factor where six DSM statements were agreed 
with (four strongly agreed with, and two less strongly agreed with). Given the DSM 
criterion of at least five of the nine diagnostic criteria being present where one is 
either feeling sad and/or empty much or all of the day (statement 11) or markedly 
diminished interest or pleasure (statement 13), those participants associated with 
this factor would be likely to be diagnosed with clinical depression if they sought 
medical/clinical psychological help. The distinguishing statement for this factor 
concerns recurrent thoughts of death and suicide (statement 19) and this also fits 
with a clinical picture of depression where suicide may be a serious risk. ‘Mild’ and 
‘moderate’ depression tend not to be seen to have as high a risk of suicide and 
therefore Factor 1 may well represent something like ‘severe’ depression as 
understood within the ICD criteria. In this way Factor 1 can be argued to roughly 
correspond to the ‘clinical’ phenomenology for major depression found within the 
DSM.  
None of the other factors fit the DSM diagnostic criteria in the same way as 
Factor 1, although one (Factor 3) showed a strong rejection of the DSM statements, 
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displaying disagreement with 6 DSM statements (five strongly disagreed with and 
one less strongly), indicating some resonance with the clinical/abnormal psychology 
picture of depression albeit through a rejection of it. Thus, it could be argued that 
Factors 2-8 could be categorised as ‘non-clinical’ depression, however as I stated in 
the previous chapter, while two of the factors reveal an experience of depression that 
participants labelled as the ‘blues’, some of the other factors, especially Factors 4, 6 
and 8, disclose experiences that appear to be severe, where there is much pain and 
distress. Moreover, there was only mild disagreement with statement 19 (recurrent 
thoughts of death and suicide) with two factors (Factors 4 and 8) and either neutrality 
or ambivalence concerning it with a third (Factor 6), indicating at least the possibility 
that suicide could still be a risk with these experiences. Furthermore, while 3 of the 4 
participants associated with Factor 1 had been diagnosed with depression, there 
were four other factors (Factors 2, 4, 6 and 8) where at least one of the participants 
who were associated with the factor had been formally diagnosed with depression. 
Likewise, while participants loading on Factor 1 all self-identified their depression as 
either moderate or severe, five of the other factors (Factors 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8) were 
also associated with at least some participants who identified their depression as 
either moderate or severe. This suggests that distinctions between ‘clinical’ and ‘non-
clinical’ and ‘mild’, moderate’ and severe’ depression are not so clear cut and that 
although not necessarily falling into the DSM/ICD diagnostic net, some of the 
experiences of depression found here may be self-identified and experienced as 
moderate or severe episodes nonetheless. Given this, the results provide some 
evidence that clients’ own experience and portrayal of their depression may 
sometimes be at odds with a more abnormal and clinical psychological/nosological 
account. 
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I argue here that these findings call into question at least some aspects of the 
medical/clinical psychological practice of diagnosing depression to the extent that 
several other experiences of depression, some of which include severe negative 
emotional states, are rendered less visible or even invisible when examined though 
the received DSM nosological lens. Moreover, adopting a relatively singular and 
fixed understanding of the complex phenomenology of depression may also 
pathologise one experience over others, or alternatively trivialise or downgrade some 
very severe and difficult experiences because they do not conform to a notion of 
‘serious’ or ‘clinical’ depression. The findings of this study therefore put into the 
spotlight the extent to which we should rely on the received diagnostic criteria for 
depression in counselling psychology practice. Those diagnostic criteria may well be 
of use in identifying clients with depression who are experiencing a severe episode 
and who may be at higher risk of suicide, however these results show that the term 
‘depression’ - as a category and means of communicating an experience - can 
include experiences which do not fit into the received diagnostic criteria but appear 
to be severe nonetheless. It could be argued that adopting a fairly fixed and narrow 
picture of depression may be appropriate for medical practice and/or clinical 
psychology, where the aim is to accurately identify a clinical/medical phenomenology 
and to subsequently provide appropriate intervention which may include (in medical 
practice) the prescription of medication. However, in counselling psychology practice 
we are likely to encounter the whole range of depression experience and very liable 
to miss the lived reality and meaning of depression for clients if we rely on too 
narrow a definition or understanding or hold ‘clinical’ depression as the only serious, 
severe, high-risk form.  
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It is also important to remember that each of the eight experiences uncovered 
in this study are experiences which are shared between at least two participants, Q-
methodology is precisely aimed at uncovering shared experiences within a particular 
sample. This means that the factors/experiences, while evidencing divergence from 
each other, also represent an experience which has meaning and relevance beyond 
the level of one individual. Moreover, while the purposive and snowball (non-
probability) sampling utilised in this study means that there must be great caution 
used in considering the extent to which these results can be more widely 
generalised, it can reasonably be argued that these eight factors/experiences may 
exemplify some forms and modes of experiencing depression found within the wider 
(UK) population and possibly beyond. I am not suggesting that these results are 
necessarily directly or straightforwardly generalisable but rather that they may give 
an overall snapshot of some of the different and diverse elements and aspects of the 
ways persons experience their depression found in wider populations. In this way, 
the findings may well be of use for practitioners and as a basis for further research, 
which I discuss later in this chapter. 
7.3 The social construction of depression 
In this section I return to the social constructionist conceptual framework of the thesis 
in order to further interpret and discuss the results. In Chapter 3 I reviewed some key 
literature related to the lived experience of depression and concluded that the social 
historical and cross-cultural writing and literature revealed the socially constructed 
nature of depression. Put another way, this work shows that our conceptions of 
depression have changed significantly across time and have been bound up with 
many different social and moral orders, culminating in the dominance of the current 
bio-medical understanding in the West. Likewise, that research shows how culture 
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(cultural structures and processes) greatly impacts on the experience of depression 
which varies across cultures and continents. I also contrasted the autobiographical 
accounts with the abnormal/clinical psychology understandings of depression as an 
‘affect’ or mood disorder and argued that the abnormal psychology understandings 
appear narrow and limited when placed alongside the first person accounts. Here the 
results of this study also suggest that the abnormal/clinical understandings appear 
too fixed and narrow to fully capture the diversity of experience revealed in this 
study. I now wish to discuss this notion of the social construction of depression in 
more detail referring back to the work reviewed in Chapter 2.  
I suggested there that social constructionism offers at least four key critiques 
of mainstream psychological theory and practice and I will make use of each of those 
critiques in order to explore the utility of this conceptual framework in making sense 
of the results of this study. Firstly, I suggested that social constructionism has played 
a role in dismantling modernist (realist, empiricist) ideas of truth and objectivity, 
where there is a questioning of the notion that there is a real, discernible world ‘out-
there’ that can be accessed directly through the senses and is separate from and 
impervious to our experiences, understandings and interpretations of it. Rather, 
social constructionism asks us to understand reality as socially constructed, meaning 
that what we take to be real and true (including how we directly experience the 
world) is a reflection not only of the intra-psychic realm but also of complex historical, 
social, cultural and political-economic processes which, to a great extent (though 
never fully), shape and construct our lived, embodied experience. As I have 
previously argued, from such a perspective we would expect a variety of 
understandings and experiences of low mood, found not only across time and culture 
but also at the personal, individual level as persons draw from a range of ‘repertoires 
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of social practices’ (Harré, 1986: 4) to make sense of and to convey their 
experiences. In this sense, the results of this study problematise both the narrow, to 
some extent culture-blind and restricted ‘truth’ of the abnormal/clinical psychology 
accounts of depression and the nosological practice of dividing depression into 
‘clinical’ and ‘non-clinical’ categories. As stated earlier, some of the experiences of 
depression uncovered here which do not fit the accepted abnormal psychological 
understandings, appear to be as severe as the ‘clinical’ form and, moreover, it 
appears that for some of the factors that do not fall into the standard diagnostic net, 
a risk of suicide cannot be ruled out.  
Many of the participants associated with Factors 2-8 had been previously 
diagnosed which may indicate that the diagnostic criteria are being more loosely 
applied and that the safety-net of diagnosis still captures persons who may not fall 
into the standard diagnostic categories. Alternatively, it could be argued that the 
diagnostic criteria are inconsistent (or inconsistently applied) and/or that they are 
unnecessarily resulting in pathologising/medicating persons with depression. Above 
all however, I suggest that the results offer evidence that a dominant 
(abnormal/clinical psychology) discourse or singular truth of the experience of 
depression is problematic and difficult to sustain. Rather, we see here multiple 
(personal but to some extent shared) ‘truths’ where the importance of ‘subjective 
truth’ or ‘aletheia’ comes to the fore. A stronger argument could be that the 
abnormal/clinical psychology ‘truth’ risks casting some persons/clients who are 
experiencing depression in the role of Other and I discuss this possibility later in the 
chapter.  
Secondly, I suggested that social constructionism asks us to question the 
representational theory of language that still pervades mainstream traditional 
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psychology. It might be claimed that the abnormal psychology/psychiatric accounts 
rely upon a (mainstream) representational theory of language where the description 
of symptoms is understood as an objective, factual indication of the singular, 
underlying (possibly causal) reality of the disease or syndrome, evidenced by the 
description conforming (or not conforming) to the nosological criteria. For the 
medical/disease model to function language must enable, just as with all natural 
science, a clear, unambiguous and accurate account of the experience or (medical) 
phenomenology. Social constructionism shows us that language works in a more 
complex, constructive, performative way, where it does not enable straight forward or 
direct access to the reality underneath but is rather subject to many discursive and 
narrative forces which are in turn shaped and affected by the wider social, historical 
and cultural context. The variety of accounts found here could be argued to indicate 
the variety of possible ways of experiencing and constructing what is termed 
‘depression’ but where these personal constructions (and subjective truths) also, to 
some extent, draw upon and reflect particular stories or discourses (repertoires of 
social action) that circulate in our culture(s).  Thus, any strategy to reduce these 
experiences/stories to a single valid, ‘serious’ form will always, intentionally or 
unintentionally, displace, marginalise or refuse other accounts and experiences. 
Linked to this notion of stories and ‘discursive repertoires’ is the idea that, at the 
personal level, depressed persons may have chosen particular – isolating, 
separating – propositions/stories from their broader language repertoire such that 
choice and language-use become combined. As Dorothy Rowe has argued: 
… the person who experiences depression has in his [or her] language 
structure a group of propositions each of which concerns a way in which 
he separates himself from other people… Depression is that experience 
which accompanies the selection from the set of possible states from a 
person’s language structure that particular state or system of 
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propositions whereby the person sees himself as being cut off from and 
as choosing to be cut off from interaction with others. (Rowe, 1988: 30)  
Given the study’s focus on the diversity of shared experience, the results do 
not allow any clear conclusion with regard to individual language-use but rather they 
evidence the possibility of understanding and describing one’s depression in varied 
ways, ways in which the meaning of the depression can profoundly shift and 
therefore the consequences of that meaning - for example feeling cut off from others 
and therefore cut off from help - may also shift. 
Thirdly, I suggested that social constructionism challenges the individualism of 
mainstream psychology which adopts a variously explicit and/or implicit version of 
the person based upon current Western ideas and values. This aspect of social 
constructionism is more difficult to map onto the results of this study, however it 
could be argued here that the complexity and multiplicity of experiences found in this 
study problematises the mainstream clinical/abnormal accounts which tend to situate 
the depression firmly within the person, within their individual biological, neurological 
or psychological structures and process. Moreover, we might argue that when 
participants are given a wide range of statements which include some of the 
relational and social aspects of the experience of depression, some people report 
experiences where these aspects come to the fore. This was reflected in differences 
between the relational aspects among factors, including the sense of isolation, 
feeling cut off from others and feelings of shame and fear of being judged, and 
different senses concerning whether depression is an illness and/or part of the ‘cycle’ 
or fabric of life. As I argued in Chapter 2, the individualism of mainstream psychology 
often plays a role in fixing certain problems within persons or groups and in so doing, 
intentionally or unintentionally, elides or even deletes elements of their origin in the 
relational world and/or in society and culture itself. This process of individualisation, 
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in turn, may play a role in the creation and reproduction of oppressive discourses 
and practices. It cannot be argued here that the results provide strong evidence for 
this but rather that they indicate that the individualism inherent in medical/nosological 
models may be difficult and/or problematic to sustain, and this may be especially 
relevant for existential-phenomenological counselling practice which I discuss later in 
this chapter.  
Fourthly, and linked to three above, I suggested that social constructionism 
offers a challenge to essentialism in mainstream psychology – most often reflected in 
psychological explanations which rely on neurological/neurotransmitter, genetic, 
hormonal, biological and physiological explanations of thoughts, feelings and 
behaviour. The mainstream abnormal/psychiatric accounts of depression are, by 
definition, essentialist in nature given their reliance on the bio-
medical/nosological/clinical model of disease and ‘disorder’. Such essentialism – 
manifested in psychological typologies - is not necessarily in itself a negative thing 
but rather should be judged on the consequences, real and/or potential, of such 
explanations for those with depression, including clients and patients undergoing 
treatment. Again, it is not possible to make strong claims on the basis of the results 
of this study, however the way in which the lived experience of depression has been 
shown here to be multi-faceted and manifold, where several distinct experiences can 
be communicated and categorised under the same term, would suggest that 
essentialising the experience may lead to unnecessary pathologisation on the one 
hand and marginalisation of some experiences on the other. Moreover, the emphasis 
in abnormal and clinical psychology/psychiatric accounts on biological/physiological 
causes, and the concomitant practice – based on the ‘disease’ model - of giving 
antidepressant medication to address those causes, may well hinder or even prevent 
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our ability to understand and work with other equally severe and disturbing 
experiences of depression which may not necessarily be primarily physiological in 
nature. For some of the experiences reported here, it may, for example, be far better 
to consider psychotherapeutic treatments which emphasise the relational, situated, 
context bound aspects of the depression and in a way that avoids abstracting a 
common version from the multifarious, concrete lived world. In the words of Harré 
(1986) which I quoted in Chapter 2: 
There has been a tendency among both philosophers and psychologists 
to abstract an entity - call it anger, love, grief or anxiety - and then try to 
study it. But what there is are angry people, upsetting scenes, 
sentimental episodes, grieving families and funerals, anxious parents 
pacing at midnight, and so on. There is a concrete world of contexts and 
activities. We reify and abstract from that concreteness at our peril. 
(Harré, 1986: 4) 
It is important to reiterate however, as I have already noted in Chapter 1, that 
there is a sense in which this study can also be said to be reifying and abstracting 
the lived experience of depression, categorising it into discrete factors/experiences. 
However, as I have earlier argued, firstly some degree of reification must always be 
present in research given the nature of the relationship between narrative, discourse 
and experience and secondly I would argue that this study is making sense of the 
experiences in a way that enables participants’ voices and experiences to be more 
clearly heard. For me, it is never possible to gain direct access to lived experience, 
once that experience is communicated it becomes an account of some kind, 
although some accounts may get much closer to the lived experience than others – 
and these are the accounts I have sought in this study.  
It can further be argued that the essentialising, individualising nature of 
abnormal psychology/nosological accounts risks creating and sustaining a form of 
symbolic violence with respect to the experience of depression and those who 
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undergo it. Indeed, does the abnormal psychology/nosological model represent a 
‘self-celebratory monologue’ (Sampson, 2008: 4) in which there is a hierarchy, a 
dominant and subordinate (self-other) aspect to it? Can it be argued that a singular, 
reduced abnormal psychology/nosological version constructs and defines the 
Otherness of the ‘patient’ whose experience is seen to lie outside normal, healthy 
thinking, feeling and acting and who therefore must be brought back to that 
normality, back into healthy, civilised citizenship? To what extent does the 
abnormal/clinical version marginalise, trivialise or even exclude experiences of 
depression which do not fit the model? Such symbolic violence, where (and if) it 
occurs, may well exacerbate the experience of depression which I have shown here 
already includes, for many, a profound sense of not being heard, of feeling cut off 
from others and therefore from possible help.  
The key role of concepts of normality and abnormality, and to some extent 
‘clinical’ and ‘non-clinical’ categorisations may omit the socio-economic roots of such 
distinctions which, it can be argued, have more to do with relations of power and 
authority than with (medical) phenomenology. Here I am not arguing that the results 
of this study are necessarily able to shed clear light on this complex social and 
historical aspect but rather that a fuller awareness of the operation of bio-medical 
discourse requires an understanding of wider relations of power. As Rose (1985: 
231) has argued: 
To derive a theory of normality from a conception of the normativity of a 
life process and the incidence of pathology is one thing. To derive a 
theory of normality from the normativity of a statistical average and the 
incidence of variations from it is another… The problem [of psychology’s 
basis in differentiating normal and abnormal] is exacerbated further 
when what counts as abnormality is set by a norm of adaptation to the 
conventions of a socio-economic order. Health, for the psychology of the 
individual, is not so much life in the silence of the organs as life in the 
silence of the authorities. 
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Above all, I suggest that the results of this study and the discussion above 
indicate the importance of rejecting a dichotomous understating of personhood - of 
placing the individual realm in opposition to the social, relational and collective realm 
- in favour of a: 
…dialectical interpenetration of subject and object in which neither has 
full primacy… The person is the mediated product of society and also, in 
acting, reproduces or potentially transforms that society (Sampson, 
1989: 6) 
However, the results do not necessarily diminish the possible utility of a 
clinical diagnosis per se but rather provide useful empirical evidence for the 
narrowness and limited range of its ability to capture the reality and complexity of 
depression for some, or even for many, clients.  
Finally, while the social constructionist/post-structuralist conceptual framework 
adopted in this study enables the inclusion of a broader, more contextualised 
understanding of the experience of depression, as I have already discussed 
(Chapter 2) social constructionism has clear limits in relation to the extent to which 
the role of personal experience - and especially the lived body - are in danger of 
being lost altogether (Burr, 1999). In the next section I more fully consider the ways 
that existential-phenomenology can help us to make sense of the experience of 
depression in a form that is useful and helpful for counselling psychology practice.  
7.4 An existential-phenomenological approach 
The marginalising of lived, embodied experience in social constructionist and some 
post-structuralist conceptual frameworks mentioned earlier, for me highlights the 
utility of existential-phenomenology as a way to provide a much needed account and 
a deeper understanding of lived experience - in a way that might inform and 
illuminate counselling and psychotherapeutic work with depressed and other clients. 
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As I have already discussed (Chapter 4), though post-structuralism/social 
constructionism and existential-phenomenology were elaborated at different 
historical periods – where post-structuralism to some extent followed and critiqued 
phenomenology – they can be seen to have major themes and concerns in common. 
Dreyfus (2004) has argued that there is a rough parallel between the work of 
Foucault and Heidegger, where Heidegger was interested in the ways in which 
things become turned into objects and Foucault was interested in the ways in which 
selves become subjects. Both thinkers, for Dreyfus, seek to show us the 
‘constructedness’ of our existence.  
Despite their common themes and shared concerns however, there are still 
some key differences between these two ways of thinking about, and understanding, 
our world and the persons who inhabit it. I have already highlighted (Chapter 2) a 
key difference between the post-structuralist/constructionist rejection of a 
foundational truth and Heidegger’s advancing of a form of existential truth - where for 
Heidegger (2002) truth is not a representation, but rather ‘aletheia’, (disclosure/truth) 
or ‘Unverborgenheit des Seins’ (a presence or unconcealment of Being). In fact, for 
Heidegger representational thinking is conceptualised as already covering up this 
genuine original understanding, which is a mode of existence preceding the 
objectified mode of the representational subject (Georg, 2016). It is this notion of 
existential truth that I wish to utilise here in order to make more sense of the lived 
experiences of depression uncovered in this study.  
Heidegger’s understanding of mood as a fundamental aspect of how we find 
ourselves (how the world is disclosed to us) may be one way in which it is possible to 
expand and deepen the current understandings of depression – both the 
experiences found in this study and that presented in the received comprehensive 
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diagnostic systems. Heidegger’s key concept of Befindlichkeit (attunement), which is 
existential (or ontological) and which is expressed ontically as everyday feeling or 
Stimmung, indicates that an experience such as depression may reflect some 
change in the existential or ontological aspect of Being rather than solely the 
everyday (ontic) feeling. For Heidegger then, there is something underneath our 
feelings, or put another way, something other than feelings and emotions may 
potentially be disclosed in the experience of depression; something more than 
emotions experienced by persons and/or the socially constructed patterns of 
representation which give shape to them (as in post-structuralism). Thus, when we 
experience something like the kind of emotions described in the different factors 
found in this study, we are already deeply rooted in the interpersonal world, we 
already have a sense of Being-in-the-world which precedes these recognisable 
feelings, we are already ‘there’, but this Being-there is difficult to recognise or reflect 
on as it forms the very fabric which is necessary for us to have any lived experience 
(or representations) at all. 
Matthew Radcliffe has written extensively, and very usefully, on developing an 
existential-phenomenological understanding of depression and argues that in 
depression it is not only that we experience certain kinds of feelings (shown in some 
detail in the results of this study) but that we may also, and at a deeper 
existential/ontological level, find ourselves in a profoundly different realm where 
there is a ‘shift in the sense of belonging to a shared world’ (Ratcliffe, 2013a: 5). 
Ratcliffe (2015) suggests that there is some evidence for this in the fact that many 
persons who have experienced depression find it difficult and sometimes impossible 
to put the experience into words, something described earlier in Chapter 3 and 
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reflected in the results of this study, especially with Factor 4 ‘emotionally 
devoid/isolated depression’. As Ratcliffe (2013a: 3) suggests: 
…we might ask, why is depression so hard to understand? The first thing 
to appreciate is that it is not simply a matter of the intensification of 
certain familiar aspects of experience and the diminution of others, such 
as feeling more sad and less happy, or more tired and less energetic… 
One finds oneself in a ‘different world’, an isolated, alien realm, adrift 
from social reality… depression involves a radical departure from 
‘everyday experience’. And it is not a localized experience that one has 
within a pre-given world; it encompasses every aspect of one’s 
experience and thought – it is the shape of one’s ‘world’. 
Thus, bringing existential-phenomenology to bear upon the experience of 
depression requires us to understand that some experiences of depression may 
involve profound existential alterations in our fundamental sense of belonging in or to 
a world. Indeed, Heidegger asks us to understand that humans are their Being-in-
the-world-with-others. Moreover, Heidegger’s notion of finding oneself in a world (the 
concept of Befindlichkeit, which is always in relation to Rede and Stimmung), exists 
prior to any split (through objectification) between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, between 
mind and body or thoughts and feeling. Furthermore, this sense of finding-oneself-in-
a-world, also includes a central element of possibility and choice: 
Dasein is not static – it has possibilities. It either finds itself thrown into 
them or it chooses them, but in either case it can realise them or put 
them aside. Possibilities suggest temporal frameworks, they are not yet 
but may be in the future [original italics] (Cohn, 2002: 9-10). 
In relation to the experience of depression, where there can be a profound 
sense of a lack of hope and a lack of possibility, it could therefore be argued that 
somehow the usual mode of finding oneself in a world has shifted, where there is a 
very different sense of the kinds of possibilities we have access to: 
Whereas the non-depressed person might find one thing practically 
significant and another thing not significant, the depressed person might 
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be unable to find anything practically significant. It is not that she doesn’t 
find anything significant, but that she cannot. And the absence is very 
much there, part of the experience – something is missing, painfully 
lacking, and nothing appears quite as it should do. (Ratcliffe, 2013a: 5) 
Put another way, for Radcliffe there is a key difference in losing hope in 
particular aspects of one’s life or particular tasks or ventures and losing the very 
facility of hope. Furthermore, conceptualising some kinds of depression as a 
reflection of a shift in one’s Being-in-the-world; of one’s sense of connection to 
others, of having access to possibility and choice, might provide an alternative and 
useful means of interpreting some of the experiences of depression found in this 
study. Indeed, paying closer attention to the existential/ontological aspects of 
depression may provide a means to understand and to work with clients who are 
deeply depressed without recourse to objectifying and/or pathologising discourses 
and accounts. I discuss these and other issues relating to practice in the next 
section.  
Finally, in terms of the theoretical framework of this thesis, the notion of 
subjective truth can be said to provide a vantage point which is in some sense 
‘outside’ of the constructed world but without recourse to a classical metaphysical 
type or truth which - as has been argued here and previously - could become 
authoritarian, imposing forms of truth tied up with regulatory practices; forms of truth 
to be submitted to. Rather, bringing in a notion of existential truth or ‘aletheia’, 
through providing a dimension that is not socially constructed, offers the possibility of 
conceptualising an ontological ground of existence which precedes processes of 
representation and objectification7. Bringing elements of Heidegger’s work into social 
constructionism could be argued to provide one way in which to approach the difficult 
                                                          
7 I am very grateful to Georg Nicolaus for a helpful discussion of this issue. 
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issue of absolute relativism - which for some is not possible – however these are 
issues that go beyond the scope of this thesis, although I continue to struggle with 
and to clarify these ideas and debates for myself. Here I merely wish to highlight the 
interesting and potentially useful outcomes of bringing post-structuralist and social 
constructionist ideas together with Heidegger’s and other versions of 
phenomenology. I now consider the implications of this research for existential-
phenomenological counselling psychology practice. 
7.5 Implications for Existential-phenomenological Counselling Psychology 
practice 
In this section I wish to reflect in more detail on the implications of the results for 
counselling psychology practice. From the detailed results presented in Chapter 6 it 
can be seen that clients who say they are depressed might be referring to something 
more akin to the ‘blues’ (there were two types of the ‘blues’ identified here, where 
either overcoming bereavement or where self-reliance and self-awareness were 
central), it may be an experience where alienation and isolation are significant, or 
where a lack of feeling is predominant. It may be an experience where feelings of 
loss and sadness or a loss of meaning predominate. It may also be an experience 
which more closely resembles the form of depression identified as ‘clinical’ or 
‘severe’ by the major diagnostic systems. Thus, one important implication for 
practice is that there is a vital need for gaining a rich and detailed description from 
the client of exactly what their depression is like, of what is significant or fundamental 
for them in their experience.  
This implication also supports the utility of an existential-phenomenological 
approach to counselling psychology where the starting point is to gain a detailed 
description of what the client is bringing and where repeatedly returning to the on-
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going description to clarify, refine and alter it can provide a better sense of the 
’presenting problem’ compared with the practice of identifying and matching 
diagnostic criteria in order to find the correct nosological category or label. Working 
with the notion of four interwoven dimensions of existence; the physical, the social, 
the psychological and the spiritual (van Deurzen and Adams, 2016) is one way in 
which we can ensure we get as complete a picture as possible of what clients bring 
and where they are in their difficulties. Clarifying exactly what is happening for one’s 
client within each of the four dimensions enables a fuller and deeper understanding 
of the client’s world, as Yalom (2003: 18) entreats us; ‘look out the other’s window, 
try to see the world as your patient sees it’. 
A further implication of the findings is the need to properly acknowledge and 
engage with clients’ personal meanings including the questioning, change or 
absence of personal meaning, (as opposed to primarily aiming to reduce or remove 
the symptoms of an underlying condition, syndrome or disease). Although such loss 
or questioning of meaning was most evident with Factor 8, this notion of working with 
personal meaning, for me, is part and parcel of working with our clients’ Being-in-the-
world and might encompass the concepts of subjective truth, of shifts in one’s sense 
of belonging, in one’s sense of possibilities in the world, which I discussed in the 
previous section. Indeed, Viktor Frankl has suggested that the ‘will to meaning’ is a 
fundamental part of what it is to be human: 
Man [sic] is always reaching out for meaning, always setting out on his search 
for meaning; in other words what I call the “will to meaning” is even to be 
regarded as man’s primary concern (Frankl, 1979: 29). 
 
 
190 
 
To work with meaning is to move away from the pathologisation and objectification 
that I have argued may result from relying too heavily on diagnosis and 
medical/psychiatric accounts. To work with meaning is to acknowledge that the client 
is the foremost expert with regard to their own life, their own thoughts and feelings; 
with regard to what matters to them. As van Deurzen (2009: 2) has suggested: 
… there can be no authority higher than that of our own experience as it is 
understood in the light of reflection and in comparison with the experience of 
our fellow humans. 
 
Working with personal meaning also requires us to move beyond our clients’ 
inner world, to look at their choices and the consequences of those choices, at the 
way they are living their lives, at what they want, at the direction in which they are 
travelling and/or would like to travel, at their perceived place in the world. Linked to 
this, Frankl further argues that focusing too exclusively on the therapeutic encounter, 
on the exchange between the therapist and client, between I and Thou, misses a key 
dimension of Being; that of the world of meaning beyond the individuals in the 
encounter, what he calls a ‘cosmos of meanings’: 
The fact remains that in this view [the encounter as a relationship between I 
and Thou] something has been left out and it is no more or less than a whole 
dimension…. a world of “meaning” and this “cosmos” of meanings is what 
may be aptly called the “logos”… A Psychology deserving of its name has to 
pay tribute to both halves of that name – the logos as well as the psyche 
(Frankl, 1979: 65-66). 
 
I take this cosmos of meaning to relate to the wider social and cultural structures, 
constructions and repertoires that are part and parcel of the world we inhabit and 
which I have discussed throughout the thesis. Social constructionist and post-
structuralist frameworks offer one way to interpret and conceptualise this ‘cosmos of 
meanings’, and enable us to understand meaning as exceeding that which is 
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personal, such that therapeutic intervention should relate not only to personal 
meaning but also to the ways we all inhabit the wider world of meanings in which we 
find ourselves, the cosmos of meanings into which we have all been thrown.  
Above all, Frankl’s placing of meaning-making at the heart of our humanity 
reminds us of the need to create a facilitative space through our therapeutic work 
such that personal meaning-making can be revealed and explored without 
necessarily (or too quickly) bringing in other meanings which may potentially alienate 
and/or exclude the lived experiences of the client, such as analytic (interpretive) or 
nosological conceptual frameworks.  Furthermore, in this way, Existential-
phenomenological counselling psychology practice also requires us to work with a 
more complex view of personhood and to question those models which tend to 
categorise and label persons and clients. van Deurzen (2013) describes the 
approach as follows: 
The existential approach considers human nature to be open-minded, 
flexible and capable of an enormous range of experience. The person is 
in a constant process of becoming. I create myself as I exist and have to 
reinvent myself daily. There is no essential self, as I define my 
personality and abilities in action and in relation to my environment… 
Existential thinkers seek to avoid restrictive models that categorize or 
label people. Instead they look for the universals that can be observed 
cross-culturally. There is no existential personality theory which divides 
humanity into types or reduces people to part components. Instead there 
is a description of the different levels of experience and existence with 
which people are inevitably confronted. (van Deurzen, 2013: 159) 
 
Following from this, diagnosing depression along the lines of the DSM and the 
ICD criteria may well impose a framework of understanding that does not fully or 
meaningfully capture or represent what the client is feeling and thinking. As I argued 
earlier in the thesis, the reification of depression into a concrete ‘thing’, into a 
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diagnostic label, a condition, a syndrome or disease, may pathologise and/or 
objectify clients through a distortion or negation of their embodied lived experience. 
Even where such a diagnosis is useful, in that for example medication might be 
prescribed which the client finds helpful and which reduces the clients immediate risk 
of suicide, in the longer term a narrower nosological account may well hinder a fuller 
understating of the client’s problems and lead to a less meaningful, trusting and 
effective relationship or alliance between counselling psychologist and client. If, as 
human beings, we are always in a state of becoming, our models and 
understandings as counselling psychologists need to be much more open and 
flexible, more able to deal with movement, development and change.  
It can be seen from the results that the received ‘clinical’ account of 
depression broadly captures only one of the various experiences uncovered in this 
study. Here – as previously - I wish to argue against adopting such a fixed, narrow 
‘clinical’ version of depression in counselling psychology practice. I fear that if we 
become too enamoured with the claimed authority and scientific credentials of 
Clinical Psychology and seek to emulate that practice, the DSM/ICD diagnostic 
criteria could become increasingly incorporated into counselling psychology practice. 
While the received diagnostic criteria may be useful in identifying some of those 
clients at high risk of suicide, this study shows that the lived experience of 
depression is so much more than this narrow conceptualisation. Furthermore, if one 
agrees with Vicky Rippere (1994) that depression may be something most clients 
come to therapy with, this call to acknowledge the wide range of experience that can 
be referred to by the term depression becomes even more important for a 
counselling psychology practice that fully recognises the variety and complexity of 
what clients bring to therapy, of what it is to be depressed. 
 
193 
 
The findings of this study also indicate that there is more to the experience of 
depression than the abnormal/clinical psychology distinction between ‘clinical’ and 
‘non-clinical’ depression. Rather, other distinctions or understandings which are 
more open and cognisant of the client’s life-world appear to be required in order to 
more fully capture the complexity and variety of the experiences found here. One 
possibly useful distinction might be between ‘existential’ and ‘everyday’ depression; 
where existential depression is seen as a result of a shift in the client’s sense of 
belonging to a shared world, (and the concomitant shifts in their sense of having 
access to possibilities in the world and of feeling connected to others), and everyday 
depression seen as a product of having certain kinds of depressive feelings. Rather 
than working with this distinction as two labels or categories, such a (working) 
differentiation could instead be used to more effectively help identify where the 
client’s depression could be coming from. Factors 2 and 7, which participants 
described as the ‘blues’, would seem to be encompassed by this notion of ‘everyday’ 
depression, as would Factors 3 and 5. Whereas Factors 1 and 4 seem to resemble 
existential depression and this may also be the case for Factors 6 and 8 although 
this appears less clear without further research. In this way, whereas only Factor 1 
broadly fulfilled the received diagnostic criteria for ‘clinical’ depression, here the other 
factors/experiences found in this study which seem also to be severe could be more 
readily recognised and treated as such. Likewise, we should not assume that 
everyday depression will always be less severe or less debilitating, each client needs 
to be approached as an individual. At the same time distinguishing certain 
experiences of depression as existential should not become another label or 
category, rather this conception could help us to better understand the complexity 
and subjective truth of the client’s lived experience.  
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One important way to identify and clarify something of the nature of the 
client’s depression could be to look for what Ratcliffe has termed ‘existential 
emotions’, which he defines as ‘feelings that involve alteration of our overall sense of 
belonging to a world, rather than something more localized’ (Ratliffe, 2013a: 4). 
Thus, for Ratcliffe, these feelings are linked with a change in one’s sense of 
possibilities in the world. It may be that some, or even many, existential-
phenomenological counselling psychologists already practice something like this 
identification of existential emotions, however the results of this study may well help 
to begin to clarify or exemplify what this way of working might look like. Moreover, 
working in a way that more fully acknowledges the existential aspects of depression, 
I argue, goes some way to lessen the individualising, psychologising and 
pathologising aspects of the abnormal and clinical psychology/nosological account(s) 
of depression, such that we would instead see depression as possibly tied in with the 
clients Being-in-the-world-with-others, as part of their relational world as opposed to 
primarily contained within the individual’s self, body or psyche. In this vein, Caplan 
(1995) has forcefully argued that contemporary mental health treatment too easily 
fixes people’s troubles within them: 
I believe that far too many people who are badly treated because of their 
race, sex, age, class, sexual orientation, mental or physical condition, 
physical appearance, and so on end up seeking psychotherapy because 
they mistakenly believe that their unhappiness stems from something 
within themselves. Too much contemporary treatment by mental health 
professionals, including treatment influenced by the DSM, maintains this 
almost exclusive focus on individual’s psyches, as if the major sources 
of their troubles came from within them. (Caplan, 1995: xxi) 
In contrast to this, existential-phenomenological counselling practice (for 
example, Yalom, 1980; van Deurzen, 2009) would, I suggest, be well placed to both 
elicit a full, ongoing and deep understanding of the client’s lived experience of 
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depression - through phenomenological techniques – and to work with the client in a 
way that fully recognises the relational, existential aspects of some (or possibly, to 
some extent, all) experiences of depression. 
It could also be the case that ‘existential’ depression may not necessarily 
respond well to antidepressant medication, particularly in the medium to long term. 
While drugs may well be very useful for some clients in the short and medium term, 
especially where there is a higher risk of suicide and/or self-harm, conceptualising 
some forms of depression as existential suggests that counselling psychology and 
psychotherapeutic interventions could be more effective in the longer term.  If it is 
acknowledged that some experiences of depression involve a shift in one’s Being-in-
the-world which brings with it a reduction or even a loss of a sense of access to 
possibilities (and therefore to a future) and a loss of a sense of connection with 
others and with the world, then it is possible that a meaningful, trusting and caring 
relationship or alliance with a counsellor or therapist who is able to clarify and more 
fully recognise what is happening in the client’s life-world, may well offer the prospect 
of reconnecting with another person and possibly, in time, a reconnection with a 
deeper sense of belonging in a world with possibilities; although this proposition, of 
course, is something that would need to be explored with further research.  
I also wish to argue here that it is important to understand depression as part 
and parcel of the human condition, not necessarily something that should always be 
treated and/or ameliorated through intervention. As Solomon (2014) eloquently 
suggests: 
Life is fraught with sorrows: no matter what we do, we will in the end die; 
we are, each of us, held in the solitude of an autonomous body; time 
passes, and what has been will never be again… despite the 
enthusiastic claims of pharmaceutical science, depression cannot be 
wiped out so long as we are creatures conscious of our own selves. It 
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can at best be contained – and containing is all that current treatments 
for depression aim to do. (Solomon, 2014: 16) 
Other commentators have questioned the widespread use of anti-depressants 
in our contemporary culture and have linked the increase in prescriptions for such 
drugs to wider structures and processes in Western society and culture. For 
example, the individualisation which is part and parcel of the abnormal and clinical 
psychology/nosological version(s) of depression may well be ultimately bound up 
with particular aspects of Western consumerist economic systems and ideologies. 
Leader (2009) has argued that anti-depressant medication itself can also be seen as 
reflecting elements of those ideologies: 
Although anti-depressant drugs are prescribed to millions of people in 
the Western world, with figures rising steadily in other countries, it seems 
to have occurred to no one purveying a medical cure for depression that 
the remedy may function as a mirror for the malady. The solitary pill [in 
a foil strip] sends back a cruel message to whoever opens the packet. 
This bleak image of separated units conveys the negative side of modern 
individualism, where each of us is taken to be an isolated agent, cut off 
from others and driven by competition for goods and services in the 
market-place rather than by community and shared effort. (Leader, 
2009: 1-2) 
Matt Haig (2016) has also argued that medicating for depression and other 
mental health problems is linked to our contemporary reliance on consumption and 
so called ‘normality’: 
Medication is an incredibly attractive concept. Not just for the person with 
depression, or the person running a pharmaceutical firm, but for society 
as a whole. It underlines the idea that we have hammered into us by the 
hundred thousand TV ads we have seen that everything can be fixed by 
consuming things. It fosters a just-shut-up-and-take-the-pill approach, 
and creates an ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide, where everyone can relax and feel 
‘unreason’ – to borrow Michel Foucault’s favourite word – is being safely 
neutered in a society which demands we be normal even if it drives us 
insane. (Haig, 2016: 30) 
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For me, while I very much agree with Leader’s and Haig’s accounts I also 
wish to acknowledge that for some people antidepressant medication can be 
immensely helpful and sometimes life-saving. Indeed, Leader (op cit) describes his 
own experience of medication thus: 
I feel sometimes as though I am swallowing my own funeral twice a day, 
since without these pills, I’d be long gone. I go to see my therapist once 
a week when I’m at home. I am sometimes bored by our sessions and 
sometimes interested in an entirely dissociative way and sometimes 
have a feeling of epiphany… by themselves pills are a weak poison, love 
a blunt knife, insight a rope that snaps under too much strain. With the 
lot of them, if you are lucky, you can save the tree [oneself] from the vine 
[depression] (Solomon, 2014: 30). 
There are no easy remedies for depression. Anti-depressant medication, with 
its individualising, normalising, consumerist ideological roots, can only ever serve to 
(temporarily) contain the difficult feelings while the help provided by counselling 
psychology and other psychotherapeutic interventions will always have its limits. 
However, this study suggests that a better understanding of the lived experience of 
depression, including the relational, existential elements of the experience along with 
the crucial requirement to actively discover the client’s subjective truth, as opposed 
to fitting the client into a narrow, pre-existing diagnostic category or categories, could 
begin to enable a better understanding of how we can work effectively with clients 
who are depressed.  
Vicky Rippere (1981) who - as I stated at the beginning of this thesis - was an 
early advocate of researching ‘lay’ or everyday understandings of depression, 
reminds us that conceptualising depression as an illness is a relatively recent 
practice. Moreover, since the 16th Century depression or melancholia has been seen 
in terms of a lack of wisdom in living, something that corresponds with themes in 
existential-phenomenological counselling and psychotherapeutic practice, for 
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example Emmy van Deurzen’s notion of the therapist as ‘an ally with a modicum of 
wisdom’ (van Deurzen, 2002: 166). Here Rippere lists the various cures for 
depression that can be traced since the 16th Century: 
The basic notion of circumspect, temperate living, based on knowledge 
of one’s own individual and constitutional susceptibilities, the focus on 
enhancing efficient biological functioning through attention to diet, sleep 
and exercise, the strategy of deliberately avoiding known physiological 
and psychological precipitants, the notion of the individual as a member 
of a supportive social network, the practice of systematically preparing 
to face adversity, and, finally, the concept of personal responsibility and 
initiative in choosing to live with care. (Rippere, 1980: 53) 
 
Even in our contemporary, technology and consumption driven present, Rippere’s 
compilation of long established ways of coping with depression does not appear to 
have been surpassed. I will now further develop some of these arguments through a 
reflection on my own way of working and what counselling psychology as a discipline 
and a practice means to me. 
7.6 What is Counselling Psychology for me? 
I was drawn to Counselling Psychology training precisely because it, on the whole, is 
so different from Clinical psychology. The way in which Counselling Psychology aims 
to incorporate elements of mainstream psychology, in particular through a focus on 
creating an evidence base, while at the same time staying firmly within a 
humanist/phenomenological philosophy and value-base, for me opens up a range of 
new and exciting possibilities. One of these possibilities is to adopt a sophisticated 
critical and questioning stance towards the dominant medical/clinical models of 
psychiatry and abnormal psychology which place nosology at the heart of practice, 
and much of the work found in Critical Psychology could be an important resource 
here. As I earlier described, I have had a long standing interest and commitment to 
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questioning and critiquing those elements of psychology which are, or could be, tied 
up with oppressive and or pathologising theories and practices. The profession of 
Counselling Psychology, for me, offers a space where we can acknowledge the 
practical utility of some of the abnormal psychology/diagnostic accounts of 
depression and other mental health disturbances without falling into the trap of 
objectifying, distorting the lived experience of, or potentially dehumanising, our 
clients.  
The tensions and contradictions I described in Chapter 3 between what have 
been termed ‘being-in-relation’ and ‘technical expertise’ (Strawbridge and Woolfe, 
2003: 5) could be seen as strengths and possibilities for real creativity rather than 
solely difficulties and challenges. This professional space, which might be described 
as a space in between technical expertise and being-in-relation, is one that I think is 
incredibly valuable, opening up as it does the possibility of taking a more critical and 
questioning stance towards, while at the same time not dismissing the value of, 
(social) science approaches and evidence-based practice. Indeed, living and 
inhabiting these tensions and possible contradictions, seems far more interesting to 
me compared with upholding the established (establishment) discourses and 
practices of clinical and abnormal psychology with their overly narrow 
conceptualisation of science, psychology, mental health and the person as an 
‘individual’.  
For me, the existential-phenomenological approach to counselling psychology 
is one that fits very well with my own critical and questioning stance along with my 
anti-pathologising and client-led way of working. Indeed, having come to the end of 
my training I see just how crucial this perspective is to my own practice and my 
sense of identity as a counselling psychologist. The tensions and possible 
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contradictions in the profession described in Chapter 3, to a large extent reflect many 
of the critiques and developments in social and other aspects of psychology I 
described in Chapter 2. Social constructionism developed early on in response to a 
growing questioning of the utility and relevance of natural science models as an 
appropriate and/or desirable foundation for psychology. The critiques of 
individualisation, psychologisation and of the widespread methodolatry (in relation to 
natural science) in psychology that led to the social constructionist movement in the 
first place continue to resonate deeply with my own identity and beliefs as a 
psychologist. To a great extent many of these issues and difficulties remain true of 
psychology now and existential-phenomenology can respond to them in ways that 
are positive and constructive and which can usefully inform counselling psychology 
practice and intervention. 
The more complex and relational understanding of the person at the heart of 
existential-phenomenological counselling psychology practice is, for me, one that 
goes a long way to addressing many of the concerns embodied in social 
constructionist perspectives and critiques. In conceptualising the person as always in 
relation, as inhabiting a complex life-world in which history and temporality play 
crucial roles, existential-phenomenology enables counselling psychologists to work 
with a very different model of the ‘person’; of our clients and their lived worlds. Here 
the person is not assumed to have essential qualities but is rather seen as always 
becoming, always creating and recreating themselves within the relational world that 
they inhabit. Such a model of the person supports a valuable and much needed 
focus on the client’s lived experience, their relational world and above all the value of 
their freedom and choice. With respect to working with depression, as I have already 
highlighted, existential-phenomenological counselling practice may offer a place in 
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which to understand depression as related to one’s sense of being-in-the-world-with-
others, one’s sense of possibilities and of a future in that relational world.  
Practicing phenomenologically means striving to be with one’s client in their 
world, so that it becomes possible, in a deep and respectful way, to acknowledge 
where the client is without necessarily having to fix them or their situation, or to offer 
solutions or ‘homework’. In my experience achieving something of this ‘meeting’ – as 
Martin Buber called it – can be immensely therapeutic for clients. It can be 
therapeutic for clients to have somebody who really understands just where they are, 
who can be with them in that very place, and this is especially true for clients who 
are depressed where such a ‘meeting’ is something that for many can be very 
difficult and sometimes impossible to find with friends and family. Importantly, at the 
same time, given the openness of the existential-phenomenological approach and its 
focus on freedom and choice, this way of working does not preclude using a range of 
techniques drawn from cognitive and other approaches where they fit the client’s 
needs. Although for me, ‘being-in-relation’ continues to form the bedrock of my own 
practice. 
As I have already said, the work of Michel Foucault has had a profound 
impact on my professional work and my understanding of myself and the world 
around me. It can be argued that Foucault was a political activist, that drawing on 
Nietzsche he saw philosophy as action, as always political and in many ways this is 
what drew me to his work in the first place. For me counselling psychology practice 
is political, it is one means through which we can question and resist certain 
sedimented discourses which may operate in oppressive and divisive ways. In this 
sense, for me listening is not only a psychological, therapeutic process but also a 
political one, meaning one that relates not only to technique and process but also, 
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and possibly more profoundly, to the notion of intervention in the world for political 
reasons, to create positive change; to the notion of phenomenological listening itself 
as a political response to objectification, dehumanisation and pathologisation.   
My own identity as an existential-phenomenological counselling psychologist is very 
much tied up with my own development as an academic who has long been drawn to 
alternative modes of theorising and practicing in psychology which strive not to 
reinforce and reproduce the status quo, not to recapitulate the existing power 
relations of the discipline and its clinical practices. I feel that the existential-
phenomenological approach and the work of Heidegger in particular, offers me a 
way of working where I can be true to my own thinking and my own ethics which are 
firmly rooted not only in humanism but also in asking profound questions about the 
way the world is constructed, how those constructions came about and, where 
necessary, how they might be changed.  
Finally, I believe that as existential-phenomenological counselling 
psychologists we have a key role to play in resisting a narrow, clinical, bio-medical 
reduction of the complex, multifaceted lived experience of depression (and other 
experiences of psychological health issues) and in promoting broader, more 
relational and existential accounts of depression which can encompass much more 
of the variety and diversity of what it is to feel and to be depressed. 
7.7 Strengths and limitations of the study; possibilities for further research 
Q-methodology is a robust technique where, in comparison with other factor 
analytic/statistical techniques, for example a survey or psychometric scale, 
participants are more actively involved in creating the data. This approach is very 
well suited for uncovering shared subjective structures, thoughts, feelings, beliefs 
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and opinions; in this case I used the technique as a phenomenological method to 
elicit shared experiences of depression. The use of Q-methodology in this study 
enabled a detailed snapshot of shared experiences to be taken, however this 
approach does not produce the kind of very detailed accounts and experiences that 
can be gained from case study and interview research. Rather, the aim of this work 
is ‘…to enable the person to represent his or her vantage point for purposes of 
holding it constant for inspection and comparison’ (Brown, 1997: 2). Thus, the 
approach to phenomenology adopted in this study enables a broad brush view of 
different ways of experiencing a particular phenomenon but where there is enough 
detail for meaningful comparisons between the different experiences.  
The sample of statements (Q-set) in this study differentiated very well 
between participants’ diverse experiences. There was only one consensus statement 
in the study which indicates that the other 57 statements reflected the concourse 
comprehensively enough to enable participants to distinguish their own particular 
experience of depression - as evidenced in the 8 interpretable factors found in the 
study.   
Q-methodology does not require a representative person sample as would 
often be the case with statistical research, rather it requires sampling for diversity so 
that as many different experiences as possible can be collected and included in the 
study. Likewise, Q-method does not require very large person samples and usually a 
range of 40-50 (up to a maximum of 60) is prescribed where numbers higher than 
this do not normally add more information to the data set. Here I aimed for the mid-
point of this range, 50, and achieved a sample of 46. The person sample in this 
study has some limitations given that is was gained through purposive and snowball 
sampling methods. The initial phase of sampling consisted of myself contacting 
 
204 
 
friends and colleagues who then forwarded the research information (through a 
Facebook page with a link to the Q-sort) and while this gained a reasonably diverse 
sample there is a skew towards middle age and above, and a skew towards White 
British participants. This does not invalidate the results – which can be seen as 
exemplifying some of the possible ways in which persons can experience depression 
- but rather there needs to be caution in overgeneralising the results; further work 
would be needed to ascertain the extent to which the experiences found here are 
also found in wider/other populations.  
Such further work could involve repeating the Q-study with a larger and/or 
more diverse sample, and with different specific samples, for example with 
individuals who have been diagnosed with depression, or with persons who have 
never been diagnosed. Additionally, one could use all female or all male samples in 
order to refine the results of this study along lines of gender and it would also be 
possible to use Q-method as a means to elicit case-study data, where several Q-sets 
are given either to one person or to a very small ‘case’ sample. For me, the most 
important follow-up research would involve trying to ascertain if the experiences 
found here are found in other groups, other samples, and whether there are other 
different, interpretable factors/experiences yet to be identified. 
A further limitation to this study relates to its theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks. As I was reading and researching for this study I came to see the 
complexity and challenge of bringing together social constructionism, post-
structuralism and existential-phenomenology for a thesis of this type. These 
conceptual frameworks and philosophical traditions have a complex, intertwined 
history and this complexity became ever more evident as the thesis progressed. 
Foucault and many other post-structuralists took phenomenology as a key starting 
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point in their attempts to move beyond foundational frameworks and find other ways 
to understand the relationships between experience and social and cultural 
structures and processes. Although I have done my best to set out the lines of some 
of these conceptual borders and boundaries, a full explication of the philosophical 
journey from phenomenology to post-structuralism and of the differences between 
Foucault’s and Heidegger’s work is beyond the scope of this thesis. That perhaps is 
best left for another time, another project.  
7.8 Final reflection 
At the end of this project I wish to give some final personal reflections. This thesis 
has been concerned with a range of very powerful negative emotions and 
experiences, including gloom, despair, desolation, despondency, hopelessness and 
thoughts of death and suicide. While this work has at times affected me deeply, 
including empathising and sometimes identifying with the experiences that 
participants shared with me, I have really enjoyed the overall process of research 
and especially the nature of the contact and connection with participants and 
especially their reports of their depression that I needed to develop in order to 
successfully convey their experiences, their personal stories. I have also come to 
more fully understand that the process of research is just as important as the 
outcome with regard to personal learning and professional development. This 
research has taken me back to periods in my own life when I have been depressed, 
when I have had to deal with the difficulties and struggles that life throws our way. At 
the same time, I have realised that I have been fortunate and have not – so far – 
experienced the depths of depression that some participants described in this study. 
I feel lucky in that respect. I also feel privileged that my participants chose to share 
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their experiences with me in such a candid and honest way, I am very grateful to 
them.  
At the same time, I have grappled with complex conceptual constructions and 
configurations, which has both been a real pleasure and a real challenge and in 
these last few lines I wish to return to the issue of reflexivity. Some years ago I came 
across a thought-provoking text by Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) who suggested that 
in social constructionist and other ‘definitional’ conceptual frameworks, authors 
problematise and question certain aspects of reality while leaving other aspects of 
reality unquestioned or even taken-for-granted, in their words: 
Viewed as a practical accomplishment, both theoretical statements and 
empirical case studies manipulate a boundary, making certain 
phenomena problematic while leaving others unproblematic. We call the 
main strategy for managing this boundary ontological gerrymandering. 
(Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985: 214) 
For me this concept of ‘ontological gerrymandering’ beautifully captures the 
complexity and difficulty of writing and thinking from a social constructionist 
perspective. Which parts of reality, of the social, material and experiential world, do 
we choose to question, which parts do we choose to leave alone, to hold true or 
even ‘sacred’? In this thesis I have told an ultimately personal story, a ‘fiction’ – 
although one which I have endeavoured to fully ground in the data - in which the 
value and utility of the diversity of experiences (and the phenomenology) of 
depression has been upheld, has been taken as a valid and meaningful starting point 
both for research and for counselling psychology practice. I have questioned the 
narrow and potentially pathologising version(s) of depression found in clinical and 
abnormal psychology, I have represented a type of (primarily Heideggerian) 
existential understanding as one which more accurately and meaningfully represents 
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the nature and significance of some experiences of depression. Ontological 
gerrymandering is, for me, an unavoidable aspect of this way of working; thus rather 
than judging research on its truth value, constructionism asks us to judge along other 
lines: usefulness, practical consequences and coherence for example. 
Above all for me, my writing is both personal and political, reflecting my own 
agenda, beliefs, motives, feelings and past and present experience. In this study I 
have emphasised the crucial role of the client’s personal, subjective truth for 
counselling psychology practice, however the researcher’s subjective truth must also 
be seen as central to the research that we produce as professional psychotherapists 
and counselling psychologists, and be valued as such. 
I hope that I have done justice to the richness and diversity of experiences 
found in this study and made some contribution towards questioning both the 
pathologising stance and narrow conceptualisation of depression found in 
medicine/clinical/abnormal psychology and the established mental health diagnostic 
systems along with the ever burgeoning reliance on medication as a remedy for 
something that is often fundamentally relational and existential in nature. 
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Information about the following research project: 
Exploring the Phenomenology of Clinical and Non-Clinical 
Depression: A Q-Methodological Study. 
 
Researcher: Dr. Ian Hodges (ian@ianhodgestherapy.co.uk) 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT  
 
Middlesex University 
The Burroughs 
London NW4 4BT 
          
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide to participate, it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take your time 
to read the following information carefully, and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take your time to decide whether or 
not you wish to take part.  
What is the purpose of the research? 
Most of us experience some kind of depression at some point in our lives. For some people their 
depression may become difficult to cope with and may adversely affect their day to day lives and 
relationships including their ability to work. The purpose of my study is to explore and document in 
detail the different ways that persons experience depression and enduring sad mood. By focusing on 
the actual day to day experiences of depression as it is lived by many of us, it is hoped that a rich and 
detailed picture of the variety of different experiences can be built up. My study is designed so that a 
comparison can be made between participants’ own experiences and the models and theories that 
professionals use in trying to help people whose depression becomes severe and long lasting. 
Counsellors and psychotherapists might be able to use the findings from the study to improve the 
help they give to depressed clients.  
What will happen to me if I take part?  
You will be asked to complete a few basic details about yourself which will be fully confidential. 
You will then be asked to take part in a focus group which will involve discussing your experiences of 
depression in a group with other participants. The focus group will last up to 60 minutes. If you are 
able to take part you will be contacted to arrange a time for the focus group to take place. The focus 
group will take place at the University of Westminster (Regent St.). The discussion will be fully 
confidential and we will ask all members of the focus group to abide by this. The discussion will be 
transcribed and the transcript will be used to inform a further study. Any personal information or any 
comments which may identify any participant will be removed. A full copy of the transcript can be 
provided if you wish. 
 
What will you do with the information that I provide? 
All of the information that you provide me with will be identified only with a project code and stored 
either on an encrypted USB stick or in a locked filing cabinet.  I will keep the key that links your details 
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with the project code in a locked filing cabinet. The focus groups will be recorded using a digital 
recorder and I will transfer the files to an encrypted USB stick for storage, deleting the files from the 
recorder. The focus groups may be transcribed by another person. I will not use your real name in the 
focus group transcript and the person transcribing the discussion will not know who you are. 
The information will be kept at least for at least 6 months, and will be treated as confidential.  If my 
research is published, I will make sure that neither your name nor other identifying details are used.  
Data will be stored according to the Data Protection Act and the Freedom of Information Act. 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
It is not the intention of the research to upset participants but talking about personal experiences of 
depression may sometimes be upsetting or distressing. If you no longer wish to continue to participate 
you will be able to leave the project at any time. 
Although this is very unlikely, should you tell me something that I am required by law to pass on to a 
third person, I will have to do so.  Otherwise whatever you tell me will be fully confidential. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Sharing one’s own experiences with others can be a positive and valuable experience.  By taking part 
in this study you are also making a contribution to advancing our understanding of depression and the 
ways different people experience it and hopefully contributing to better services and support for 
people in need. 
6.  Consent 
You will be given a copy of this information sheet for your personal records, and if you agree to take 
part, you will be asked to sign a brief consent form before the study begins.   
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  You do not have to take part if you do not want to. 
If you decide to take part you may withdraw at any time without giving a reason.   
7.  Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is not funded. 
8.  Who has reviewed the study? 
All proposals for research using human participants are reviewed by an Ethics Committee before they 
can proceed. The NSPC research ethics sub-committee have approved this study. 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. If you have any further questions, you can contact me 
at: 
Dr Ian Hodges 
ian@ianhodgestherapy.co.uk 
  
 
226 
 
 
Middlesex University School of Health and Social Sciences 
New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling 
 
Psychology Department 
Written Informed Consent 
 
Title of study: Exploring the Phenomenology of Clinical and Non-Clinical Depression: A Q-
Methodological Study. 
 
Researcher:  Dr Ian Hodges 
Supervisor: Dr Georg Nicolaus 
 
I have understood the details of the research as explained to me by the researcher, and 
confirm that I have consented to act as a participant.   
I have been given contact details for the researcher in the information sheet. 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, the data collected during the 
research will not be identifiable, and I have the right to withdraw from the project at any 
time without any obligation to explain my reasons for doing so. 
I further understand that the data I provide may be used for analysis and subsequent 
publication, and provide my consent that this might occur. 
 
__________________________   ___________________________ 
Print name      Sign Name 
 
date: _________________________ 
 
To the participants: Data may be inspected by the Chair of the Psychology Ethics panel and 
the Chair of the School of Social Sciences Ethics committee of Middlesex University, if required 
by institutional audits about the correctness of procedures. Although this would happen in 
strict confidentiality, please tick here if you do not wish your data to be included in audits: 
___________ 
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PARTICIPANT DETAILS FORM (Focus groups only) 
 
 
Name (first name only) ___________________ 
 
 
Please complete the following biographical details: 
 
Male    
 
Female  
 
Age: __________ 
 
City/town/place of residence _________________ 
 
Occupation: _________________________________________________ 
 
How would you describe your ethnic origin? _____________________ 
 
 
Please delete as appropriate: 
 
Have you ever been treated for depression or a related condition? 
Yes/No 
 
Have you ever taken prescribed medication for depression or a related condition? 
Yes/No 
 
 
  
 
 
 
228 
 
Debrief Information Sheet for research project: 
 
Exploring the Phenomenology of Clinical and Non-Clinical Depression: A Q-
Methodological Study. 
Carried out by Ian Hodges as a requirement for the DCPsych in Existential Counselling and 
Psychotherapy from NSPC and Middlesex University. 
NSPC Ltd. 
258 Belsize Road 
London 
NW6 4BT 
 
Middlesex University 
The Burroughs 
London 
NW4 4BT 
 
Thank you again for participating in this research. Your contribution is greatly valued. In addition to 
the debriefing you have been given in person by the researcher this sheet gives you some more 
information about organisations and websites which you might be interested in following up. If you 
have any more questions, comments or concerns please feel free to contact the researcher using the 
following email address: 
ian@ianhodgestherapy.co.uk 
Please also use this address to request further information about the results of this study as 
discussed with the researcher. 
The study 
The purpose if this study was to explore and document the ways that persons experience depression 
and enduring sad mood. In particular, there was a focus on uncovering the different kinds of 
experience that might be understood as ‘depression’ and fully appreciating the varied nature of 
those different experiences. In this way persons’ lived experiences of depression can be compared to 
the theories and models that professionals use, for example Clinical and Counselling Psychologists, in 
order to further our understanding of this condition and therefore to provide better treatments and 
support for those in need. 
Further Information: 
The following organisations and charities provide useful information and services with regard to 
depression and related conditions: 
The National Health Service provides useful information online here: 
http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Depression/Pages/Introduction.aspx 
The British Psychological Society is also a useful source of information about Psychology and what 
Psychologists do: 
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www.bps.org.uk 
The Depression Alliance provides excellent information and various kinds of support: 
http://www.depressionalliance.org/ 
The charity SANE also provides excellent information and various services: 
http://www.sane.org.uk/ 
General advice and information about mental health and depression can be found at the charity 
MIND here: 
http://www.mind.org.uk/ 
If you are interested in finding a Psychologist, the British Psychological Society provides an online 
page to search for Chartered Psychologists in the UK: 
http://www.bps.org.uk/bpslegacy/dcp 
If you are interested in finding an existentialist counsellor you may find the following webpage 
useful: 
http://www.existentialanalysis.org.uk/find-a-therapist/ 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. If you have any further questions, you can contact me 
at: 
Dr Ian Hodges 
ian@ianhodgestherapy.co.uk 
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Focus group protocol and sample pictures (stimuli) 
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Focus group protocol        Ian Hodges  
Focus group, experiences of depression. 
 
Start: 
1) Welcome & thank everyone for coming 
2) Ask for consent forms to be signed 
3) Distribute bio questionnaire 
4) Ground rules: 
I would like everyone to participate 
There are no right or wrong answers, everyone’s experience is important 
I want to hear the full range of experiences – this is crucial to the research 
Remind participants that it is up to them how much they share with the group. 
This will depend on what participants are comfortable with. 
It’s important that what we say here in this room should stay in this room 
I’ll be recording the group. No-one will be identified on the transcript or in the 
research 
Warm up 
1) Ask participants to introduce themselves (name labels if appropriate) 
Back up: 
Tell us about something you saw or noticed on the way here. 
OR 
Favourite food?  Favourite film/book etc.? Why? 
2) Introduce topic 
I am interested in the ways in which people experience depression and enduring, 
long term sadness. These terms only refer to a general area of experience, it is how 
each of you have experienced these that is important, you may apply different labels 
- which is also of interest. This stage of the research is exploratory, laying the ground 
for a further study with more participants using a different method, a sorting task.  
Stage 1: Engagement 
1) Exercise:  Choose an image or images that represent a sad, depressed 
feeling or feelings you’ve experienced or are experiencing.  Facilitate each 
member discussing this: 
Why this picture? 
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Does it evoke a particular feeling/memory? 
What was it like? 
Stage 2: Exploratory questions (in conjunction with stage 1) 
Key questions: 
What did you feel? 
What kind of thoughts? 
How did episode begin/end? 
How long did it last? 
One episode or more? 
What about: 
Loss of interest or pleasure? 
Sleep? 
Appetite? weight loss/gain? 
Energy levels? 
Stress? 
Concentration? 
Self-care? 
Drinking/smoking? 
Medication? 
Work? 
Triggers? 
Effect on relationships/partner//family/children? 
Effect on others/did others notice? 
Thoughts of suicide? 
Continuation questions: 
Has anyone else had the same or a different experience? 
Does anyone feel differently about this? 
Stage 3: Exit question 
1) Is there anything else you would like to add? Something important we haven’t 
discussed? 
Closing down: 
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1) What’s it been like this evening? How are you feeling now (go round group so 
each person is able to share this). 
2) Tell us about something positive you can take from this group. 
Finally: 
1) Hand out final information sheet 
2) Reaffirm confidentiality and thank participants 
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Example images used for focus group stimuli (all printed as A4) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
236 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
238 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
Table of themes/issues for preliminary study 
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Table A1: Table of interrelated themes and key issues (preliminary study) 
  
 
 
Overarching theme: Feeling depressed/depressed feelings 
 
 
Related Theme Related Theme Related Theme 
 
 
Living with depression  
 
 
 
 
Making sense of depression 
 
 
Dealing with others’ reactions 
Key issues Key issues Key issues 
Cycle of depression/triggers Ordinary sadness vs ‘real’ 
depression 
Others not understanding/not 
taking the depression seriously 
Ways of coping/getting help Framing depression/looking 
for causes 
Difference and isolation 
Wanting to stay ‘in the 
hole’/resisting help 
Outlook on life Not wanting to burden others 
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Appendix 4 
Q-set (statements) 
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Table A2: Table showing all statements used in Q-study (DSM statements in bold) 
Number Statement (DSM statements in BOLD) 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from other 
people            
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going through hell            
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is           
4 I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body               
5 I feel tense and anxious most of the time                               
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted           
7        I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down   
8         I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day        
9 I have little or no interest in sex                                    
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin           
11         I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                  
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my activities is 
very diminished          
14 Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished           
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                                
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling                               
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                                
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it         
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life           
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                   
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                      
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day            
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish             
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself         
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it              
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings           
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking and 
recreational drugs, goes out of the window          
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally            
30 Time seems to slow down for me                                       
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or better future                 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up              
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been released in 
my brain           
34 My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'                   
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity               
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                  
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                          
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38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life          
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this 
life?’            
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to me             
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                                 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself          
44   Professional help is the last thing I need                          
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                  
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me feel like 
I’ve lost a part of myself          
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                         
49 I fear being judged if I tell others about it                          
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or my judgement                  
51 I feel ashamed of my depression                                        
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships            
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them feel 
bad too           
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together                   
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it            
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined          
57 I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                          
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                            
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Appendix 5 
Results tables for Q-study 
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Table A3: Rotated Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort (also in bold)  
Q-sort Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
1 0.1176     0.2729     0.0139     0.5340    -0.0403     0.1578     0.3620     0.2438 
2 0.2861     0.0967     0.2235     0.0743     0.2175    -0.0754     0.0173     0.5996X 
3 -0.0531    -0.0825    -0.1080     0.1262     0.3801     0.2592     0.3562     0.6091 
4 0.2222    -0.0411    -0.0225     0.3390    -0.0790     0.6316X   -0.1563     0.1017 
5 0.0470     0.2643    -0.3039    -0.0660     0.0574     0.0338     0.4785     0.4828 
6 0.2233     0.4842     0.3076     0.2117     0.0837     0.1574    -0.0805     0.1611 
7 0.4139    -0.0344     0.1190     0.0292     0.0690     0.4762     0.4863     0.2310 
8 0.4403     0.1335     0.1999    -0.1134     0.4174     0.2998     0.0291     0.1282 
9 0.4349    -0.0230     0.0756     0.4013    -0.3233     0.4145    -0.1864    -0.0219 
10 -0.1157     0.1432     0.1921    -0.0019     0.1836    -0.0894     0.7606X   -0.0322 
11 0.2196     0.2531     0.1252     0.6837X    0.2308     0.1350    -0.0648     0.2968 
12 0.1926    -0.0590     0.1875     0.2782     0.0897     0.5759X   -0.1921     0.2043 
13 0.4871    -0.0933     0.0276     0.1908     0.4412     0.2752     0.1743     0.1335 
14 0.6911X    0.1754    -0.1334     0.1025     0.0606     0.2302     0.0168     0.1752 
15 0.5752     0.1026    -0.0259     0.0950     0.0944     0.5229     0.0447     0.2624 
16 -0.1653     0.7390X    0.0510    -0.0219     0.2957     0.2459     0.0483     0.0560 
17 0.4708     0.0826     0.0951    -0.0005     0.4622     0.1109     0.0216     0.1927 
18 0.0759     0.0435     0.7010X    0.0781     0.2646    -0.1066     0.2431     0.0998 
19 0.0882    -0.1659    -0.2515     0.6147X    0.1121     0.0838    -0.0037     0.0650 
20 -0.0632     0.1201     0.3740     0.1131    -0.0790    -0.0747     0.5565X    0.3370 
21 0.1526    -0.0411     0.1801     0.4433     0.0830     0.2208     0.3559     0.3975 
22 0.7230X   -0.0700     0.0931     0.0177     0.2013     0.2349     0.1523     0.1862 
23 -0.0520     0.2813     0.2651     0.5265     0.3191     0.0870     0.3716     0.1183 
24 0.3035     0.4734     0.2610     0.4626     0.1474     0.1368     0.0975     0.0316 
25 0.6113X    0.1286    -0.0323     0.2579     0.0765    -0.0164    -0.2483     0.0522 
26 0.0389     0.1111     0.0934     0.1608     0.6036X    0.1079    -0.0107     0.3032 
27 0.0740     0.1226     0.0272     0.1187     0.2248     0.0711     0.0835     0.7569X 
28 0.2968    -0.0593     0.0768     0.3859     0.0940     0.3025     0.0110     0.4793 
29 -0.0660     0.1814     0.1313     0.2744     0.5783X    0.0381     0.1187     0.2914 
30 0.0152     0.1354     0.0105    -0.0830     0.1471     0.7461X    0.0120    -0.0318 
31 -0.0952     0.4063     0.1368     0.4679     0.2097     0.1071     0.3732     0.1194 
32 0.1502     0.1281     0.5653X   -0.0257     0.0697     0.2005     0.0925     0.2622 
33 0.2743     0.0424    -0.0605     0.1889     0.0694    -0.1750     0.5219X    0.1233 
34 0.0976     0.5993X    0.1423     0.1596    -0.0909    -0.2010    -0.0329     0.3831 
35 0.3245     0.2462     0.2707     0.2631    -0.0033     0.2818     0.1423     0.5166 
36 0.4787     0.1082     0.0003     0.2610     0.0013     0.5574     0.1395    -0.0745 
37 0.3805     0.2880     0.0280    -0.0357     0.0445     0.3907     0.3642     0.4860 
38 0.0283     0.7209X   -0.0922    -0.0947    -0.0275    -0.0990     0.3314    -0.0056 
39 0.0882     0.3216    -0.4295     0.2793     0.2143    -0.0523     0.2199     0.0487 
40 0.1014     0.2963     0.4739     0.0656     0.3537     0.0838     0.0269    -0.2469 
41 0.4876     0.0854     0.0784     0.4955     0.1553     0.0467     0.2683    -0.1464 
42 0.2435     0.0183     0.0553     0.1129     0.6072X   -0.0040     0.1171     0.0258 
43 0.3886     0.3574     0.3720     0.1516     0.2157     0.1400     0.2445     0.0432 
44 0.6700X   -0.1394     0.2426     0.0727    -0.0497     0.0779     0.0084     0.0490 
45 0.3519     0.0167     0.0807     0.1840     0.1813     0.5680     0.0176     0.4429 
46 0.3077    -0.0992     0.0122     0.4664     0.3122     0.4620    -0.1633     0.0711 
% Expl. 
variance 
11 7 5 8 6 9 7 8 
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Table A4: Factor scores for Factor 1 
Factor 1: ‘Clinical’/suicidal depression 
Explained variance 11% 
Participants loading significantly on factor 4 
Number Statement Grid Z-score 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly 
every day           
5 1.815 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                         5 1.814 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of 
taking my own life           
5 1.757 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every 
day                 
4 1.739 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very 
critical of myself         
4 1.617 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                               4 1.458 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you 
live this life?’            
4 1.425 
31    I find it hard to imagine a different or better future              3 1.333 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling                               3 1.135 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on 
my family and close relationships          
3 1.002 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my 
activities is very diminished          
3 0.919 
42     My life and the world seem meaningless                             3 0.721 
14         Most of the time my ability to concentrate and 
make decisions is diminished 
2 0.615 
51    I feel ashamed of my depression                                     2 0.607 
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                   2 0.567 
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together                   2 0.566 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                    2 0.559 
1   I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off 
from other people       
2 0.525 
3         I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is   
1 0.478 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm 
going through hell          
1 0.478 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                1 0.477 
9         I have little or no interest in sex                            1 0.466 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my 
thoughts and my feelings          
1 0.416 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm 
up down           
1 0.378 
4 I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my 
body               
1 0.283 
5         I feel tense and anxious most of the time                      0 0.281 
47   Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make 
me feel like I’ve lost a part of myself         
0 0.127 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                       0 0.030 
30 Time seems to slow down for me                                       0 -0.063 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                           0 -0.093 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            0 -0.100 
49 I fear being judged if I tell others about it                         0 -0.125 
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18 However bad it gets i know that I have to survive and 
get through it          
0 -0.204 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock 
is seriously disrupted           
-1 -0.240 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the 
cycle of life       
-1 -0.286 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it              -1 -0.296 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or judgement                  -1 -0.373 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every 
day               
-1 -0.396 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                       -1 -0.402 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for 
myself          
-1 -0.404 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish            -2 -0.557 
7 I notice that most of the time my bodily movements 
have slowed right down           
-2 -0.579 
36   I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                -2 -0.629 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make 
them feel bad too          
-2 -0.691 
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been 
released in my brain          
-2 -0.699 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                  -2 -0.735 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                                -3 -0.806 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've 
imagined         
-3 -0.865 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to 
me            
-3 -0.954 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, 
drinking and recreational drugs, goes out the window          
-3 -1.068 
34        My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'            -3 -1.278 
44   Professional help is the last thing I need                          -4 -1.279 
55   I feel more anxious because I don't know what's 
causing it          
-4 -1.392 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity               -4 -1.565 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would 
normally          
-4 -1.731 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                           -5 -1.805 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or 
burning my skin       
-5 -1.951 
57    I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                      -5 -2.022 
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Table A5: Factor scores for Factor 2 
Factor 2: The ‘blues’/overcoming loss and bereavement 
Explained variance 7% 
Participants loading significantly on factor 3 
Number Statement Grid Z-
score 
34 My feelings could be best described as the 'blues' 5 2.182 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up            5 1.562 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships          
5 1.499 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself 4 1.489 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people             
4 1.446 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it               4 1.409 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings          
4 1.387 
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it            3 1.220 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life       3 1.058 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it           
3 1.000 
4 I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body               3 0.906 
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together                   3 0.892 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my activities is 
very diminished           
2 0.881 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell           
2 0.847 
5 I feel tense and anxious most of the time                            2 0.802 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day           2 0.774 
9 I have little or no interest in sex                                    2 0.759 
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me feel 
like I’ve lost a part of myself 
2 0.744 
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                    1 0.721 
51 I feel ashamed of my depression 1 0.635 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day 1 0.503 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them feel 
bad too           
1 0.461 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity              1 0.395 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking and 
recreational drugs, goes out of the window 
1 0.365 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                           1 0.292 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is           
0 0.104 
49 I fear being judged if I tell others about it                      0 0.096 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day                 0 0.081 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                           0 -0.081 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                                0 -0.145 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                      0 -0.147 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                0 -0.162 
14 Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished          
0 -0.174 
44 Professional help is the last thing I need                            -1 -0.272 
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33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been released 
in my brain        
-1 -0.299 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               -1 -0.344 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling                            -1 -0.431 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                  -1 -0.446 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                  -1 -0.448 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish            -1 -0.554   
7   I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down          
-2 -0.612 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                        -2 -0.701 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                   -2 -0.745 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally           -2 -0.840 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to me           -2 -0.853 
30 Time seems to slow down for me                                       -2 -0.883 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or my judgement                 -3 -0.896 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined        -3 -0.898 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin         
-3 -1.116 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                               -3 -1.124 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this 
life?’           
-3 -1.329 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted          
-4 -1.380 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself          
-4 -1.461 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -4 -1.467 
57 I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                         -4 -1.503 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life         
-5 -1.527 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                               -5 -1.584 
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or better future         -5 -2.088 
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Table A6: Factor scores for Factor 3 
Factor 3: Anxious/’non-clinical’ depression 
Explained variance 5% 
Participants loading significantly on factor 2 
Number Statement Grid Z-
score 
5         I feel tense and anxious most of the time                      5 1.866 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell    
5 1.701 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is            
5 1.701 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my activities is 
very diminished          
4 1.648 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself           
4 1.592 
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together                  4 1.483 
9 I have little or no interest in sex                                    4 1.374 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                   3 1.374 
14 Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished           
3 1.153 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it           
3 1.096 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish             3 0.988 
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been released 
in my brain          
3 0.935 
26         I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it      2 0.931 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling                               2 0.879 
4         I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body       2 0.822 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself           2 0.766 
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or better future                 2 0.713 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                         2 0.605 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                 1 0.387 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                                1 0.274 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                            1 0.274 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this 
life?’           
1 0.165 
57         I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                 1 0.165 
55   I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it           1 0.056 
49 I fear being judged if I tell others about it                          1 0.053 
58         I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                   0 0.000 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life         0 -0.053 
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                  0 -0.056 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                               0 -0.109 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or my judgement                  0 -0.109 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking and 
recreational drugs, goes out of the window         
0 -0.113 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                 0 -0.165 
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me feel 
like I’ve lost a part of myself         
0 -0.165 
44        Professional help is the last thing I need                    -1 -0.222 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                                -1 -0.222 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to me             -1 -0.327 
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32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up              -1 -0.330 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted         
-1 -0.330 
34   My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'                  -1 -0.383 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships           
-1 -0.436 
30 Time seems to slow down for me                                        -2 -0.439 
51 I feel ashamed of my depression                                       -2 -0.439 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them feel 
bad too 
-2 -0.548 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings        
-2 -0.548 
1        I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people    
-2 -0.601 
7 I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down           
-2 -0.605 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                           -3 -0.826 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                   -3 -0.988 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity               -3 -1.044 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                        -3 -1.153 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally            -3 -1.209 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day               -4 -1.262 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined          -4 -1.371 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day           -4 -1.483 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                     -4 -1.592 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life          
-5 -1.648 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               -5 -2.031 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin          
-5 -2.197 
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Table A7: Factor scores for Factor 4 
Factor 4: Emotionally devoid/isolated depression 
Explained variance 8% 
Participants loading significantly on factor 2 
Number Statement Grid Z-
score 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling 5 2.006 
1         I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people    
5 1.624 
23   I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day          5 1.566 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up               4 1.566 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this 
life?’            
4 1.452 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                         4 1.375 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself           
4 1.375 
5 I feel tense and anxious most of the time                               3 1.318 
12         I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost            3 1.241 
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it             3 1.203 
57 I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                          3 1.127 
29         I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally    3 1.070 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them feel 
bad too          
2 1.012 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                 2 0.955 
14   Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished         
2 0.879 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                            2 0.745 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my activities is 
very diminished           
2 0.688 
31   I find it hard to imagine a different or better future               2 0.439 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                                 1 0.439 
49         I fear being judged if I tell others about it                 1 0.268 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships          
1 0.248 
34 My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'                    1 0.191 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                            1 0.191 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings           
1 0.172 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                                 1 0.134 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking and 
recreational drugs, goes out of the window           
0 0.114 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                    0 0.057 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                                0 0.057 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted           
0 0.019 
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together                  0 -0.019 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day                0 -0.057 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               0 -0.172 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or judgement                  0 -0.191 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is           
-1 -0.191 
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18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it          
-1 -0.248 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell           
-1 -0.268 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to me             -1 -0.382 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it              -1 -0.382 
44        Professional help is the last thing I need                     -1 -0.439 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined          -1 -0.497 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life          
-2 -0.630 
51        I feel ashamed of my depression                               -2 -0.688 
30        Time seems to slow down for me                                -2 -0.688 
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been released 
in my brain          
-2 -0.745 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself         -2 -0.821 
9   I have little or no interest in sex                                  -2 -0.955 
7 I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down          
-3 -0.993 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life          -3 -1.012 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -3 -1.050 
4   I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body             -3 -1.070 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish           -3 -1.070 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity              -4 -1.127 
48        I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                -4 -1.241 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                      -4 -1.318 
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me feel 
like I’ve lost a part of myself        
-4 -1.375 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                 -5 -1.757 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin          
-5 -1.948 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                   -5 -2.197 
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Table A8: Factor scores for Factor 5 
Factor 5: Sadness and loss/surviving depression 
Explained variance 6% 
Participants loading significantly on factor 3 
Number Statement Grid Z-
score 
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                   5 2.287 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it          
5 1.968 
11         I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                5 1.800 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking and 
recreational drugs, goes out of the window           
4 1.522 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself           
4 1.474 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people            
4 1.333 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell           
4 1.294 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them feel 
bad too           
3 1.153 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life          3 1.149 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is            
3 1.108 
54     I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together               3 1.106 
7 I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down            
3 1.009 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                            2 0.842 
30 Time seems to slow down for me                                         2 0.680 
5 I feel tense and anxious most of the time                               2 0.641 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself           2 0.639 
41    I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'              2 0.629 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day                 2 0.629 
31   I find it hard to imagine a different or better future               1 0.371 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                                1 0.352 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up              1 0.321 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it               1 0.277 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions  1 0.201 
14 Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished                           
1 0.180 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my activities is 
very diminished         
1 0.166 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this 
life?’            
0 0.139 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships           
0 0.023 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally            0 0.019 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to me            0 -0.008 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                               0 -0.033 
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it            0 -0.043 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                        0 -0.141 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                                0 -0.293 
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27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings          
-1 -0.307 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling                             -1 -0.352 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish            -1 -0.356 
9   I have little or no interest in sex                                  -1 -0.449 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               -1 -0.501 
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me feel 
like I’ve lost a part of myself         
-1 -0.508 
49    I fear being judged if I tell others about it                      -1 -0.508 
57 I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                         -2 -0.555 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day          -2 -0.610 
51        I feel ashamed of my depression                               -2 -0.622 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                  -2 -0.653 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity               -2 -0.692 
34 My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'                    -2 -0.832 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                      -3 -0.961 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted           
-3 -0.964 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -3 -0.985 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined         -3 -0.987 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                   -3 -1.102 
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been released 
in my brain          
-4 -1.141 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life          
-4 -1.169 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                   -4 -1.200 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or judgement                  -4 -1.444 
4 I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body              -5 -1.472 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin         
-5 -2.117 
44    Professional help is the last thing I need                         -5 -2.304 
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Table A9: Factor scores for Factor 6 
Factor 6: Alienated/helpless depression 
Explained variance 9% 
Participants loading significantly on factor 3 
Number Statement Grid Z-
score 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell            
5 1.987 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people            
5 1.448 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself          5 1.421 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings           
4 1.364 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                4 1.332 
11         I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                4 1.307 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is           
4 1.281 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                                3 1.229 
51 I feel ashamed of my depression                                        3 1.194 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them feel 
bad too           
3 0.948 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                                 3 0.945 
14 Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished           
3 0.915 
5 I feel tense and anxious most of the time                               2 0.907 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships            
2 0.829 
57 I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                          2 0.815 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this 
life?’            
2 0.796 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin           
2 0.747 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                   2 0.657 
8         I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day        1 0.598 
49 I fear being judged if I tell others about it                          1 0.593 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                            1 0.569 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my activities is 
very diminished          
1 0.546 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                         1 0.517 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish             1 0.490 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day            1 0.376 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling                               0 0.357 
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or better future                 0 0.328 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life           
0 0.305 
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been released 
in my brain           
0 0.298 
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together                   0 0.140 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to me             0 -0.111 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself         
0 -0.128 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity               0 -0.271 
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30 Time seems to slow down for me                                       -1 -0.276 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or my judgement                  -1 -0.293 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                      -1 -0.295 
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it            -1 -0.433 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined          -1 -0.439 
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me feel 
like I’ve lost a part of myself          
-1 -0.603 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it         
-1 -0.660 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking and 
recreational drugs, goes out of the window          
-2 -0.780 
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                  -2 -0.787 
7        I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down   
-2 -0.839 
44   Professional help is the last thing I need                          -2 -0.850 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up              -2 -0.926 
4 I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body               -2 -0.974 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted           
-3 -1.056 
34 My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'                   -3 -1.113 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                                -3 -1.115 
9 I have little or no interest in sex                                    -3 -1.118 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                          -3 -1.259 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it              -4 -1.278 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life          -4 -1.312 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally            -4 -1.416 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               -4 -1.519 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                  -5 -1.524 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -5 -1.551 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                  -5 -2.314 
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Table A10: Factor scores for Factor 7 
Factor 7: The ‘blues’/ surviving through self-reliance 
Explained variance 7% 
Participants loading significantly on factor 3 
Number Statement Grid Z-
score 
18 However bad it gets I know that I have to survive and get 
through it           
5 2.235 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself           5 2.045 
34         My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'            5 1.725 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                           4 1.537 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted            
4 1.488 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                    4 1.360 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it               4 1.329 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships           
3 1.068 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is            
3 1.053 
28   My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking and 
recreational drugs, goes out the window         
3 1.004 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish             3 0.994 
49 I fear being judged if I tell others about it                         3 0.890 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                                 2 0.840 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life           2 0.728 
44 Professional help is the last thing I need                             2 0.618 
51 I feel ashamed of my depression                                        2 0.611 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                 2 0.583 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                         2 0.457 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself          
1 0.403 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to me              1 0.396 
9   I have little or no interest in sex                                   1 0.368 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this 
life?’            
1 0.291 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                    1 0.206 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling                              1 0.190 
57         I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                 1 0.188 
7 I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down           
0 0.181 
4         I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body       0 0.168 
1         I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people    
0 0.141 
54 I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together                  0 -0.061 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell          
0 -0.105 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day           0 -0.126 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day                0 -0.132 
5 I feel tense and anxious most of the time                              0 -0.138 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                               -1 -0.193 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity               -1 -0.205 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally            -1 -0.227 
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14 Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished          
-1 -0.356 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                                -1 -0.356 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up              -1 -0.374 
30 Time seems to slow down for me                                        -1 -0.392 
13   My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my activities is 
very diminished       
-2 -0.586 
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been released 
in my brain          
-2 -0.638 
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me feel 
like I’ve lost a part of myself          
-2 -0.657 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings          
-2 -0.739 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them feel 
bad too          
-2 -0.759 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -2 -0.771 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               -3 -0.826 
12 I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                   -3 -0.851 
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or better future                -3 -0.918 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                      -3 -1.013 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                  -3 -1.129 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined          -4 -1.145 
48        I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                -4 -1.308 
50 I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or my judgement                  -4 -1.360 
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it            -4 -1.510 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life          
-5 -1.830 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin          
-5 -2.146 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                           -5 -2.247 
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Table A11: Factor scores for Factor 8 
Factor 8: Loss of meaning/depression as part of the cycle of life 
Explained variance 8% 
Participants loading significantly on factor 2 
Number Statement Grid Z-
score 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life          5 2.004 
9 I have little or no interest in sex  5 1.871 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                                 5 1.706 
12    I find myself dwelling on the things that I've lost                 4 1.574 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                                4 1.441 
41 I find myself wondering 'what's the point of my life?'                 4 1.409 
28 My normal self-control, for example with smoking, drinking and 
recreational drugs, goes out of the window           
4 1.143 
13 My interest and/or pleasure in almost all of my activities is 
very diminished         
3 1.026 
40 I feel that I need answers to why this is happening to me              3 1.026 
18 However bad it gets i know that I have to survive and get 
through it           
3 1.010 
2 Although on the outside I seem OK, on the inside I'm going 
through hell           
3 1.010 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day                 3 0.994 
15 I find myself becoming more aggressive                                 2 0.994 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of 
myself           
2 0.877 
11 I feel sad and/or empty much or all of the day                         2 0.877 
55 I feel more anxious because I don't know what's causing it             2 0.861 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this 
life?’            
2 0.845 
5 I feel tense and anxious most of the time                               2 0.712 
35 I know that it's the price I have to pay for creativity                1 0.680 
27 No matter how hard I try I just can't take control of my thoughts 
and my feelings          
1 0.579 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day            1 0.563 
32 I have alternating periods when I'm down and when I'm up               1 0.532 
43 Rather than burden others, I try to fix my problems for myself           1 0.415 
1 I experience a deep feeling of being alone and cut off from 
other people            
1 0.165 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is 
seriously disrupted            
1 0.149 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                            0 0.133 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling                               0 0.016 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it               0 0.000 
30 Time seems to slow down for me                                        0 -0.149 
44 Professional help is the last thing I need                            0 -0.149 
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or better future                0 -0.282 
34 My feelings could be best described as the 'blues'                    0 -0.282 
4 I experience all sorts of aches and pains around my body               0 -0.282 
14    Most of the time my ability to concentrate and make 
decisions is diminished      
-1 -0.282 
54        I feel guilty that I can't just pull myself together          -1 -0.298 
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7 I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down           
-1 -0.314 
22 I find myself sleeping too much nearly every day                     -1 -0.447 
20 I find that sleep is my only escape                                  -1 -0.447 
57 I find myself becoming secretive and paranoid                         -1 -0.447 
19        I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life  
-1 -0.579 
47 Although anti-depressants numb the pain, they make me feel 
like I’ve lost a part of myself          
-2 -0.680 
3 I feel as though others have no idea how truly awful the 
experience is          
-2 -0.696 
53 I avoid seeing other people because I know I'll make them feel 
bad too          
-2 -0.712 
24 I feel as though other people think I'm just being selfish            -2 -0.712 
33 I feel as though something, like a chemical, has been released 
in my brain          
-2 -0.829 
50   I'm not able to trust my senses, memory or my judgement                -2 -0.861 
52 I worry about the effect that my depression will have on my 
family and close relationships           
-3 -0.861 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally           -3 -0.994 
51   I feel ashamed of my depression                                     -3 -1.159 
36 I am aware that it is a result of a physical illness                 -3 -1.260 
56 I find it hard to distinguish what's real and what I've imagined          -3 -1.260 
48 I feel unsafe in my house, at work, everywhere                       -4 -1.308 
45 Anti-depressant medication really helps me                            -4 -1.425 
58 I experience bizarre thoughts and delusions                           -4 -1.425 
49        I fear being judged if I tell others about it                 -4 -1.441 
46 I cling to the belief that there is a God who cares                   -5 -1.590 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin          
-5 -1.590 
21 I experience a decrease in my appetite nearly every day               -5 -1.855 
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Table A12: Distinguishing statements for Factor 1 (statements that were sorted significantly 
differently to all other factors), p = ≤0.05, * = significant at ≤0.01 
No Distinguishing Statements Factor 1 Q-sort z-
score 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life           
5 1.76* 
 
 
Table A13: Distinguishing statements for Factor 2 (statements that were sorted significantly 
differently to all other factors), p = ≤0.05, * = significant at ≤0.01 
No Distinguishing Statements Factor 2 Q-sort z-
score 
17 I feel as though everything is hopeless                               -3 -1.12 
39 I find myself struggling with the question 'how do you live this life?’           -3 -1.33* 
25 I get this internal voice which is negative and very critical of myself          -4 -1.46* 
42 My life and the world seem meaningless                               -5 -1.58* 
31 I find it hard to imagine a different or better future         -5 -2.09* 
 
 
Table A14: Distinguishing statements for Factor 3 (statements that were sorted significantly 
differently to all other factors), p = ≤0.05, * = significant at ≤0.01 
No Distinguishing Statements Factor 3 Q-sort z-
score 
8 I experience fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day               -4 -1.26 
23 I feel worthless and/or excessively guilty nearly every day           -4 -1.48 
 
 
Table A15: Distinguishing statements for Factor 4 (statements that were sorted significantly 
differently to all other factors), p = ≤0.05, * = significant at ≤0.01 
No Distinguishing Statements Factor 4 Q-sort z-
score 
16 I am sometimes totally devoid of feeling 5 2.01 
29 I find myself taking many more risks than I would normally    3 1.07 
 
 
Table A16: Distinguishing statements for Factor 5 (statements that were sorted significantly 
differently to all other factors), p = ≤0.05, * = significant at ≤0.01 
  
No Distinguishing Statements Factor 5 Q-sort z-
score 
7 I notice that most of the time my bodily movements have 
slowed right down            
3 1.01 
44 Professional help is the last thing I need                         -5 -2.30* 
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Table A17: Distinguishing statements for Factor 6 (statements that were sorted significantly 
differently to all other factors), p = ≤0.05, * = significant at ≤0.01 
No Distinguishing Statements Factor 6 Q-sort z-
score 
10 I intentionally injure my body, for example cutting or burning my 
skin           
2 0.75* 
19 I experience recurrent thoughts of death and of taking my 
own life           
0 0.31 
37 I am aware that I need to get some sunshine                          -3 -1.26* 
26 I know that I'm not helpless, I can get myself out of it              -4 -1.28 
 
 
Table A18: Distinguishing statements for Factor 7 (statements that were sorted significantly 
differently to all other factors), p = ≤0.05, * = significant at ≤0.01 
No Distinguishing Statements Factor 7 Q-sort z-
score 
6 It feels as though the normal rhythm of my body clock is seriously 
disrupted            
4 1.49* 
 
 
Table A19: Distinguishing statements for Factor 8 (statements that were sorted significantly 
differently to all other factors), p = ≤0.05, * = significant at ≤0.01 
No Distinguishing Statements Factor 8 Q-sort z-
score 
38 Although it's difficult right now, I know it's part of the cycle of life          5 2.00 
49 I fear being judged if I tell others about it                 -4 -1.44 
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Focus Group 1: ‘Non-clinical’ group  
4 participants; Location: University of Westminster 
Facilitator: Dr Ian Hodges 
 
Speaker key 
S1 Speaker One (IH) 
S2 Speaker Two  
S3 Speaker Three  
S4 Speaker Four  
S5 Speaker Five  
 
1. S1: I’ll just make sure it’s working.  Yeah, so does anyone want to start just to 
kind of tell us about your picture, why you chose it, what it means to you?  
2. S2: Yeah. My picture is focusing…so do I describe it for the audio or…? 
3. S1: No, you don’t need to but go ahead. 
4. S2: Yeah, I mean that’s…this relates to work, pressure in workload that we have 
over the last let’s say two years really.  So they did it for a change of work which 
increase, which was installing a new IT structure which was going to be a lot more 
beneficial to the staff and everything but actually it turned out…and they reduced 
the back office workforce by a significant amount in preparation for this new IT 
system which is going to be all singing and dancing but it was reverse effect so it’s 
caused real problems at work for everyone we get across the workforce and just 
meant for prolonged working hours, work that we did, extra work that we had to do 
which we didn’t do previously.  So yeah, just long days and just… all you thought 
about was working.  Not achieving all the deadlines but you were…well, not in a set 
that clients would basically ask for information and ask for non-achievement at all.  
So yeah, I mean that’s over a really long period of time and I’m saying nearly two 
years.  And you sort of basically or you know you basically had a cloud over your 
head [this references the picture] all of the time you know and you know just tired, 
long hours and what we thought about was working not really much else you know.  
Even on weekends you know and evenings you know being away from the work 
environment didn’t help because then you’ll have cues that would make you think of 
work or a name which reminds you of someone at work, guys at work possibly that 
you may think, “Oh, I’ve got to do this.  I’ve got to do that.”  So it’s quite a difficult 
period of time because that reminds you of something that you know you needed to 
do for the next day or that you haven’t done or you know or something.  So 
it’s…wherever you were, whatever was it, yeah, you have all those cues kind of 
thing, remind me of work that needs to be done and that was overdue so that’s 
quite a long period of time.  And now I think we’re sort of coming towards the end 
of it.  So yeah, coming towards the end of it.  And I think the organisation I work for 
are addressing it as well and that’s probably what’s helping everyone in the 
workplace.  So yeah, that’s my experience of it.  
5. S1: …sounds like a lot of pressure. 
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6. S2: Yes, yeah. Intense pressure. 
7. S1: Okay, so intense pressure. 
8. S2: Yeah. 
9. S1: Yeah.  And there was something about,…I was wondering about the control 
thing.  It sounds like these were changes imposed from somewhere else.  
10. S2: Yes, yeah by the organisation I work for. 
11. S1: Right. 
12. S2: Yeah, they were imposed by them to assist us in getting the work done, 
changing the IT system, changing the IT systems that we use.  We use possibly 20 
different IT systems on the day-to-day basis and they brought that down to one IT 
system.  So it was one-size fits all basically unfortunately and it didn’t and that’s 
what caused a lot of problems.  So everyone had to use the new IT system.  And as a 
result of the new IT system, they were told there will be a lot of time saved and 
money saved and they reduced the workforce, the back office workforce and that in 
turn caused a lot of pressure on the frontline workforce who had to then do that 
because that work wasn’t then being done by the new IT software you know IT 
systems that way but that is…so yeah, that was imposed by the organisation I work 
for. 
13. S1: Okay. 
14. S2: No one had any choice in it.  So that was an outcome as a result for a new 
structure, new software, new programs we use. 
15. S1: So something imposed on you from outside.  But there was something about 
being reminded… 
16. S2: Yeah, it just gives us you know for example simple things about names even 
just simple names you know.  Over the weekend if I you know if I’d heard a name or 
meet someone and said, “Oh, I’ve got to do this for the same name client maybe at 
work.”  You know that remind me of his name and you know the [inaudible 
00:04:59] of her name.  And I think, “Oh I need to do that work for them.”  Or for 
example tax you know, they have tax.  Currently, we have…it’s a tax time in the US 
just finished and in the UK, they have tax reporting.   So anywhere you hear about 
them on news, newspapers and things like that.  That’s a sort of a busy period for us 
in the last six months.  So you know that would be a key for our...the work done for 
these clients.  So they requested this tax certificates that we need to provide for 
them for their tax returns.  So there’s the kind of cues which…which sort of followed 
you around you know outside work, not in the work but in the news or you know 
other side of the media so the papers.  Yeah, so. 
17. S1:  Thanks, just one more last thing… 
18. S2: Sure. 
19. S1: …because if we go around to everyone first then we’ll just open things up to 
see what you want to talk about.  But can you think just for an instance what the 
feelings were?  It sounds like you’re doing a lot more work… 
20. S2: Yes, yes. 
21. S1: …than you were before.  
22. S2: Huge amount of work.  Yeah, a lot more work.  That was actually undertaken 
by the back office staff. 
23. S1: Yes. 
24. S2: So we were having to do those work now. 
25. S1: So you do all that as well as what you would normally do… 
26. S2: Mm. 
27. S1: So how did the pressure make you feel? 
 
273 
 
28. S2: Oh very, very, very depressed.  Very anxious.  I’ve not been able to see light 
at the end of the tunnel because the...you sort of have an audit trail of your work.  
So for example you have a to-do list and you know just a forever growing to-do list 
you know never really ending kind of thing which made it a lot you know which you 
didn’t see any you know light at the end of the tunnel. You can’t see things getting 
any better so. 
29. S1: Yeah 
30. S2: Yeah, it was just you know completely, totally sort of…Yeah, very, very down 
and very depressed kind of thing you know.  And you know we had the pressure of 
having to deliver those...that work day on day.  We couldn’t just say that it wasn’t 
getting done or get done or get done later on when we get around to it.  It have to 
be delivered within sort of close at the timescales that the clients requested because 
they had to follow the tax sort of tax papers to the IRS or HMRC and things like that.  
So if you didn’t, there’s financial consequence which resulted in them complaining 
to my organisation.  Yeah, they were complaining to the organisation I work for.  
And they were then obviously if they were at fault then they would need to pay for 
that.  So if they would need to pay for that, they would need to then investigate well 
why do they need to pay for that.  So that you know and then they’ll see, it’s 
someone fault at the bank you know.  That from not doing that job in time so you 
know so that’s even more pressure on you from your managers.  So you know so its 
financial consequences if it’s not done on time which is usually the consequence in 
the area I’m working. 
31. S1: Okay, thanks for…thanks for that.  I’ll just hold on that for a bit.   
32. S2: Sure. 
33. S1: Does anyone want to go next with their pictures? 
34. S3: Yeah, I might.  This one kind of just reminded me of that feeling.  I mean I 
don’t actually smoke but sometimes when I have been low I think, “I’m going to 
smoke,” you know.  Or it’s that kind of I don’t really give anymore.  I’m just going to 
have a cigarette or smoke and drink you know.  You get so low that you think it 
doesn’t really matter.  Whereas my normal self-control will keep me from sort of 
even thinking about when I go drinking.  So the look on the guys face here is kind 
of…yeah, when you get into that kind of just that guy which is trying to focus on 
nothing.  Close your eyes, shut everything out kind of remind me of that sort of 
feeling on occasion that I have.  That’s what struck me. 
35. S1: Is there something about switching off for you?  Is that a sort of switching 
off or something? 
36. S3: Oh you’re kind of switching off, yeah. 
37. S1: Right. 
38. S3:   Someone trying to make a sense to you as well so it’s kind of switching off to 
everything that’s going on and I suppose in that switching off, you kind of re-
evaluate many things.  You put things in focus.  You can sort of recover it.  But there 
is this period of like that sort of snapshots says it for me as that kind of…there’s just 
so much pressure, responsibility, yeah, there’s all these sorts of things that are on 
you in your life and you sometimes just have to stop and...before it breaks you.  You 
have to sort of take that time out. 
39. S1: Mm.  Okay.  So something about switching off, something about stopping, 
something about getting to a level where it’s too much… 
40. S3: Yeah. 
41. S1: …or maybe overwhelming.  Again, I’m just trying these words [Overlapping 
Conversation]. 
42. S3: No, overwhelming.  Overwhelming is a good word, yeah. 
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43. S1: Okay. 
44. S3: Yeah, I feel, that feeling of being overwhelmed with things, yeah.   
45. S1: And I wondered about the smoking thing because that sounds like needing 
something or wanting something to help with it or is it different from that? 
46. S3: Well, I used to smoke.  I used to smoke a lot actually. 
47. S1: Right, okay. 
48. S3: And I suppose, I mean for me it will be that almost I don’t really care 
anymore.   It’s what would take me over the edge almost. If I started smoking that 
would mean there’d be no…I would lose control I think if I started to smoke. 
49. S1: Thank you, I’m just thinking in a sense the stopping might be taking care of 
yourself in a way.   But you’re saying it’s kind of… maybe there’s a point where it’s 
like, “I just don’t care. I haven’t smoked for years but I’ll just go on and get a packet 
of cigarettes.  
50. S3: Yeah, sort of I was going to get something. 
51. S1: Okay.  Do you have anything else or…? 
52. S3: That’s it so it’s a short one. (Laughter) 
53. S1: No, no it’s fine. 
54. S3: I mean I could grumble about work and that would really.... 
55. S1: Short or long, that’s fine. (Laughter) 
56. S3: That would just put me into a bad mood. (Laughter) 
57. S1: Yeah, that was very…it was all useful by the way.  So [name removed]. 
58. S4: Um…okay, do you want me to go first? 
59. S1: Yeah, please. 
60. S4: Okay.  I chose two images.  One is of this man just sitting there all alone.  
And I guess in a way when I feel really low I feel isolated in my low feeling.  And I feel 
somewhat removed from everybody else and can’t really (Laughter)…can’t really 
reach out to anybody else.  So it’s almost like this is how I feel.  And the other image 
I chose was very much; it’s about this woman walking in the rain.  Two women 
walking in the rain and one has got an umbrella and the other one doesn’t.  And I 
feel that for me, I’m the one without the umbrella.  So it’s almost like everybody else 
is lovely and dry and happy and I’m the one who doesn’t have an umbrella and I’m 
getting all wet.  And I guess my…when I’m feeling that desperate and low, I feel like 
nobody else would understand or nobody else would be there.  And I sort of feel like 
everybody else’s life is perfectly okay and happy and cheery and then there’s me 
who’s alone in my sadness.   
61. S1: It’s interesting because it’s very different, isn’t it?  And there’s something 
about the image that I saw.  I have this image of in a sense everyone else is having a 
good time when you look out.  And at the same time for you this sort of feeling 
brings you away from people.  Is that right? 
62. S4: Mm.  Yes, very much. 
63. S1: So yeah. 
64. S4: And it’s…it’s very debilitating and I think there is probably a fear in the 
debilitation because it’s like, “How will I cope on my own?”  And so there’s the 
isolation but there’s also the debilitating feeling of how will I cope with this? 
65. S1: Okay.   
66. S4: Thank you.  
67. S1: We’ll get more detail later. (Laughter) Okay.  So [name removed], last but 
not least.   
68. S5: (Laughter) Um…this image is quite literal because you can see a room, a tiny 
room.  So I have to go back in time a bit because I live in London for about three 
years now.  When I’m…before that I lived in [name of country removed].  And when I 
 
275 
 
came to England, there was a [inaudible 00:15:04] but it was very different living in 
London especially because you have to share your flat or your house otherwise it’s 
really expensive.  And in Germany you can easily have your own flat and place like 
that it had more flat.  And I came to London and you basically can’t get a shoebox for 
your money and you have to live in.  And for me it’s very, very important to have, 
not just my own space but a lot of space so and I want to feel homey in my room.  So 
it needed to be really…you know what I mean?  If you go home, you want to feel like 
relaxed and calm down if you have a lot of work for example.  So that was my 
biggest depression last year.  Yeah, two years ago I moved to London and I lived in a 
really good house and then we have to move out.  And we had a flat and we had to 
share it though. I think it was a three-bedroom flat but we share the flat with four 
people so we had no living room.  We only had our rooms.  It was tiny and it was 
horrible and I felt really depressed because of that.  And I start to hate London 
really.  And then after eight months or something, we moved to a new house and it’s 
big, it’s lovely.  So after that I felt really good.  And it also kind of explains my 
depression when I put a lot of pressure on myself.  For example work-wise because I 
always want to achieve a lot and I want to…I don’t like failures so I always want to 
be really good in my job.  And you come home and you don’t feel or you don’t feel 
good when you come home, that puts a lot of pressure on me.  So I need, I need 
yeah a beautiful place really to live in.  And yeah, I think that’s it. 
69. S1: Yeah, thank you.  I’m struck by how much there is about home in all of that. 
70. S5: Yeah, because I love, I love my home.  I love my room basically. 
71. S1: And you moved home in a profound way.  You came from [country] over to 
London and you changed your location.  And can you just say a little bit about the 
feelings?  When you mentioned the depression, how would you describe how it felt? 
72. S5: It is…I don’t know maybe it’s just, how do you say?  If it’s too small, the walls 
are coming towards you.  You feel like that.  It’s just like, “Oh my god.  I need to get 
out.  I need to get out.”  And as I said then I need to when I come home I want to 
calm down and just relax sit on my bed for example and listen to music and feel 
good.  And if I can’t do that, if I don’t feel homey then I’m like, “Oh shit, I need to get 
out.”  It’s just, yeah.  It’s a very important part of my life really to have a beautiful 
home and wasn’t able to have that last year. 
73. S1: It’s interesting how it’s another different view of different things.  And I was 
thinking with what…there’s something about your environment… 
74. S5: Yeah, very much. 
75. S1: …in this home is something like what you said about you, what it’s like 
where you are physically, where you are and how that might that affect you when 
that changes. 
76. S5: And I think it kind of affects your whole life or my life because I put a lot of 
pressure on me anyway.  And if I don’t have a place to hide (Laughter) then yeah. 
77. S1: So that…there’s kind of retreat element, something like that. 
78. S5: Yeah, exactly, yeah, yeah. 
79. S1: Somewhere to go to. 
80. S5: I feel safe, to feel safe, to feel comfortable. 
81. S1:  And if that’s not quite as you wanted it 
82. S5: Yeah, then you have more depression really. 
83. S1: Yeah, yeah. 
84. S5: I’m more depressed then.   
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85. S1: Okay, so.  So what I would like to do is just go around and just get each of 
you to talk about the pictures, what they remind you of and so on.  So, does anyone 
want to begin? 
86. S2: I’ll go.  Actually it’s this one because actually like when I’m depressed I find it 
really hard to be sociable and I don’t want really to see people.  I don’t know if it’s 
because I just…I don’t know if they’ll understand or I just feel quiet and therefore I 
feel really self-aware and uncomfortable in a social setting.  So I tend to just kind of 
stay in my room and turn away from people.  And it’s hard that you talk about 
because your mind is quite scrambled about exactly what the cause is.  It’s hard to 
kind of verbalise why you’re feeling how you’re feeling.  It’s easier to just to kind of 
escape. 
87. S1: Okay.  And is that different to how you normally are or…? 
88. S2: Yeah, I can be quite a social.  But if I’m in a particular mood and I have felt 
that I’m trying to teach myself when I am feeling down or depressed to kind of force 
myself into a social situation especially with good friends because I feel that helps 
me.  Like I sometimes feel like I, that people that I trust…I don’t really trust that 
people understand or get it and they do you know like most people and that’s been 
a learning process and then feeling safer to just kind of go out and if you’re feeling 
quiet, be quiet and just be whatever state you’re in and then it kind of helped to 
relax and kind of open up a bit more and feel better I think.  But it’s been a hard 
thing to learn.  I’m still not very good at it.  
89. S1: Mmm.  It sounds like something that you do have to make yourself do this 
or…? 
90. S2: Kind of yeah. 
91. S1: Right. 
92. S2: Yeah, yeah, I do.  Sometimes it doesn’t work, sometimes it ends up leaving 
or feeling a bit fragile but it can be really good for me I think because I think that my 
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depression’s often link to anxieties so like a social anxiety kind of you know 
exacerbates it a little bit I think.   
93. S1: So there’s something about moving away from others?  Is that right?  
94. S2: Yeah, yeah.  There’s a couple of people I think in my life that I feel okay 
being that way with them but only a couple. 
95. S1: And just one more thing, you can just…again, I want you to answer what you 
feel comfortable with.   
96. S2: Yeah. 
97. S1: But so there’s something in the moving away from others is there something 
about not showing yourself?  I’m just trying to understand that. 
98. S2: I think so.  I think it’s like a self-consciousness about being depressed you 
know… 
99. S1: Right. 
100. S2: …and being like a drag on other people.  Or it also not making sense in a way 
like it’s not a reason like it’s easy.  It should be like you know that I’m able to think 
that I’m sad for this reason you know.  I failed an exam.  I broke up with my 
boyfriend, whatever it is, that’s much easier to talk about. But I think depression for 
me is more like this kind of like you just don’t know really what the source is 
sometimes and it doesn’t make sense.  So it’s easier just to kind of turn away. 
101. S1: Okay.  Thank you.  Thank you for starting as well.  So anyone else want to go 
next?   
102. S3: I chose this one because she’s in…it seems to be sunny, nice weather and 
nice environment.  There seems to be no reason to be depressed but she is kind of 
sulking.  And I associate that with…even though I have no reason, supposedly no 
reason to be depressed you still kind of feel depressed and that sets the frustration.  
And also that kind of pressure to be happy.  That’s where depression often comes 
from for me.  That sense of kind of needing to be [inaudible 00:04:25] and get on 
with things and enjoy what you have and make the most of the things and to 
succeed.  So, but then still to feel depressed is a sense of kind of I guess failure or 
not being able to sort of get on in that but yeah.  So that’s why I chose that one.  But 
again, I agree with [name removed].  Depression for me is that ambiguity not 
knowing what the source.  If I feel sad, I’m sad about a particular thing and it’s quite 
clear how to process that or deal with that.  The depression is that murky ambiguity 
as to where it’s coming from and not knowing what to do about it.  And it…like in 
the situation perceiving it. You can’t understand why you should be depressed and 
they have negative...on the surface, there seems to be no reason why it should be. 
103. S1: Mmm.  I’m struck that might also…there’s something about not knowing the 
cause yourself and there not being an obvious reason. 
104. S3: Yeah and you don’t want to come across as being sort of mope or not 
maybe…. 
105. S2: Yeah, you feel kind of guilty that you are because you can’t explain it like 
and you should, like have the most lucky, fortunate life ever and it something as the 
same thing as my life I can’t explain it sometimes and I kind of beat myself up over 
feeling this way because it’s absolutely no reason you know which kind of is a bit of 
confusing and a struggle. (Laughter) 
106. S3: There’s no place for it and there’s no understanding in…in cultural society.  
There’s no…there’s no, yeah there’s no place for it. 
107. S4: I find it also becomes like a bit of a battle between wanting to not burden 
others whether or not get [inaudible 00:06:27] but then also trying to sort of, I guess 
a cry for help a little bit and try to want people to sort of find out and ask you and 
sort of help.  But even that you don’t so it becomes this kind of two-way thing where 
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you know…you don’t know the source and you don’t know it yourself but you want, 
so you don’t want to like burden others but then you just don’t want to…you don’t 
want to cope alone. 
108. S2: (Overlapping Conversation). 
109. S3: You don’t want to be a drag.   
110. S1: Thank you.  Anyone else?  Who wants to go next? 
111. S4: I’ll go next. 
112. S1: [name removed], do you want to go next?   
113. S4: Sure. 
114. S1: Okay. 
115. S4: So these two.  This one, that’s what I chose because it’s a bottle and for me 
depression is kind of linked with alcohol in a way.  I’m not really sure of the 
relationship between the two yet but they…it exists in some way.  I don’t know… 
116. S1: Okay. 
117. S4: I don’t know if it’s causal or if it’s you know often it’s sort of self-treatment 
and escape.  Sometimes it exacerbates it but sometimes it also can actually like help 
it sometimes.  I feel like if you have, you’d have a drink with friends and you sort of 
forget about and then it can…but other times, it doesn’t work at all and it sort of 
comes back.  But also I think there’s like a link between that and the idea that when 
you’re not depressed and you’re happy, a lot of the…a lot of the format in which we 
share that happiness with others well, me and my friends anyway is drinking so you 
go out.  When you’re happy, you go out and you drink and it’s really fun.  So then a 
lot of the time, if you’re depressed you drink because you want to sort of relive that 
kind of you know that sort of happy, social environment when really you’re not 
feeling like that.  And then if you’re drinking, when you’re feeling like that it can 
often make it worse.  So I think it can be hard to sort of be honest about how you’re 
feeling and then sort of react to it accordingly like with the sort of social, being social 
and being with people and drinking.  And also in my family, we’ve got like a history 
of sort of depression and alcoholism amongst like the men so.  And also it comes 
into this kind of fear thing about you know like I’m sort of scared of that, of drinking 
and feeling depressed because anything like, “Am I going to….?”  And you know but 
then you don’t want like to not drink at all because it’s something that you do for 
fun with your friends and so yeah, it’s linked somehow through alcohol I think. 
118. S1: Okay.  So there’s something about alcohol and coping which may or may not 
work and I get the sense…again, you have to tell me when this is wrong.  I...got a 
sense that you might not know actually if it will work or not… 
119. S4: Yeah. 
120. S1: …and also it’s something perhaps for you that’s a bit different perhaps to 
some others which is if you have a history in your family then that might already be 
in your mind and have some kind of influence or at least colour the way you think 
about. 
121. S4: Yeah.  Well, that’s…I’m never sure whether it’s like you know if that’s a 
genetic thing, can be a genetic thing.  But I don’t know if it’s just like your awareness 
of that existence or that history can be influencing it or whether it is just purely the 
genetic thing because often just, as soon as you become aware that that’s there, 
then the fear of it you kind of like, becomes like a psychosomatic exacerbation of 
that thing and it becomes this fear thing.  So you’ll never know whether it is actually 
that you have that gene or I don’t know if the genes are really there or whatever so.   
122. S1: So that’s a mixed feeling as well? 
123. S4: Mm. 
124. S1: That together? 
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125. S4: Yeah. 
126. S1: Okay.  Thank you very much.  Thank you, [name removed].  So anyone else? 
127. S5: I think for me a lot of the time I feel like I’m kind of opposite to yours.  I feel 
like I know the cause of the depression but there isn’t much that I can do about it 
and there is an acceptance of things that every now and then this deep hole is open 
again and there’s nothing you can do about it until something makes that okay 
again.  And yeah, I guess whatever that something is it changes each time.  And so 
yeah, maybe that is not knowing what that will be.  But I chose this picture.  Because 
it feels yeah, very like isolating and heavy like lead and dust at the same time.  And I 
also chose this picture because sometimes I feel it’s…there’s so much happening in 
like so much of what is being processed, it’s all in the head.  But then when you look 
at yourself in the mirror, you don’t even recognize who that person is.   
128. S1: Thanks, so there’s something, I’m struck that for you there’s something 
different, that you feel that you know there’s something causing the depression? 
129. S5: Mm. 
130. S1: Is that right? …or you think the cause is the same or…? 
131. S5: I think often it comes back to the same thing.  And um…I guess like it’s like of 
the family and not having any support or network in that way.  And yeah, I think and 
some other things you know that spread off from that but I think a lot of the time in 
the end it does kind of cycle back to that in a way.  And different things can, can 
trigger it.  But yeah. 
132. S1: Okay.  Thank you. 
133. S3: Can I just say something?  
134. S1: Please yes 
135. S3: I agree with what you said about you know I guess I could say that I do, 
could feel depressed about something in particular but the ambiguity then comes 
from like you said not knowing how, what to do about it, how are you going to get 
out of that, this problem.  So like say if I was sad about someone dying, I wouldn’t 
call...me personally I wouldn’t call that depression because it’s just a problem and 
there’s no you know.  You just got to deal with it.  But having, almost having like a 
problem that you could possibly solve in some way that you could but not knowing 
how to get out of that or how maybe whether you’ve been stuck in the dilemma as 
to how to deal with this problem.  So then that ambiguity comes back and so 
whether you’re being sort of selfish or unreasonable or something. 
136. S4: I think sometimes it’s wrong with looking for like…I know what you’re saying 
about sort of possibly knowing the reasons but a lot of the time it feels as though 
that that’s like a story you’ve created or like… 
137. S5: Yeah. 
138. S4: …through you know you look out for your history or past or whatever, 
whatever may have happened and you sort of create a story around it and you think 
maybe this is to construct this narrative to give it like you know a basis for where 
you sort of, depressions come from but then you’re not really sure if that’s the right 
reason anyway.  So things like, I’m going to go like push down some path of trying to 
solve but we don’t really know if that’s the way yeah. 
139. S3: Only if it’s a reason like maybe just complain when you shouldn’t. 
140. S5: Or unlike…. 
141. S4: Yeah, it’s like get on with it kind of…. 
142. S2: Or it’s just giving you a basis like to me, “Okay, that’s what it is.  That’s what 
it is.” (Laughter) 
143. S5: It sounds like you kind of want to know so you can have some relief. 
144. S2: Yeah. 
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145. S5: You can put it then you can fix it.  But you can’t because it’s harder to fix.   
146. S2: So it’s that sense of like another problem which is kind of more 
straightforward and practical and you can find a solution even if there’s a cause 
when in it that stage there’s like you don’t have the energy or initiative or objectivity 
to kind of solve it you know.  It’s like so murky and you can’t kind of approach as an 
objective problem or to see in a different way it’s because you have got lost in it you 
know.   
147. S1: Thank you.  So we have three people left. 
148. S6: I can go next.  I speak French so it’s very hard for me to explain it so I’ll try 
my best. 
149. S1: That’s fine.  Take your time. 
150. S6: (Laughter) Well, I choose this one just because the stare that…so you have 
the person because for me all the time, I’m depression like you get scared.  It’s like 
let’s have…it’s I assume lots of thinking, lots of not sleeping.  It’s also like a big pile of 
links you know like [inaudible 00:16:18] so it’s like you want to see anything or not 
be able to, it’s just lots of like kind of negative things at the same time but you’re so 
stuck into yourself that you can’t really figure out you know which way then 
you…you feel like, you’re so much into yourself that there’s no way out of the issues.  
And, but for I’m going to say I’m not really used to talking about it because... 
151. S1: That’s fine.  That’s fine.   
152. S6: But for me it’s really about, yeah not being able to achieve things whether 
it’s a small thing or not.  So I could go from extreme laziness to not taking care of 
yourself, not going to work, not answering to your friends and also like again it’s, it’s 
a tricky, quite a tricky game because you can’t really…even though you can’t really 
put an event on it or one thing on it, it’s a blend of let’s say of different human 
reaction like frustration you know so like I don’t know. You know of being tired and 
not really being happy in general or that type of self and…I mean of course that 
makes sense but I think that’s the reason why nobody can really explain, yeah that’s 
here because that’s too…yeah, that’s too tangled into…and there’s also this horrible 
feeling of not, yeah, again I’ve not…because you have some of these things in your 
head like you can’t really…you’re like, “Oh my god.  I’ll never be able to do that kind 
of thing because I have to pay my bills.  I have to pay this and that.”  So it starts from 
here but ends just like really build up and then I just go back to…to other foundation 
pretty much of what you’ve learned from your parents, in education then having 
friends and…so it’s always like you question yourself about everything.  So for me, 
that’s the reason why I chose this picture because it just makes you guilty.  You lie 
because you can’t really…again, it’s like stillness like you can’t even move. 
 
